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INTRODUCTION

WRITING about religion in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the sixties, the late Walter Kolarz documented its survival in a book of that title. He said that no quantitative analysis of the situation was possible, that Soviet society was affected not only by the official policy of the atheist state, but also by the universal secular effects of industrialisation and urbanisation, and yet that religion survived in the Soviet Union. 'One would have to look into the depths of every human soul in Russia if one wanted to investigate how much religious thinking still exists after so many years of communist rule'.

Since that time Soviet sociologists have undertaken what is called 'concrete sociological research into the religious beliefs of the population', although not yet 'on a scale to embrace the whole country' (*Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, no. 4, 1967). However, these attempts are unlikely to give an answer to Mr Kolarz's question. On the other hand evidence of a different kind, which supplements the findings of Soviet sociologists, indicates that it is no longer just a question of the survival of religion in the USSR, but of a certain revival of religious attitudes. It is no longer a question of *babushkas* and old believers, or of what is officially known as 'religious survivals in human consciousness', but of a new phenomenon, a rebirth of religious attitudes which affects part of the new intelligentsia and of the general public, and which is not confined to the older generation but is found among young people as well.

Communism has been called a religion so many times that an important difference is often lost sight of, namely that the question here is not only the organisation of beliefs, but their content. Transcendental problems simply do not fall within the scope of the secular doctrine. That means that a revival of interest in existential, and not just social, problems has naturally a strong affinity to religious interest. It is of course impossible to say how many people embrace religion as a result of existential *Angst*, but what we do know is that recently there have been many indications of increased existential preoccupations manifested in literature, in the activities of religious sects, in the movement towards the regeneration of the Orthodox Church, and in the protests of the younger priests. That does not mean that every existential anxiety manifested in Soviet literature can automatically be treated as leading to transcendental religious answers. In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, matters are more complicated than that, and the spectrum of attitudes probably even more fuzzy, for good historical reasons. Yet even so it is clear from the material presented in this issue of SURVEY that the present trend is, in however limited a sense, more favourable to religion.

Many contributions in this issue were originally presented as papers at a conference on 'Religious and Intellectual Ferment in the USSR' organised by the *Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Réligieuses* in Geneva, to whom we wish to express our gratitude.

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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE USSR

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

THE Bolshevik victory in Russia created an unprecedented problem of the relationship between the church and a state ideologically committed to the complete elimination of religion among its subjects. Over the fifty years following the Revolution, the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet state evolved from their initial open conflict, through the weakening, division, and decimation of the church towards a *modus vivendi* whereby the church secured a measure of legality and toleration for limited and closely policed activities; in return it pledged its unconditional loyalty to the Soviet state and positive support of the latter's policies, at the price of alienating those members of the church who considered this compromise a surrender of the church's spiritual mission and moral integrity. Unlike the Orthodox, some other religious groups, in particular the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists, were able to establish at first a mutually satisfactory relationship with the new regime, which was willing to make substantial concessions to the sectarian groups, previously discriminated against, in the hope of reaping economic and political benefits from their good will and collaboration. Eventually, by 1929, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists found themselves in a position similar to that of the former established church, struggling for survival during the years of anti-religious terror to re-emerge in the 1940s among the beneficiaries of Stalin's 'religious Nep'. The early difference in the Soviet treatment of the Orthodox Church and the sectarians, as well as the contrast between Stalin's religious policy after 1941, and policies pursued during the 1930s and since the late fifties, indicate that it was not only ideological considerations which determined the Soviet line on religion. Undoubtedly, Marxist atheism with its militant Leninist bent, has had an important and continuous influence on the nature of church-state relations in the Soviet Union, but other factors must not be ignored—the tenacity of religious beliefs among the population, the regime's overriding concern for its political survival, the reaction of the country's friends and enemies abroad, and the government's pragmatic inclination to utilise particular religious groups to further its principal political objectives at home and abroad.

Relations between religious groups and the Soviet state were also shaped by the regime's tendency to extend its control and direction into every type of social relations, to absorb into the all-embracing pattern of the Bolshevik dictatorship all social institutions, and to destroy those of them which could not be transformed into the transmission belts of the party will. With no scope left for an autonomous group life, and in

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the absence of effective legal restraints upon the arbitrariness of the state, the notions of 'freedom of conscience' and the 'separation of church and state' became constitutional fictions designed to conceal the actual state of affairs. Constructed around these notions, the official theories of church-state relations which have been espoused by the Soviet government and the loyal religious organisations, bear only a superficial resemblance to the familiar western concepts of the separation of church and state as implemented in the United States or France, especially as these theories treat the Soviet state in isolation from the ruling Communist Party, and represent, or rather misrepresent the former as an ideologically neutral, impartial *Rechtsstaat* extending equal protection to believers and to atheists. From the earliest days of the regime, Soviet legislation and administrative practice have deviated from this constitutional fiction, since the classical liberal concepts of freedom of conscience and separation of church and state, of religion being a private matter for the state, could not be reconciled with the ruling *Weltanschauung* which demands an ideologically committed, 'confessional' state. Accordingly, one must look beyond the official theory of church-state relations in the USSR to the actual practices of the regime to discover what are the operative principles guiding the state's relations with religious groups.

IN his programmatic writings before 1917, Lenin drew an important distinction between the party's and the state's attitude towards religion. Rejecting the common programmatic postulate of the western Marxist parties that religion was the private concern of each individual, Lenin committed the Bolsheviks, from 1905, to a systematic anti-religious propaganda aiming at the eventual elimination of 'religious prejudices'.[1] In 1909, he qualified his position by insisting that Bolshevik anti-religious work must be subordinated to the party's larger political objectives.[2]

As for the state's attitude towards religion, Lenin's pre-revolutionary writings reflected the standard social-democratic position favouring constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience, separation of church and state, secularisation of education, and nationalisation of ecclesiastic and monastic lands. In 1903 he wrote:

> Everyone should have full freedom not only to adhere to the faith of his choice but also to propagate any creed. . . . All confessions should be equal before the law. The priests of different faiths may be maintained by those belonging to the given creed and the state must not use public funds to support any confession.[3]

In 'Socialism and Religion' (1905), already quoted, Lenin further elaborated his notion of church-state relations:

[1] 'Sotsializm i religiia', in V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (5th ed. Moscow, 1960), XII, 143–45.
[2] 'Ob otnoshenii rabochei partii k religii', ibid. XVII, 421.
[3] 'K derevenskoi bednote', ibid. VII 173.

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> The state must not concern itself with religion; religious societies must not be connected with the state power. Everyone should be absolutely free to profess whatever religion he prefers or to recognise no religion. . . . There must be no discrimination whatever in the rights of citizens on religious grounds . . . no state grants must be made to ecclesiastic and religious societies which must become absolutely independent, voluntary associations of like-minded citizens.

These demands, clearly, were addressed to the Tsarist regime; their implementation was regarded as one of the important tasks of a 'bourgeois democratic' revolution.

Following the March 1917 revolution, the short-lived Provisional Government undertook to modify church-state relations in Russia. It ended legal discrimination against religious minorities and took important steps towards the emancipation of the church from its tutelage under the governmental bureaucracy and towards the secularisation of education.[4] The final determination of the future relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state was left, however, to the local *Sobor* and to the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.[5]

Having overthrown the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, proceeded to carry out individual provisions of their ecclesiastical programme—in particular the nationalisation of monastic and church lands, the transfer to the Commissariat of Education of all church schools, including theological seminaries and academies, the abolition of the departments of the former Ministry of Cults, and the dismissal of military chaplains.[6] Faced with the bitterly hostile reaction to these measures on the part of the Orthodox Church, which now challenged the legitimacy of the new regime and called upon the faithful to defy the new ecclesiastical legislation,[7] Lenin's government hastened to introduce and implement far more radical measures with regard to church-state relations than were envisaged in the party's pre-revolutionary programme. Its provisions, designed for a 'bourgeois democratic' system, had become obsolete, and many of the past restraints on the party's anti-religious orientation had disappeared, while the earlier distinction between the state's and the party's attitude towards religion was rapidly losing substance as the state was being transformed into the instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship. To the victorious Bolsheviks, 'freedom of conscience'

[4] For the texts of these laws, see *Sobranie uzakonenii*, I (1917), 2, nos. 1014, 1099, 1134.

[5] There was a wide consensus within the Russian Orthodox Church following the fall of the monarchy that the church ought to be freed from state domination; but at the same time the great majority of the clergy and the entire episcopate continued to insist on the retention of most of the church's former privileges. Cf. J. Schweigl, 'Die Hierarchen der getrennter Orthodoxie in Sowjetrussland', *Orientalia Christiana*, June 1928, 29–31.

[6] *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii Rabochego i Krestianskogo Pravitelstva*, no. 1, 1917, 3; no. 9, 1917, 126; no. 16, 1918, 237.

[7] See Patriarch Tikhon's message of 1 February 1918, cited in full in B. Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1959), 36–37.

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could now only stand for the 'freeing of conscience from the fetters of religion', accordingly, the terms of the separation of church and state had to be formulated to speed up the elimination of religion from society. This, however, was bound to be a protracted process; the immediate problem, as Lenin saw it, was to destroy the power of the clergy, to eliminate the Orthodox Church as a hostile political force capable of rallying the temporarily dispersed foes of the regime for a holy war against Bolshevism. Lenin's tactics, as they unfolded during the first years of the Soviet regime, were to deprive the church of its means of subsistence and communication, disrupt its centralised organisation, and establish an effective policing of ecclesiastical activities. At the same time, so long as the regime's survival remained uncertain, Lenin was determined to avoid an open conflict with the Orthodox masses and to woo the once persecuted religious minorities. For tactical and propaganda reasons, no attempt was made to formally revise the now obsolete pre-revolutionary Bolshevik theory of church-state relations, despite the increasingly obvious contradiction between this theory and Soviet legislation and administrative practice in ecclesiastical matters.

The decree of the Council of People's Commissars 'on the Separation of Church from the State and of School from the Church', as promulgated on 5 February 1918,[8] bore a superficial resemblance to its alleged French and American models[9]: it disestablished the Orthodox Church, and banned any state or public subsidies to religious groups; the legal status of all religious denominations and of believers and non-believers was made uniform, religion was eliminated from public life and education, along with any reference in official documents to citizens' beliefs; all religious associations were made subject to the ordinary legislation governing private societies, and were allowed 'free performance of religious rites so long as it does not disturb public order, or interfere with the rights of citizens'.[10] Significantly, however, the decree restricted religious activities to the performance of 'rites', and prohibited religious associations from imposing compulsory fees and contributions, as well as punishment upon their members. The most sweeping provisions appeared in the last two paragraphs: borrowing from the enactments of the Paris Commune, the decree nationalised the entire property of all religious groups, including church buildings and their contents, which from now on were to be leased free of charge to the believers by the state authorities; moreover, and without precedent in ecclesiastical legislation of any modern state, all churches and sects were deprived of the rights of a juridical person, including the right to own property. These two paragraphs of the decree not only created

8 *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii*, no. 18, 1918, 263. On the circumstances in which the decree was prepared, see M. I. Shakhnovich, *Lenin i problemy ateizma* (Moscow, 1961), 566–72.

9 See M. A. Reisner, 'Razdelenie tserkvi i gosudarstva', *Izvestiya*, 25 January 1918.

10 This particular provision of the decree has been most often cited in support of the regime's limitations on religious practices.

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insoluble legal problems for religious groups,[11] but, by vesting the control over the physical requisites of religious practice in the Soviet authorities, placed the latter in a strategic position from which they could both manipulate churches and sects for political ends and eventually deal a fatal blow at overt religious group activities.

BEFORE Lenin died, the basic framework of Soviet legislation on religion had been completed. Under this legislation, religious organisations ceased to exist as corporate, hierarchically ordered national bodies: the Moscow Patriarchate, its diocesan administrations and deaneries, were now reduced to an extra-legal if not illegal existence. The law now recognised only local 'religious associations'—groups of at least twenty believers (the so-called *dvadtsatki*)—which, after their registration by the local Soviets, could lease from them houses of worship and liturgical objects.[12] Such associations could hire 'servants of the cult', who were later also made subject to registration by the authorities.[13] It was forbidden to offer any organised instruction in religion to persons under 18 years of age, and, though the church could theoretically reopen theological schools, and issue religious publications, the exercise of these rights became dependent on prior official sanction and the supply of facilities. Conferences of representatives of local religious associations at regional and national levels were made subject to many restrictive provisions and could be held only with the approval of the authorities.[14]

All clergymen, monks, and nuns were disfranchised by the 1918 Constitution (Para. 65 (d)) which, in practice, deprived them of civil and economic rights and subjected them, along with other 'non-toiling elements', to the highest tax rates. Ambiguously worded provisions of the RSFSR Criminal Code (Arts. 83, 119, 120) blurred the dividing line between the 'legal' and 'illegal' conduct of the clergy. Though the Constitution permitted 'religious propaganda'[15] (along with 'anti-religious propaganda'), 'servants of religion' could now be imprisoned for disseminating the creed among minors, for 'propaganda aimed at

[11] V. Gsovsky raises in this connection the question of the ownership of the funds pooled from voluntary donations to pay for the parish expenses. *Fordham Law Review*, January 1939, 14.

[12] Though, nominally, churches were leased 'free of charge', congregations had to pay the land rent (in cities), the annual local tax amounting to ½ per cent of the value of the building, as well as rental charges for any other buildings located on the church plot. See N. Orleanskii, *Zakon o religioznykh obedineniiakh RSFSR* (Moscow, 1930), 69–71.

[13] Para. 4 (c) of the Instruction of the Commissariats of Justice and Internal Affairs 'Concerning the Registration of Religious Societies and Issue of Permits for Convocation of Their Congresses', *Izvestiya*, 27 April 1923.

[14] Resolution of the Commissariat of Education, 3 April 1919; of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 13 June, 1921; Art. 121 of the 1922 Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

[15] According to P. A. Krasikov, this was 'a compromise with the age-long religious prejudices, still so strong in the Russian village' ('Sovetskaia politika v religioznom voprose', *Revoliutsiia i tserkov'*, no. 1, 1919, 8).

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inciting national and religious enmity', or for carrying out 'fraudulent activities [designed] to awaken superstitions in the masses of the people in order to obtain advantages in this way'. In violation of its own laws, the regime intervened in matters of the Orthodox creed and rite, attacking the cult of the relics of saints and ordering, in 1920, their 'complete liquidation'.[16] Similarly, without bothering to pass a law to this effect, the government encouraged the local authorities to undertake a 'painless but thorough liquidation of the monasteries'.[17]

Rather than separating church and state, the combined effect of the 1918 decree, as interpreted and supplemented by the authorities in the following years, was to surround the activities of religious groups with an ever tightening network of administrative and police controls, and to involve the state agencies increasingly in the internal affairs of churches and sects. From the very beginning, these agencies—in particular the special departments of the Commissariats of Justice and Internal Affairs and the Cheka-GPU[18]—were entrusted with such irreconcilable tasks as the implementation of the separation of church and state, protecting freedom of conscience, the political manipulation of religious groups, the conduct of anti-religious propaganda, and combating of 'counter-revolution' by the churches. Working under formal and secret bodies set up at the top governmental and party levels,[19] and guided at times by secret directives violating Soviet laws, these agencies were bound to develop a vested interest in the continuing illegality and arbitrariness in dealing with the bearers of the only 'reactionary ideology' openly surviving in the USSR.

BY 1929 a major turning point had been reached by the Soviet regime: overt opposition to Bolshevik rule had been suppressed and, within the ruling party, Stalin had defeated or isolated his rivals, setting the stage for the consolidation of his personal dictatorship. Secure from outside intervention, the regime now felt strong enough to withdraw concessions to the peasantry which blocked the way to the realisation of the programme of rapid industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture. In the process of massive regimentation of society required for the consummation of this 'second revolution', the remnants

16 *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii*, no. 73, 27 August 1920, 354.
17 *Revoliutsiia i tserkov*, no. 9–12, 1920, 83.
18 The department for the Implementation of the Separation of the Church from the State, otherwise known as the Eighth and, later, Fifth Department of the Commissariat of Justice, existed from 1918 to 1924, under Krasikov. Within the NKVD, equivalent functions were assigned to a Section of Cults within the administrative department. Within the Cheka—GPU, a secret sub-division for ecclesiastical affairs was headed during the 1920s by E. Tuchkov. In 1924, a higher level agency was formed to coordinate governmental controls over religion, in the form of a Secretariat for the Affairs of Cults attached to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (renamed in 1929 The Permanent Commission of the *VTsIK* for the Affairs of Cults).
19 In 1922, a standing Commission on the Implementation of the Decree on the Separation of Church from the State was formed at Central Committee level, under Yaroslavsky, who displaced Trotsky as the man in charge of anti-religious work.

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of individual and group freedom and national autonomy were to be sacrificed at the altar of the totalitarian state.

In the realm of church-state relations, the year 1929 marked the disintegration of the *modus vivendi* attained by religious groups in the preceding years, with the Soviet regime opening the first in a series of devastating attacks on religion designed to realise its objective of a completely godless society. A constitutional amendment withdrew from churches and sects the right of religious propaganda which, according to an authoritative commentary, was nothing but the 'right to conduct anti-Soviet agitation and struggle against any measures of the Soviet regime . . . while concealing this propaganda behind citations from their ecclesiastical books and references to church customs and Christian morality'.[20] While anti-religious propaganda was now made obligatory for state institutions, including the hitherto 'areligious' schools,[21] the new constitutional formula was officially interpreted as limiting believers to the performance of religious rites only among themselves:

> . . . the recruitment of new cadres of toilers, especially of children, into the ranks of supporters of religion (which, obviously, can be achieved only by speculating on their economic dependence, on inadequate class consciousness, or the absence of elementary scientific education) is without doubt a harmful activity from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletariat and the conscious peasantry. Obviously, this activity cannot in any way be protected by the law nor come under the meaning of 'freedom of religious confession'. Accordingly, any propaganda or agitation by the adherents of the church and religion (all the more, of a 'missionary' kind) cannot be viewed as a lawful activity; on the contrary, it shall be regarded as exceeding the limits of freedom of conscience . . . and violating the criminal and civil codes.[22]

The new Law on Religious Associations of 8 April 1929, codifying and revising all previous ecclesiastical legislation, prohibited churches and sects from organising any auxiliary societies, groups, or circles, and provided for an even more pervasive governmental control over the internal activities of religious associations. Under the new legislation as interpreted by the authorities, all local, regional, or national meetings of religious associations had to have their agenda approved in advance; government and police representatives were now empowered to attend 'any meeting of believers to look after order and security', and to close such a gathering whenever it departed from the approved agenda or whenever appeals for violation of the law were made. Minutes, reports, resolutions, and lists of officers elected at such meetings had to be submitted to the NKVD agencies, which could remove any officer 'who had discredited himself before the state authorities'. Complete lists of

[20] Amendment to Art. 4 (1) of the Constitution of the RSFSR, passed on 16 May 1929; Orleanskii, op. cit. 47.

[21] The Directive of the Commissariat of Education of 28 March 1929, cited in Gsovsky, loc. cit. 22.

[22] Orleanskii, op cit. 47.

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members of religious associations had to be submitted to the same agencies every year. The new provisions increased the already heavy burdens and risks assumed by members of the 'twenties' and made the tenure of the churches by religious associations extremely insecure; not only were the authorities given practically unlimited power to cancel church leases and withdraw registration from local congregations, but prayer houses could now be closed at the request of the majority of the local 'toilers'. 'Servants of religion' (including bishops) were now to restrict their activities (save by special permission of the authorities) to the single local religious association listed on their registration.[23]

While formally the selection of the clergy depended on the local 'twenty', the discretionary power of the authorities to grant or deny registration to any clergyman, left to them, in effect, the final decision as to who should be admitted to legal priestly activities, a power which the government used to the full to purge the church of its best priests and to corrupt and intimidate the weaker characters into serving the regime.[24]

Although hostility towards religion was an important motive in promulgating these measures, the rapid deterioration of the status of organised religion in the USSR, beginning with 1929, appears to have been an integral part of the general process by which the Soviet system assumed its totalitarian character; this involved the destruction of social institutions which could not be fully assimilated into the system, and reliance on 'prophylactic' terror and perversion of 'socialist legality'. These developments served to widen still further the gap between actual practice and the constitutional notion of church-state relations, embodied in the new federal constitution of 1936 (Art. 124) in the familiar terms of the separation of church and state and 'freedom of religious worship'. The much publicised restoration of electoral rights to the 'servants of religion' in the constitution had little effect on the steadily deteriorating fortunes of the clergy; the surviving religious associations were on their way to near complete extinction in the purges of the *Ezhovshchina*.

A VARIETY of not wholly congruous elements combined to shape the actual Bolshevik attitudes towards the church and religion. Among them were the notion of religion as a reactionary anti-scientific ideology, born of man's fear and ignorance and exploited by the dominant classes with the help of the clergy to dupe the toiling masses and thus thwart their revolutionary impulses; the long-standing hostility

[23] Art. 17 of the new law prohibited religious organisations from forming 'mutual credit societies, cooperatives, or commercial undertakings . . . special prayer or other meetings for children, young people or women, or, generally, meetings, groups, circles or departments for biblical or literary studies, sewing, working, or the teaching of religion', as well as from offering material or medical assistance to their members.

[24] See the account of Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresenskii) of Lithuania and Vilna, 'Tserkov v SSSR pered voinoi', *Rossiia*, 10 October 1945.

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towards the Russian Orthodox Church, especially its episcopate and monastic clergy, as the chief apologist before 1917 for the existing political and social order, and as an ally of the extreme Russian right; and traces of the old populist sympathy for the persecuted religious dissenters as the misguided radical vanguard of the peasant masses. At the same time, in their treatment of ecclesiastical questions, the Bolsheviks displayed such familiar traits as the deeply rooted distrust of the masses' rationality; the inclination to substitute force and manipulation for the slowly-working socio-economic processes that, along with education, were to raise the 'consciousness' of the people; and the readiness to sacrifice ideological scruples for the sake of immediate political advantage.

Out of this Leninist syndrome emerged the 'private' Bolshevik image of the church in Soviet society as a species of commercialised social vice [25] catering to the needs of the backward masses and diverting them from socially useful endeavours, a vice providing a livelihood for a parasitic stratum of the clergy which was inherently hostile to the communist world-view and determined to subvert the Soviet order. Accordingly, so long as a large part of society remained addicted to 'spiritual *sivukha*', the state could not completely suppress religion without endangering the regime's existence. It must, nevertheless, attempt to minimise the influence of religion on society and prevent its further spread through such means as 'unmasking the reactionary nature of religion' and compromising the church and the clergy in the eyes of their followers, the progressive cutting down of the number of licensed churches and clergy, providing antidotes to cure the believers of their addiction, preventing churchmen from recruiting new adherents, and, especially, inoculating children and young persons against religion. The security agencies must maintain continuous and close surveillance over the dispensers of 'religious opium' to prevent them from violating these restrictions and from using their power over the believers against the interests of the Soviet system; at the same time, the state must withdraw for socially useful purposes the profits accumulated by the clergy from their 'fraudulent activities'.

While sharing this notion of religion and the ultimate objective of a completely atheistic society, the Bolsheviks have differed, from the earliest days of their regime, over the role to be assigned to the state and law (as against the party and 'mass organisations') in combating religion, over the speed and methods of anti-religious struggle and the tactical uses of religion. Perhaps of greatest significance for the course of church-state relations in the USSR was the opposition between the 'fundamentalist' tendency, entrenched primarily in the party *agitprop* and the Komsomol apparatus, and the 'pragmatic' orientation displayed in the ranks of 'practical' state workers, and, paradoxically, the police.

Characteristic of the first tendency was the emphasis on a continuous

[25] Cf. Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresenskii), loc. cit., 9 October 1945.

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and intense anti-religious struggle, and hostility 'on principle' to all forms of religion and every church and sect. The fundamentalists were opposed to any form of cooperation between church and state, and indeed took the position that the more reactionary and obscurantist the religion, the greater the success that would be achieved by anti-religious propaganda.

The pragmatists—who emphasised Lenin's formula subordinating the anti-religious campaign to the interests of the class struggle—differentiated among religious organisations and factions in terms of their capacity to further or to thwart the current political and economic objectives of the regime; this approach called for rewarding the friends and punishing the enemies of the regime. Less optimistic about the immediate success of atheistic propaganda, they persistently strove to 'Sovietise' religious organisations, both for the sake of the regime's legitimisation among the believing masses and for reasons of internal security; in particular, they were eager to utilise the churches' influence at home and abroad in the interests of the Soviet state.

Lenin, Trotsky, Bonch-Bruevich, and some other Bolshevik leaders vacillated between the two approaches: despite his earlier tirades against the dangers of a 'refined religion' and 'democratic priests', Lenin was not above enlisting collaborators from among the 'progressive clergy' or the 'communistic sectarians'.[26] Indeed, the early Soviet ecclesiastical legislation was in part tailored to improve their relative position vis-à-vis the episcopate and monastics of the Russian Orthodox Church.

As early as December 1919, M. I. Latsis—a high-ranking *chekist*—questioned the official theory of church-state relations by calling upon the regime to assist the 'progressive clergy' openly in their attempts to 'renovate' the Orthodox Church, since 'it is not a matter of indifference to the regime what the church thinks and does'.

> Both the state and the church consist of the same citizens (excluding non-believers). To allow the church to differ from the state means to permit a state within the state which, obviously, cannot be tolerated by any regime, least of all the Soviet . . . Any religion, and any church, if it does not wish to condemn itself to non-existence, should follow the spirit of the times . . . The black clergy will not surrender their position without a struggle. Naturally, the progressive clergy has the right to count on support from the Soviet state and it will find such support if it follows the path charted by the Soviet regime (*Izvestiya*, 2 December 1919).

[26] Thus, e.g. Lenin accepted in 1917, the services of a 'progressive' priest, M. V. Galkin (M. Gorev), later a professional *antireligioznik*, who played an important part in the preparation and implementation of the Separation Decree (see Shakhnovich, op. cit 565). Lenin also supported V. D. Bonch-Bruevich in his work with the sectarians and was instrumental in the adoption of a *Sovnarkom* decree of 4 January 1919, exempting sectarians from military service. In 1921, the Commissariat of Agriculture issued a special appeal 'To Sectarians and Old Believers' inviting them to form agricultural communes.

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This strikingly pragmatic approach to the question of church-state relations was at the time sharply repudiated by Krasikov (head of the Justice Commissariat's department of cults), who argued along the fundamentalist line that the task of the Bolsheviks ought to be the elimination and not a renovation of religion; the Soviet state did not need the church's blessing; moreover, the principle of freedom of conscience could not be reconciled with any 'reunification' of church and state (*Izvestiya*, 14 December 1919).

Nevertheless, it was precisely the line advocated by Latsis that was soon adopted by the regime in offering its support to the 'Living Church' and other 'Renovationist' factions in their 1922–23 attempts to seize control of the Moscow Patriarchate. This policy of enforcing political harmony between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state—which was extended to virtually all other religious groups—involved both the manipulation of Soviet laws and regulations (in particular, those concerning the registration of parish congregations and church leases), and the violation of the existing laws (by the 'legalisation' of pro-Soviet religious centres, i.e. their official recognition by the authorities; by giving legal effect to the decisions of 'loyal' ecclesiastical gatherings and leaders; and by the use of administrative and police sanctions to force 'reactionary' church elements to recognise and obey the 'loyal' ecclesiastical leaders).

From 1922 on, following its victory in the last open church-state battle (over the removal of church valuables), the Bolshevik regime in fact introduced an unwritten but crucially important innovation into its doctrine of church-state relations. Henceforth, the right to enjoy the narrowly circumscribed freedom of religious worship was to be limited to religious groups which supplied positive proofs of their loyalty to the Soviet state. Progressively raised by the regime, the political and moral price to be paid by churches and sects for the uncertain right to legal existence sharply divided their ranks, and those ecclesiastical leaders who were willing to meet the regime's conditions eventually found themselves in the position of docile hostages held captive by the state to ensure the submission of their flock. This line, which with some important variations has been pursued ever since by the Soviet regime, has had momentous consequences for the future of organised religion in the USSR.

THE Russian Orthodox Church and some other religious groups were compelled by the necessities of survival to revise step by step their overt attitude towards the Soviet regime. This painful evolution proceeded essentially through three stages: initial hostility to the Soviet regime and active or moral support of the anti-Bolshevik forces; withdrawal from political activities into a neutral, apolitical position combined with a *de facto* recognition of the new order and professions of loyalty to Soviet authority insofar as its orders would not conflict with religious obligations; and *de jure* recognition of the Soviet regime

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and the church's commitment to unconditional loyalty to the state and positive support of its policies.

The ruthlessness of the Bolshevik measures against the church, and the absence of any massive popular defence of the church's interests, persuaded the Patriarchate to abandon its open opposition to the regime, epitomised in the January 1918 anathematisation of Lenin's government.[27] On 25 September 1919, the Patriarch called upon the clergy to cease their political opposition to the regime.[28] Though it might have been prompted by the Bolshevik announcement of Red Terror, Tikhon's message helped the Patriarchate to survive the defeat of the White armies and provided the basis for a temporary *modus vivendi* with the regime.

Offering the regime *de facto* recognition and civil obedience and renouncing all political activities, the Church hoped to retain freedom from state intervention in its internal affairs and to pursue its spiritual activities freely within the framework of the law. Given the nature of the Bolshevik rule, this attitude could not satisfy the regime, especially after Patriarch Tikhon defied the government on the issue of the confiscation of *consecrated* church objects (to which the state held legal title) for famine relief in 1922.[29]

The arrest of Patriarch Tikhon and reprisals against his followers paved the way for the Renovationist take-over of the Supreme Church Administration and most of the dioceses. The new leadership of the Church—which was promptly recognised by the government and granted concessions hitherto denied to the Patriarchate—undertook to bring church-state relations into line with the demands of the regime.[30] The Renovationist *Sobor* of 1923, in addition to adopting some sweeping canonic reforms, declared Tikhon's 1918 anathema null and void and deposed and unfrocked him. It exonerated the regime from the charge of persecuting religion, endorsing the official view that repressions were applied only to those bishops and clergy who abused their office by conducting political or criminal activities. Moreover, the *Sobor* adopted a pro-Soviet political platform and even attempted to bridge the doctrinal gap between Christianity and communism.

> The *Sobor* declares capitalism a mortal sin and regards the struggle against it as sacred for a Christian. . . . The *Sobor* brands international and domestic counter-revolution and condemns it with its entire religious and moral authority. . . . The Soviet regime, alone

[27] Szczesniak, op. cit.

[28] See M. Polskii, *Novye mucheniki Rossiiskie* (Jordanville, N.Y., 1949), I, 100; and *Pravda*, 24 October 1919. Latsis gives a different date for the Patriarch's message, 21 October 1919.

[29] For Tikhon's 28 February 1922 proclamation, which triggered off the regime's assault on the Patriarchate and eventually led to the arrest of Tikhon, see M. Spinka, *The Church and the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1927), 175–77.

[30] The ' Living Church's ' notion of church-state relations is reflected in V. N. Lvov's appeal for government intervention on the side of the ' progressive clergy ' to purge the church—' the last stronghold of reaction ' in the country. *Izvestiya*, 2 August 1922.

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> in the entire world, strives to realise, by governmental methods, the ideals of the Kingdom of God. Therefore every believing churchman should not only be an honest citizen, but also struggle, in every possible way, together with the Soviet regime, for the realisation of the Kingdom of God upon earth.[31]

Tikhon's release from imprisonment and the implied official permission to resume his office was evidently conditional on his public repentance for his former anti-Soviet activity, the recognition of the correctness of charges brought against him, and his dissociation 'both from foreign and from internal monarchist-White Guard counter-revolution'—all of which were incorporated in Tikhon's so-called confession of 16 June 1923 (*Izvestiya*, 27 June 1923). Pressed for further proofs of his loyalty to the regime and, probably, promised in return the legalisation of the Patriarchate and certain concessions for the church,[32] Tikhon seems to have come close, by the spring of 1925, to accepting the regime's terms for regulating church-state relations. Even if Tikhon's so-called Testament had been—as alleged by the emigré clergy—a GPU forgery, it offered a picture of what was demanded of the church by the regime. While reaffirming the church's dogmatic and canonic orthodoxy, Tikhon's message of 7 April 1925 recognised the Soviet regime as divinely ordained and urged the faithful to submit themselves to the government 'not out of fear, but for conscience's sake'. It invoked prayers for divine aid for the regime's 'labours for the good of the common people', and requested Orthodox congregations 'not to admit any individuals of anti-governmental inclinations, nor to nurture hopes for the restoration of the monarchy, but to become convinced that the Soviet regime is actually a national workers' and peasants' government and hence durable and stable' (*Izvestiya*, 15 April 1925).

As it became clear that the Sovietisation of the Church implied in Tikhon's 'testament' was unacceptable to most of the Tikhonite bishops and clergy, the Bolsheviks intervened to prevent an orderly succession to the Patriarchal throne in order to secure a politically reliable successor to Tikhon who would accept the Soviet terms for regulating the Church-State relations; this was done by the arrest and deportation of recalcitrants, intimidation of waverers, and manipulation of intra-church rivalries. By mid-1926 it appeared that a *modus vivendi* had been worked out between the government and the Patriarchal deputy *locum tenens*, Metropolitan Sergii (Stragorodskii) of Nizhni Novgorod. Through Sergii's message of 10 June 1926, the church reaffirmed its complete civil loyalty to the Soviet state, respect for its laws, and its determination to remain 'absolutely apart from all political parties

[31] *Pomestny Sobor Rossiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi 1923 goda. Biulleteni* (Moscow, 1923), 12.

[32] The governmental promise of such concessions is implied in Tikhon's 'testament' in which he expresses his firm belief that the church will be given the opportunity 'to teach our children the law of God, to open theological schools for the training of clergy, and to publish books and journals in defence of the Orthodox faith'.

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and enterprises which could harm the Union'. At the same time, the message reiterated the doctrinal irreconcilability between the Orthodox faith and communist ideology, and the church's insistence on the integrity of its ideals, dogmas, and canons, and the inviolability of its spiritual freedom. Moreover,

> while promising complete loyalty obligatory on all citizens of the Union, we, representatives of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, cannot enter into any special engagement to prove our loyalty. We cannot accept, for example, the duty of watching over the political tendencies of our co-religionists, even if such surveillance were to be limited to guaranteeing the political security of some and to depriving others of that guarantee. The Soviet government disposes of much more adequate organs and much more efficient means for that purpose. Above all, we cannot exercise executive functions or resort to ecclesiastical controls against elements little favourable to the Soviet power. . . . But we firmly promise that to the degree it depends on our authority, we will not henceforth permit the Church to find itself involved in any political adventure, and will not tolerate anyone to hide his own political aspirations under the Church's name.[83]

Sergii's message found powerful support in a memorandum composed in that year for submission to the government by a group of Tikhonite bishops imprisoned in the Solovki concentration camp. This document admitted the existence of fundamental doctrinal contradictions between the church and the Soviet state and pointed out that actual conflict between the two could be prevented only by a consistent implementation of the law on the separation of church and state, whereby neither of the two would interfere with each other's proper sphere of activity. Since the government had not been neutral in its legislative and administrative acts regarding religion, and had employed the state power to suppress religion and impose atheism, the Orthodox church could not follow the Renovationist example in endorsing the lie about the existence of complete religious freedom in the USSR.

> The church bases its attitude to the state power on a complete and consistent realisation of the principle of the separateness of church and state. It does not strive to overthrow the existing order and does not participate in activities directed to this end; it does not call anyone to arms or political struggle; it submits to all civil laws and ordinances, but it wishes to preserve in full its spiritual freedom and independence as provided by the Constitution: it cannot become a servant of the state. . . . The fundamental law of our country bans the church's interference in political life. To this end servants of religion are deprived of both active and passive electoral rights and are prohibited from exerting influence, by virtue of their religious authority, upon the political self-determination of the masses. It follows, then, that the church should not, either in

[83] Cited in M. Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1956), 157–60.

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> its open activity or through its pastoral influence on believers, criticise or censure the civil measures of the government; but it also follows that it should not approve them, since not only censuring but also approving the government, represents political interference; for the right of approval presupposes the right of censure or at least the right to abstain from approval, which could always be interpreted as signifying dissatisfaction and disapproval. . . . The law on the separation of church and state is reciprocally binding: it prohibits the church from participation in politics and civil administration, but it also contains the state's renunciation of interference with the internal affairs of the church—its teachings, liturgy, and administration.[84]

It soon became clear that Metropolitan Sergii and his followers had misinterpreted the regime's terms, or that the latter had suddenly raised its price. After another arrest of Metropolitan Sergii and a new round of negotiations with his captors, he issued on 29 July 1927, a new declaration which was to be of lasting importance in defining the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the Soviet regime. Echoing the Renovationist political line, the declaration recognised the providential nature of the Soviet regime and at least implicitly denied religious persecution in the USSR.[85] The crucial element in the new formula was the extremely broad interpretation given to the church's civil loyalty to the state, which was now to include unconditional obedience to the regime, positive support of its policies, and the assumption by the church of the previously rejected obligation to ensure the political reliability of its flock. Now renouncing as utopian the notion of an apolitical church within the Soviet state, Sergii called upon the believers 'to show, not in words, but in deeds', that they, too, could be 'faithful citizens of the Soviet Union, loyal to the Soviet government, but likewise the most fervent adherents of Orthodoxy':

> We wish to remain Orthodox and at the same time to recognise the Soviet Union as our civil Fatherland whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and whose misfortunes are our misfortunes. Every blow directed against the Union . . . we acknowledge as a blow directed against us. Remaining Orthodox, we regard it as our duty to be citizens of the Union 'not from fear, but from conscience', as the Apostle has taught us (Rom. 13: 5).

The declaration produced a profound division in the ranks of the Patriarchal church. While apparently most of its then still active bishops came to accept the new line, and pledged loyalty to the now legalised patriarchal administration, a number of prominent hierarchs of the Russian church, including the *locum tenens*, Metropolitan Peter,

[84] Cited in Polskii, op. cit. I, 169–77.

[85] Sergii's declaration refers to the regime's 'justified distrust of all Church functionaries' and expresses 'gratitude to the Soviet Government for this attention to the spiritual needs of the Orthodox population'. For a complete text of the declaration, see Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, 161–65.

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repudiated Sergii's compromise as irreconcilable with the integrity of the church and with their own consciences. In 1928 a group of bishops led by Metropolitan Iosif of Leningrad renounced their allegiance to Sergii and formed a dissident church group (branded by the Patriarchate as *Iosiflianskii raskol*), which was to provide the core of the 'catacomb church' in the USSR.[36] The voices of protest against Sergii's new policy were gradually silenced by the combined action of the Patriarchate and the GPU, without healing the resulting spiritual and moral wounds or bridging the growing gap of suspicion and bitterness.

The immediate sequel to the 1927 compromise failed to justify the hopes of Metropolitan Sergii and his followers. To be sure, the authorities granted legal status to the Patriarchal administration (but not to its dioceses), permitted the publication (during 1931–35) of the Patriarchate's journal for its clergy, and withdrew their support from the Renovationists and other 'progressive' splinter groups. But despite Sergii's successive proofs of loyalty to the Soviet state, including his degrading interviews to the press in 1930,[37] the regime did not keep its promise to allow the convocation of the *Sobor*, the election of the Patriarch, the opening of theological schools, and other benefits of 'normalisation of church-state relations'. Before long, not only the illegal, unrecognised church groups, but also the now legalised Patriarchal church and the once-favoured Renovationists, found themselves engulfed in successive waves of anti-religious terror that, by 1939, nearly extinguished organised religious life in the USSR. The belated acknowledgement of Sergii's loyalty to the Soviet state had to await the upheavals of the Second World War.

THE crisis of the German-Soviet war brought about a paradoxical pattern of harmony in relations between the church and the communist state, evoking memories of the regime's collaboration with 'progressive' clergy during the early 1920s. There were, however, significant contrasts. Over the last pre-war decade, Soviet ideology had evolved towards an eclectic combination of some elements of Marxism-Leninism, Russian nationalism, and Stalinist pragmatism, a process which not only weakened fundamentalist attitudes towards religion, but also provided, in the formula of 'Soviet patriotism', a more agreeable basis for the church's collaboration with the regime; the growth in the power of the state officialdom at the expense of the party apparatus after the outbreak of war, also served to weaken some of the church's earlier inhibitions in its relations with the government. On the other hand, the two decades of harassment, purges, and terror which nearly

[36] For their letters and messages, see Polskii, op. cit., II, 5–11.

[37] In his interviews with Soviet journalists and foreign reporters, held at the peak of the anti-religious campaign, Sergii denied any past or current persecution of religion in the USSR; see *Pravda*, 16 and 19 February 1930. On the possible *quid pro quo* underlying these interviews, see P. B. Anderson, *People, Church and State in Modern Russia* (New York, 1944), 109–10, and W. C. Fletcher, *A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia 1927–1943* (London, 1965), 48–56.

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extinguished organised religious life by 1939, had conditioned the surviving ecclesiastical leaders for the role of docile political servants of the regime, which, significantly, now preferred to deal with the traditionalist ecclesiastical conservatives rather than the 'progressives' among the clergy, eager to 'modernise' and 'democratise' the church.[38]

Underlying this reversal was the regime's realisation of the value of the church's contribution to popular morale and the war effort, and its capacity to project Soviet influence both upon the believers in the regions lost to the Germans and on foreign public opinion, as well as the Kremlin's concern about the political implications of the massive spontaneous resurgence of organised religion in the nazi-occupied territories. As these were recaptured, and the Soviet Army extended its control into neighbouring countries, the usefulness of a loyal and closely controlled Russian church as an instrument of re-Sovietisation in the recovered territories and of political assimilation, or at least neutralisation, of the Orthodox in the satellite countries, helped the newly-established harmony to survive the Soviet victory. No less important was the usefulness of the church as a channel for promoting Soviet foreign policy and propaganda in foreign countries, its willingness to join the regime in attacking the Vatican (and in liquidating the Uniate Church in the Western Ukraine), and its effectiveness in countering anti-communist tendencies both among the Russian emigrés and within the foreign churches.

In return the Orthodox Church received a series of concessions which enabled it to recover a part of the losses suffered during the inter-war period. Officially, these concessions did not involve, with possibly one important exception, a formal revision of the 1929 Law on Religious Associations, but consisted in a different, less biased, interpretation and application of the existing legislation: the church was simply allowed to make a limited use of the rights it possessed under Soviet law, including the right to lease houses of worship from the authorities, to hold ecclesiastical gatherings, maintain monasteries and theological schools, and to issue religious publications; the government also chose to broaden its interpretation of the voluntary collection of money for church needs, and to ignore some of the legal restrictions on religious activities, tolerating limited religious propaganda, private religious instruction of children, pilgrimages, etc.

One important exception was the reported, though unpublished, 1945 decree whereby the Russian Orthodox Church (and other loyal religious groups) was given back the rights of a juridical person, including the right to own property (except the monastic and church buildings) and to operate workshops producing liturgical objects.[39] The new *Polozhenie*

[38] Symptomatically, the Renovationist Church was dissolved in 1943, with most of its former bishops and clergy rejoining the Patriarchal Church. Cf. L. I. Emeliakh, ed., *Pravda o religii* (Moscow, 1959), 414.

[39] According to M. M. Persits (*Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudarstva i shkoly ot tserkvi v SSSR [1917–1919 gg.]* Moscow, 1958, 120), 'religious associations enjoy, since 1945, the right of a juridical person'.

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of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted (obviously with government approval) at its *Sobor* earlier that year not only implied this departure from the 1918 decree, but also signified official recognition of the church as an hierarchically ordered entity, governed internally by its own statutes and by-laws. Though the local congregations still required prior registration and had to lease their church from the authorities, the new Statute reflected official recognition of parishes as integral parts of the church, canonically subordinate to their bishops and managed by the parish priests as *ex officio* chairmen of their executive committees. Clergy of all ranks remained dependent on registration as a condition of their legal activity, but the new provisions now made them leaders rather than hired servants of the formally independent local 'twenties'.

Leaving aside the moral and political price it had to pay for these concessions, at no time since the Civil War had the Orthodox Church enjoyed such a favourable status as during Stalin's 'religious Nep'. With church income now exempt from taxation and the clergy subject to the general low income tax rate, the generosity of believers brought the church substantial funds. But the improvement in its status, power, and wealth was not accompanied by a greater sense of security or an extension of its freedom; as before, it had to operate under the close supervision of known and unknown agents of the regime. Government control over its activities was centralised in 1943 at the federal level in the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, presided over by the old police specialist in ecclesiastical affairs, G. G. Karpov [40]: in 1944, a parallel Council was formed for other religious cults, under I. Poliansky. Apparently the two Councils represented an institutional extension of the long established secret police department for 'churchmen and sectarians'. The two agencies, whose representatives were attached to the republican and local authorities, were formally vested with such duties as liaison between the government and religious groups, drafting of enactments and regulations on religion, and supervising the implementation of existing legislation.

In contrast to its earlier 'divide and rule' tendency with regard to individual religious groups, the regime now clearly favoured centralisation and, where possible, amalgamation of ecclesiastical and sectarian organisations, as well as the transfer of authority within these groups from the laity to the officials, devices facilitating political control and police surveillance of organised religion.

Neither the government nor the church officially admitted any change in the state's treatment of religion, stressing the continuity and correctness of legislation and policy, and denying any past persecution of

[40] Until 1943, administrative controls over religious activities were located at the union republic level. In the RSFSR, these functions were performed by the Commission for the Affairs of Cults attached to the Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium. See V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, vol. I: *O religii, religioznom sektanstve i tserkvi* (Moscow, 1959), 86. On Karpov see N. Eremin, ed., *Za boevuyu antireligioznuyu propagandu* (Leningrad, 1937), 246–51.

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religion in the USSR.[41] What had changed, according to the official spokesmen of government and church, was the latter's attitude towards the Soviet state, i.e. its assumption of a loyal, patriotic position vis-à-vis the regime. According to Karpov's policy statement in November 1944, the changes

> do not represent anything accidental or unexpected, and do not have a provisional character or represent a tactical manoeuvre . . . These measures flow from a tendency which became marked even before the war. These measures of the Soviet government concerning the life of the Russian Orthodox Church are in full accord with the Constitution of the USSR and reflect the approval of the position taken by the church in relation to the Soviet state during the last pre-war decade and especially during the war, a position which aimed at the most rapid victory over the enemy.[42]

Official Soviet theory on church-state relations in this period remained essentially unchanged, reiterating the familiar Leninist distinction between the party's and the state's attitude towards religion, but describing Bolshevik atheism in terms less offensive to believers, and underlining the state's neutrality between atheism and religion. Occasionally, it stressed the state's good will towards 'patriotic' religious groups, describing the clergy and the majority of believers as loyal Soviet citizens. Rather than being 'reactionary' or 'counter-revolutionary', religion was now described as an 'anti-scientific' ideology and the party's anti-religious campaign as 'natural-science propaganda'. Church-state relations were summarised by Karpov at the 1945 *Sobor* in the following terms:

> The Great October Revolution, which set our people free, also liberated the Russian Orthodox Church from the fetters that once hampered and constrained its internal activities. Freedom of conscience, proclaimed by the decree of 23 January 1918, was guaranteed by the basic law of our country—the Soviet Constitution. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, created by government decision, maintains a bond between the Government and the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in affairs requiring governmental decision. While interfering in no way with the internal life of the church, the Council contributes to the further normalisation of relations between the church and the state, supervising the correct and prompt execution of laws and decrees concerning the Russian Orthodox Church.[43]

[41] Cf. A. Kolosov, 'Religiia i tserkov v SSSR', in *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. L: *SSSR* (Moscow, 1948), 1775–90; *Pravda o religii v Rossii* (Moscow, 1942), 21–26; Metropolitan Nikolai (ed.), *The Russian Orthodox Church and the War Against Fascism* (Moscow, 1943), 5–6; and Moskovskaia Patriarkhiia, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov: Ustroistvo, Polozhenie, Deiatelnost* (Moscow, 1958), 14.

[42] Cited in Moskovskaia Patriarkhiia, *Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo* (Moscow, 1947), 308–9.

[43] Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, 113; the quotation has been corrected in accordance with the version appearing in *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov*, 18.

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This manifestly distorted picture had to be endorsed and rationalised in quasi-canonical terms by the official spokesman of the Orthodox Church; this was part of the price they had to pay for the 'normalisation' of their status within the Soviet state. In the version of the Moscow Patriarchate, there was no contradiction either between the interests of the church and the Soviet state, or between the latter's ecclesiastical legislation and the canons of the Church; all past difficulties were the fault of the leaders and members of the church who had either misunderstood or failed to follow the teachings of Christ and the Apostles concerning the proper Christian attitude to the powers that be.[44] The possibility of persecution of the church by the state was dismissed, along with the notion of Christian martyrdom in the USSR, if the church would follow its Christian obligations. Falling back on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and quoting in support of their stand Patriarch Tikhon's testament and Sergii's 1927 declaration, the spokesmen of the Moscow Patriarchate ascribed a providential character to the Bolshevik revolution and viewed the Soviet regime as divinely ordained under a 'god-given leader', Stalin, a 'true defender of the Holy Church'.[45] The harmony between church and state also derived its strength from the identity of their concern for the good of the common man, Russian national interests, the 'political and religious unification of the Slavic peoples', and 'peace in the entire world'. The separation of church and state had had a progressive, liberating, and purifying effect upon the church.[46] Though the church possessed a 'tangible organisation',

> it does not want to be a state within a state, like the Roman Catholic confession, or an organisation parallel to the state, as was the case in old Byzantium, or a department of the state, as it was before the revolution. All these are alien to the Orthodox Church, which . . . is a united family of the Heavenly Father that cannot be commensurate by its essence with the juridical nature of the state. With such a self-determination of the church as a Christian family, based not on rights but on the mutual love of its members, it cannot awaken in the state any political suspicion, just as it cannot itself fear limitations upon its spiritual freedom.[47]

The church's mission was confined to the salvation of human souls; it was not its function to denounce or criticise the government, although non-participation in politics did not imply indifference. Free to 'act in its characteristic spirit along the road marked out by ecclesiastical canons', the Russian church 'completely impartially' declares its solidarity 'with the laws and measures of the Soviet regime, based on

[44] *Patriarkh Sergii*, 274–75.

[45] See Aleksii, Patriarkh, *Slova, rechi, poslaniia, obrashcheniia, stati* (1948–1954), II (Moscow, 1954), 178, 273–77. See also Patriarch Aleksii's message of 7 November 1947 (*Zh.M.P.*, no. 11, 1947, 4–5) and his sermon on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday (Aleksii, *Slova, rechi*, II, 170–71); and, in particular, A. Vasiliev, 'Polozhenie Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v SSSR', *Zh.M.P.*, no. 1, 1958, 40–47.

[46] N. A. Khariuzov, 'Kesarevo Kesariu, a Bozhie Bogu', *Zh.M.P.*, no. 11 (1947), 27–9.

[47] *Patriarkh Sergii*, 309.

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the principles of democracy, equality, love of one's neighbour and of the Fatherland'.[48] The church, one of the Patriarchate's spokesmen said in 1947, 'should enjoy the respect of the state', as it 'increases the moral potential of society, the people, and the state' through its moral education of the faithful, teaching them 'to overcome individual egoism for the sake of the common good'.

The pronouncements in the Patriarchate's publications during the 'golden era' of its relations with the regime (especially from 1945 to 1948), pervaded by a spirit of messianic Russian nationalism in which state and church pursue their respective but harmonised providential goals, revived the vision of Moscow as the 'Third Rome'. Some articles in the *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* even echoed the Renovationist attempts to 'Christianise' some features of communist ideology, while imputing to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism political and ideological links with fascism, capitalism, imperialism, etc. In articles commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Revolution, Archpriest Khariuzov wrote about the 'dialectical transition from a bourgeois-democratic to a socialist revolution', while E. Shapovalova clearly identified the Russian Orthodox Church with the 'anti-capitalist camp'.

IN sharp contrast to its liberalising implications in other spheres, the destalinisation campaign of the Khrushchev era led to the gradual withdrawal of many concessions granted to organised religion since the early forties and to a marked reintensification of anti-religious propaganda. The first portents of the new course came in the form of a resolution of the Central Committee of 7 July 1954 (not published until seven years later) attacking the position of 'neutrality and passivity towards church activities' and ordering a resumption of the anti-religious campaign by both party and state agencies.[49] While somewhat moderated by another resolution of the committee passed on 10 November of that year (*Pravda*, 11 November 1954), the official attack on religion followed the wavering course of Khrushchev's rise to power, reaching greater intensity after the defeat of the so-called anti-Party group in 1957. After the November 1958 plenum of the Central Committee, all religious groups came under a concerted attack in the Soviet communications media, which charged them with violations of Soviet laws on religious cults, with anti-social influence, and—in selected cases—anti-Soviet activities.

An editorial in *Pravda* of 21 August 1959 signalled the shift from ideological means of anti-religious struggle to legislative and administrative methods. Some time between 1959 and 1961, the Soviet government evidently repealed some of the war-time concessions to 'patriotic'

[48] See H. Waddams, 'The Church in Soviet Russia', *Soviet Studies*, July 1953, 15; *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov*, 214; A. Shapovalova, 'K 30-letiiu Sovetskoi vlasti', *Zh.M.P.*, no. 11, 1947, 32.

[49] The resolution was published in *Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty* (Moscow, 1961), 61–65.

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religious groups. Symbolic of the new trend was the dismissal, in 1960, of the long-time chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, G. G. Karpov, and the resignation of the church's chief political spokesman, Metropolitan Nikolai Yarushevich [50]; whether or not their departure from the scene was caused by their opposition to the new policy, it symbolised the beginning of the end of church-state harmony in the USSR.

Circumstantial evidence points to such changes as the significant narrowing of the permissible scope of religious propaganda and instruction of children; greater restrictions on the church's income and spending; the abolition of the theological student's exemption from military service; and, in particular, the withdrawal of official permission for the operation of the majority of monasteries, theological seminaries, and churches. At the same time, the authorities introduced measures violating the published legislation on cults, such as the restriction of the registered members of local religious associations to twenty (hitherto a *minimum*); introduction of registration of believers requesting the performance of the rites of baptism and marriage; the requirement of administrative permission for the clergy to perform religious rites in homes and cemeteries; the extension of administrative control to the parish finances; and the prohibition of the participation of minors in church services.[51]

While employing such time-honoured devices of anti-religious struggle as the arbitrary reinterpretation and manipulation of existing regulations, the Khrushchev regime proceeded to tighten legal restrictions on religious activities, especially aimed at the less institutionalised, more elusive sectarians. Thus, along with the application of the so-called anti-parasite laws to the growing number of illegal religious servants and activists, the government in 1962 widened the Criminal Code's definition of 'crimes committed on a religious basis' to make leaders of religious congregations criminally responsible for the recruitment into these groups of minors, and for the 'renunciation of social activity' or 'refusal to perform citizen's duties' by their members.[52]

Characteristically, to maintain the fiction of continuing non-interference in legal religious activities, and to protect themselves against the charge of persecuting religion, the authorities resorted to such conspiratorial methods as the issuing of confidential verbal orders to ecclesiastical and sectarian leaders, demanding that they 'voluntarily'

[50] Karpov was replaced by Vladimir Kuroedov; no reliable data are available about his background. Yarushevich was replaced by Nikodim Rotov, now Metropolitan of Leningrad. On the circumstances surrounding Nikolai's 'fall from grace' and his 'mysterious death' on 13 December 1961, see N. Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia* (New York, 1967), 312–16.

[51] See 'Two Moscow Clergymen Protest against Soviet Harassment of Orthodox Church', *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* (hereafter *RCDA*), V, 9–10 (1966), 73–82.

[52] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 29 (199), 26 July 1962.

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discontinue certain activities hitherto allowed, discourage 'excessive' proselytising and the participation of minors in religious rites, and reduce the number of monasteries, clergy, and parishes. Thus in 1960 the Patriarchal Synod published a resolution instructing the bishops to prevent further 'violations of Soviet laws regarding religious associations', and in April 1961, under government pressure, the Synod adopted an amendment to the Church's 1945 Statute, ratified by the *Sobor* of Bishops in August of that year.[53] Under the new provisions the clergy were deprived of membership in the parish assembly; except for the unprecedented restriction of membership in the parish assembly to the *dvadtsatka*, the 1961 amendment signified the return to the provisions of the 1929 law that treated the clergy as hired employees of the legally and economically independent local religious associations.[54]

Before long the continued escalation of the anti-religious campaign led Soviet spokesmen to admit the break with Stalin's post-1941 church policy, and to commit the state agencies more openly to the struggle against religion. By 1962 *Nauka i religiya* was openly attacking Stalin for his repressions against the *antireligiozniki* and his violations of the 'Leninist line on religion'.

> The Church, especially the Orthodox, obtained during the period of the personality cult a number of concessions which contradicted the principles of the Leninist decree on the separation of the church from the state; this allowed religious organisations considerably to strengthen their financial and organisational position and to intensify their influence upon believers.[55]

Some party spokesmen now went so far as to revise the formal Marxist-Leninist tenet of the state's non-interference in matters of conscience.[56] The general plan of a massive anti-religious campaign elaborated at the enlarged plenum of the party's ideological commission in November 1963 provided for the mobilisation not only of party and 'mass organisation' resources, but also those of the state agencies, including the two governmental councils for religious affairs; as the attack was to be directed primarily against the grass-roots religious organisations and individual believers, 'commissions for supervising the observance of the legislation on cults' were formed at the local government level to police, infiltrate, and subvert the local congregations.[57]

[53] See 'Deianiia Arkhiereiskogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi', *Zh.M.P.* August 1961, 6–17.

[54] Instruction of 16 January 1931, in *Biulleten postoiannoi komissii Prezidiuma VTsIK*, 1932, art. 2, cited in Rudinskii, op. cit. 43–44.

[55] F. Oleshchuk, 'Knigi o Lenine', *Nauka i religiia*, no. 4, 1962, 48. The author, pre-war Secretary-General of the Union of the Militant Godless, was one of the survivors of the 1937–38 purge of the Union. It is likely that the pressure for the resumption of a militant anti-religious campaign came in part from the victims of this purge after they were rehabilitated in the 1950s.

[56] See, e.g. *Voprosy filosofii*, 4, 1962, 18; and the editorial in *Pravda*, 26 September 1962.

[57] *Partiinaia zhizn*, no. 2, January 1964, 22–26. See also RCDA, VI (1967), 58–60.

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Throughout the years of the new anti-religious campaign, Soviet government spokesmen predictably continued to deny any persecution of religion in the USSR or any change in the constitutional pattern of church-state relations; and in order to reassure believers at home and abroad, ecclesiastical leaders were called upon to supply once again the proof of their loyalty to the regime by endorsing this official version. In 1961, Patriarch Aleksii indeed expressed 'gratitude' for the 'unfailingly good attitude of our government towards our church', and in March 1964 the Patriarchate's political spokesman, Metropolitan Nikodim, informed the world that while there was 'a struggle of ideas' in the USSR, 'there is no repression of religion' and no 'administrative methods' were being used against believers.[58]

WHILE this combination of violations of the law by the government, official hypocrisy, and the submissiveness of ecclesiastical leaders to the anti-religious measures of the regime was a characteristic feature of church-state relations in the USSR between 1927 and 1941, the changes that had occurred in the Soviet system and society since the death of Stalin made any return to this earlier pattern virtually impossible. The decline in the capacity of the regime to terrorise the public into blind obedience to arbitrary commands, the progressive erosion of the official ideology, and the greater sensitivity of the Soviet leadership to foreign criticism, as well as the slow emergence of a domestic public opinion—all this was bound to affect the attitudes and expectations of at least the younger elements of the clergy and believers whose past had not been compromised either by 'counter-revolutionary' associations or by embarrassing 'deals' with the Stalinist authorities. It was from these strata, as well as from the older opponents of Soviet church policy released from concentration camps during the fifties, that movements of protest emerged within the Russian Orthodox Church and the Evangelical-Christian Baptists, which ultimately challenged the established notion of church-state relations in the USSR.

The immediate stimulus to these protests was supplied, on the one hand by the gross violations of legality in the anti-religious campaign, and especially the use for this purpose of the apparatus and powers of the two Councils on religious affairs, and, on the other hand, by the apparent failure of the Moscow Patriarchate to defend the rights of religious organisations embodied in the law, a failure that was interpreted either in terms of the leaders' moral weakness and timidity, or as proof of their collusion with the regime. The protest movements came into the open and sought to enlist support from abroad only after the frustration of numerous attempts to redress the grievances of the clergy and the faithful through the regular channels. In a way, these protests were the fruit of the regime's lengthy propaganda of 'Soviet

[58] *Zh.M.P.* b, 1961, 6; *RCDA*, III, 8 (1964), 57–60.

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legality' and the inviolability of the constitutional guarantees of 'freedom of conscience'.

Among the early manifestations of dissent was a petition addressed by several believers from Volhynia to the 'Eastern Patriarchs' in the name of the 'parishioners and pilgrims of the Orthodox churches' of Russia, which reached the West in the winter of 1963–64. More important were the petitions addressed, on 21 November 1965, to Patriarch Aleksii, and on 15 December to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Podgorny, by two priests of the Moscow diocese, Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin; circulated to all bishops, along with a covering letter, these documents found their way to the West early in 1966. They are clearly the work of well-educated and well-informed representatives of the younger generation of the Orthodox clergy, speaking on behalf of a group of bishops and clergy who dissent from the current course of church-state relations. Their action evidently grew out of the abortive attempt made a few months earlier by eight Orthodox bishops, led by Archbishop Ermogen of Kaluga, to secure, preferably through the convocation of a long overdue local *Sobor*, the repeal of the Patriarchate's 1961 decision to surrender the clergy's administrative and economic control over the parishes. But the two petitions go much further in revealing the cause of the church's predicament and in the solutions they propose.

In the letter to Podgorny Eshliman and Yakunin speak from the position of loyalty to the Soviet state and law. Whether or not they truly believe that the 'illegal actions' of which they complain could have been undertaken without orders from the Soviet leaders, they restrict their criticism to the subordinate organ of the federal Council of Ministers—the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church—and ascribe the anti-religious policy of 1957–64 to the personal initiative of Khrushchev, subsequently attacked for his 'subjectivism and administrative methods of leadership'. The petition presents a full catalogue of the violations of published Soviet laws on religion by Kuroedov's Council—the very organ charged with the duty to enforce these laws—and concludes:

> the leaders and plenipotentiaries of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, having fundamentally distorted the legal purpose of the Council, transformed it into a clearly discriminatory organisation, the entire activities of which are directed at the systematic violation of the laws on the separation of church and state and school and church, and the systematic obstruction of the performance of religious rites, which represents a criminal offence under Articles 194 (2) and 194 (3) of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

Pointing to the fact that the illegal practices of the leaders and plenipotentiaries of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church placed them 'in the position of unlimited dictators of the

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Russian Church', Eshliman and Yakunin appealed to the government to restore 'socialist legality', investigate and condemn the illegal activities of the Council, and bring them into accord with Soviet ecclesiastical legislation. They also petitioned for the restoration to the Russian Orthodox Church of all the churches, monasteries, and theological schools illegally closed between 1961 and 1964. Finally,

> insofar as there is, in principle, nothing secret in the relations between the church and the state, the entire activity of the Council for the Affairs of the R.O.C. must be conducted openly, as provided by law, and submitted to systematic public inspection, with the right of representation in this inspection for members of the Russian Orthodox Church.[59]

The letter to the Patriarch reveals another aspect of the current movement of dissent within the Orthodox Church—its profound dissatisfaction with the line taken by the Patriarchate vis-à-vis the state, which Eshliman and Yukunin characterise as 'appeasement of the "worldly leaders"', the dereliction of 'sacred duties to Christ and the church', and 'unconditional subordination . . . to the secret dictates of atheistic officials'. Through their 'lack of courage' and 'unprincipled silence', the Patriarchate and the majority of bishops had contributed to the demoralisation and destruction of the church.

Having illegally usurped control over the internal life of the church, the Council had been purging the latter of its best clergy while infiltrating its ranks with 'morally unstable persons of little faith', willing to serve the Council's destructive purposes. There were a number of bishops and priests within the church who 'worship any instruction of the local Council plenipotentiary more than the words of the Gospel', who 'have been selling out their brethren', and who were assisting the atheists in running the church. But the main danger came from an 'active and ever-growing group' of bishops and priests who, under a 'cloak of piety . . . consciously and actively distort the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy', attempting

> to plant in the church a spirit of indifference, a spirit of slavish contentment and phariseeism, the spirit of 'this world'—and they would like to transform the higher ecclesiastical administration into a bureaucratic office, a kind of 'ministry for the affairs of the Orthodox confession' empowered to contain and regulate the religious emotions of believing citizens.

Amidst the general anxiety, these men were working for success in their careers; their conscience was submissive and elastic. Eshliman and

[59] See 'Two Moscow Clergymen', loc. cit. Eshliman and Yakunin are mistaken in claiming that registration of the 'twenties' and the clergy is a 'fixating', and not a 'licensing' act; such registration is *not mandatory* upon the authorities, even if all conditions required by law for such registration are fulfilled; cf. Gsovsky, loc. cit. 18; or that the clergy are entitled under the 1929 law to be full-fledged members of the 'twenties'; Soviet legislation makes a clear distinction between 'believers' and 'religious servants', with the latter alone entitled to form a 'twenty'.

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Yakunin also criticised 'other bishops' (presumably including Patriarch Aleksii) who 'reckon that by their silence they are saving the Russian Church'; the tactics of silence were contrary to the teachings of Christ and the Apostles; it might save the bishops but not their flock; it served the 'adversaries of the Holy Church'.

The solution proposed by the writers did not go beyond the implementation of the literal meaning of the 1918 decree and the corresponding provisions of the Soviet Constitution:

> Unconditional non-interference of the state in the internal life of the church, on the one hand, and free cooperation of the church with the state in the civil sphere, if so desired by the state, on the other hand; such is the principle of a correct inter-relationship of the church and the state.

As for the church, it must return to the principle espoused by Patriarch Tikhon: the prevention of interference by the secular authorities in the internal life of the church, and strict observance by the ecclesiastical authorities of civil legislation. This called for the repudiation of the course adopted since the mid-twenties by the Metropolitan Sergii. Eshliman and Yakunin appealed to the Patriarch to 'renounce the fruitless and pernicious tactics of the "Sergeian" period which put the church in danger of the total destruction of all legal forms of its public existence', to request the Government to end state intervention in the internal life of the church, and to convene a national *Sobor* which would 'restore the canonical norms of ecclesiastical life'.

Their notion of correct church-state relations, they conclude, did not contradict the true interests of the state:

> For, basically, the interests of the church in the civil realm coincide with the interests of a free state governed by law. But only by putting an end to the intervention of the 'worldly leaders' in God's sacred realm will the Russian Church be able without hypocrisy to serve our Fatherland. By the very fact of its free existence, it will show to the whole world that in our country the sacred right of man to religious freedom is actually being realised . . . For no contrivances of the External Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, no interviews and 'authoritative' declarations, no participation of the Russian hierarchs in international movements, can prove that which does not exist—a free existence of the Russian Church . . . Only by being free will the church be able to bring up its children in the spirit of genuine patriotism, not out of fear of the authorities but out of love of the Fatherland . . . The church is a real, positive, and indestructible force, and it is in the interests of the state that this force be free!

The dramatic plea of the two Moscow priests struck at the most sensitive spot in the established pattern of church-state relations in the Soviet Union—the complete subordination of the church to the atheistic state. While carefully contained within the literal meaning of the published Soviet laws on religion, it implicitly attacked the totalitarian

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nature of the Soviet system, which could not be reconciled with the ideal of a 'free church in a free state'. Indeed, the realisation of this ideal would call for the separation of the state from the party, and the 'disestablishment' of the official ideology.

In the existing political conditions in the USSR, the step taken by Eshliman and Yakunin was doomed to immediate failure, and soon brought upon them severe ecclesiastical sanctions on the charge of 'spreading distrust' in the supreme church authorities, endangering the unity and peace of the church, and slandering the state organs. Their endeavours, wrote Patriarch Aleksii to his bishops, 'do not serve the interests of the church'.[60] To counteract any politically embarrassing foreign reactions, assurances of religious freedom have since been given to the press by Kuroedov, the Patriarch, and several bishops.[61]

One should not, however, underestimate the long-range effect of this public demonstration of dissent within the church; it broke the enforced seal of silence and, by awakening the ecclesiastical conscience, it may help to mobilise the constructive elements of the church around a programme which offers a positive alternative to the present situation of a captive church in a theocratic state.

THE movements of dissent within the Orthodox Church and among the Baptists have not so far attained their principal objective of freeing the church from the control of the state and expanding the boundaries of religious liberty. Having attempted to silence the voices of discontent by relaxing anti-religious pressures on 'loyal' churchmen and sectarians, and by severe repressions against the dissident religious leaders, sweetened by nominal concessions to their followers, the regime proceeded to tighten its administrative and legislative control over religion. The two governmental Councils were merged in January 1966 into a single Council for Religious Affairs, under Kuroedov, and given 'a much greater role and greater responsibility in supervising observance of the laws on cults', as well as 'correspondingly greater powers'.[62] In March of that year, the republican legislation on religious cults was amended to impose longer prison sentences and higher fines for violation of the laws on the separation of church and state under Article 142 of the Criminal Code.[63] Evidently aimed at the activities of the dissident elements within religious groups, especially the Baptists, the new *corpus delicti* included, among other criminal activities, 'the preparation for purposes of mass dissemination of handbills, letters, leaflets, and other documents making appeals for the non-observance of the legislation on religious cults', as well as 'the organisation and

[60] For the Patriarch's letter of 6 July 1966, the appeal by Eshliman and Yakunin, and its sequel, see *RCDA*, V, 15–16 (1966), 126–29.

[61] *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1966; *Zh.M.P.*, 3, 1967, 2–3; *Izvestiya*, 2 July 1967.

[62] *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1966.

[63] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 24 March 1966, 219–20.

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holding of religious meetings, processions, and other cult ceremonies disturbing public order'.

Though the new legislation provided for similar punishment for discrimination against believers in educational institutions and employment, as well as for 'other substantial limitations of the rights of citizens because of their attitude towards religion', the government now clearly served notice that it would institute criminal proceedings against the opponents of the *status quo* in church-state relations. The rise of dissenting movements within the Orthodox Church and among the Baptists may weaken anti-religious pressures on 'loyal' ecclesiastical organisations, but the immediate prospects for the relaxation of the state's hold on organised religion appear rather slight; so long as the party continues to use state power to enforce its ideological monopoly, there is no ground for optimism that the regime will allow a free contest between religion and atheism for the minds of Soviet citizens. As the official political faith loses its emotional and intellectual appeal for the masses, and the party finds it increasingly difficult to fire even its own rank and file with anti-religious zeal, the state may indeed be driven to the greater use of administrative methods to suppress the alternative appeals of religion.

In the long run, the prospects for the realisation of 'a free church in a free state' are inseparably bound up with the future fate of the larger intellectual currents and social tendencies which have now come to the surface and are gaining strength, especially among the intelligentsia. Most strongly manifested in the realm of literature, these tendencies have been directed towards the secularisation of the Soviet system, the progressive loosening-up of its totalitarian structure, the establishment of real guarantees of the rule of law, and, in particular, the drawing of an effective demarcation line between the public and the private spheres of life that would prevent encroachments by the party and the state upon the individual's freedom, dignity, and privacy. The continuing and indeed growing strength of these liberalising currents, despite the still overwhelming preponderance of power in the hands of the defenders of the *status quo*, gives ground for optimism about an eventual transformation of the Soviet system which would create conditions for the realisation of the unfulfilled promise of the October Revolution, of genuine freedom of conscience.

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RELIGION AND NATIONALISM

A Case Study: The Caucasus

David M. Lang

IF we look at a modern ethnic map of the Caucasus region, such as that provided in the excellent little handbook by Geiger, Halasi-Kun, and others,[1] we are struck by the tremendous variety of racial and religious communities living in that relatively compact area. To begin with, we have adherents of two important national churches representing different branches of the Christian faith—namely, the Armenians, with their famed church based on the holy site of Echmiadzin and the noble summit of Mount Ararat—and the Georgians, with the related Svans and Mingrelians, with their apostolic tradition going back to Saint Nino and the era of Constantine the Great. There are approximately forty peoples and communities professing Islam. These range from large, well-ordered nations like the Azeri Turks, through ancient and still important peoples like the Circassians, the Avar, the Lezgians, the Chechen, and the Kurds, down to picturesque but relatively small groups like the Godoberi, the Karata, the Bagalul, and the Dido. Both the Sunni and the Shia divisions of Islam are represented, the Shia being strong among the lowland Azeris and some of the Kurds, while mountainous Daghestan is solidly Sunni. There are also many Jewish communities throughout the Caucasus; some of these are extremely ancient. The Kalmyk of the northern steppes were Buddhists; most of them were deported en bloc in 1943. Baku was from ancient times a centre of the cult of the sacred fire and the faith of Zoroaster.

From this it can be seen that within a relatively small area we have a microcosm of faiths and nationalities of bewildering complexity. To see how these have faced up to the challenge, first of Russian Tsarism, and now of the Soviet system, should prove a rewarding and stimulating exercise.

Generally speaking, the interrelation between religious and national self-consciousness is one of the most interesting and yet least understood problems of modern sociology and political science. All over the world, we see communities related by race, yet bitterly divided by religious differences, often of quite recent origin, while elsewhere identity of religion proves a powerful cohesive force between communities and even nations of diverse ethnic affinity. In Ireland, as in India, blood brothers confront one another in enmity as a result of religious differences. The sacred centres of Rome and Mecca, on the other hand, command allegiance and brotherly love on the part of devotees all over the world. World communism, itself a form of religion, also operates

[1] Bernhard Geiger and others, *Peoples and Languages of the Caucasus* (The Hague, 1959).

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as an international unifying force, though it is no more immune from heresies and deviations than religions which concentrate on the life to come. Indeed, current disputes between Moscow and Peking and past exchanges between Stalin and Marshal Tito show that in politics, as in religion, a relatively small area of ideological disagreement is apt to produce a disproportionately large volume of bitterness and recrimination.

These problems are extremely ancient, and go back to the beginnings of human society. Every tribe had its own totem or group of totems which had to be propitiated, often by human sacrifices, in exchange for protection and favour. Many of the early monarchies were theophanic in nature, the king being both ruler and high priest. However, it is interesting to note that the earliest large-scale monarchy on the territory of the USSR, that of Urartu, was secular in character, in that the king did not pretend to any personal divine attributes. The victories and remarkable construction and irrigation works of the Urartians in the territory of modern Armenia were carried out in the name of and for the greater glory of the supreme Urartian deity, Khaldi.

During the Middle Ages, a grand and rather simple pattern of political and religious polarisation prevailed in Europe and the Near East. Western Europe paid allegiance to the Pope; the Byzantines and Russians were united under the aegis of Orthodoxy; while the Infidel were ranged under the banner of the Caliphate. This did not, of course, prevent internal conflicts of the utmost bitterness within the various camps. Often, political separatism actually assumed the form of religious dissent, as in the case of the Albigensian movement, and the resultant repressive processes were all the more terrible in that the sword of the state was sharpened by the bigotry of the fanatic. The Reformation liberated a pent-up flood of nationalism. In western Europe, the tension between old and new religious allegiances proved so strong as to result in civil wars of the greatest savagery; these rent such countries as Scotland, France, and Germany from top to bottom.

The theme of religion and nationalism greatly interested the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, notably Voltaire and Montesquieu. Voltaire was mainly interested in exposing the role of religion in perpetuating the supremacy of corrupt and self-seeking priests and tyrants; yet he singularly failed to do justice to the positive role of religious faith in keeping the ideal of liberty alive in lands under the Ottoman yoke like Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, or in Ireland under British domination. It is significant that Voltaire's tirades against the Roman Catholic religion are often reprinted today in the Soviet Union, as well as those of materialists like Helvétius and Baron d'Holbach, although their scientific value is questionable in the light of modern thought on the sociology of religion. Montesquieu, though strongly opposed to bigotry and fanaticism in all their forms, was more objective than Voltaire in his approach to religion in its political and national

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aspects. He was one of the first to draw attention to the influence of climate and of geographical and historical conditions on the formation of religious and political systems. Religion was to him more than an organised fraud; he saw in it rather an expression of the cumulative traditions and beliefs of a given nation, and it is with his great *De l'Esprit des Lois* (1748) that the comparative study of legal, religious, and social systems may be said to begin.

Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century did their best to formulate coherent views on the origin of religious faith and the influence of religion and the supernatural on primitive and modern society. However, they were too much involved with the struggle of the rising proletariat against the forces of capitalism and organised religion to work out a comprehensive and well-ordered approach to the problem. Indiscriminate quotation from the writings of Engels, themselves often merely borrowings from contemporary works by Morgan and others of his time, tends to disfigure Soviet anthropological writing to this day. The attitude of Lenin and the other founders of the Soviet state, several of them Jews, was coloured by hostility to the Russian Orthodox Church, which had traditionally aligned itself with the cause of Tsarist absolutism. The dogmatism characteristic of a period of active political struggle has spilled over into the contemporary Soviet 'Godless' movement, so that dispassionate consideration of the interaction of nationalism and religious faith is not always possible within the USSR in current conditions.

Another difficulty encountered in discussing problems of religion and nationalism within the Soviet Union is the official doctrine that all religions are based on error. If you assume that belief in the supernatural and the hereafter is a delusion, and that only dialectical materialism has the correct answers, then you will necessarily find it difficult to evaluate the tremendous vitality of religious conviction as the basis for a way of life and for personal political conviction. The example of the Jewish faith, as much a living force today as it was two thousand years ago, should teach us not to underestimate the role of religion in the preservation and fostering of national consciousness. In the United States, one of the most efficiently materialistic cultures the world has even seen, religious creeds of the most diverse and sometimes ridiculous kinds coexist in the minds of millions, along with the most hard-headed practical approach to life.

Nothing could be further from the truth than the idea that religious faith or 'sectarian prejudices' (according to one's viewpoint) die out completely in conditions of economic and political improvement. On present showing, it hardly seems as if religious 'superstition' will wither away in the Soviet Union any sooner than the machinery of state and government, whose disappearance we have long been awaiting. Indeed, slightly greater leisure and material comfort probably provides more rather than fewer opportunities for pondering the ultimate purpose of

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human life, and for developing a state of mind receptive to religious vision, ecstasies, and mystical *Schwärmerei*. This is particularly the case where a one-party regime inhibits discussion of alternative political systems, and confines outlets for social self-expression to the enthusiasm of the football field or the mouthing of loyal slogans at political jamborees. The Soviet authorities are finding, to their annoyance, that Holy Rollers are as likely as Rock and Rollers to flourish in the advanced technological society which they are creating today.

In European Russia, and in areas of Central Asia inhabited by Russian settlers, it is the dissenting and sectarian movements among groups and individuals of Russian or at least Slavic blood which provide the authorities with their main problem. These are, so to speak, religious splinter groups among people of broadly similar ethnic and social background. A very different situation prevails in Caucasia. Here, religious differences are the expression of racial and national identity and 'separateness', which is only now gradually breaking down under the impact of unifying forces in the Soviet way of life.

CAUCASIA lies between two continents, at the junction of historical trade routes, which gives to it a strategic and economic role transcending its physical borders. The Caucasus range is situated between two seas, which receive the waters of the biggest river arteries in Europe. From the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in the west, to the Caspian in the east, this imposing range of mountains stretches for some seven hundred miles, its line broken by narrow passes and defiles, and by lofty peaks. The range dominates a vast natural region, the centre of which forms an isthmus linking Europe with Asia, and connecting the Volga basin and the black earth lands of the Ukraine with Turkey and Persia. Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia together form the southernmost region of the USSR.

The Caucasus has, from prehistoric times, been a meeting point for the civilisations of East and West, and a market place for the exchange of the products of Europe and Asia. Across the Black Sea, the Caucasus is linked with the Mediterranean world, the cultures of Greece and Rome. Its Caspian littoral gives on to Iran and Central Asia, through which ran the trade routes to Turkestan, India, and China. From the east came the faiths of Zoroaster and the Buddha, from the south, the creeds of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all of which found adherents in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus or in the adjacent foothills and plains. In Bronze Age times, Caucasia was extensively influenced by the religious cults of the Hittites; this is witnessed by such archaeological finds as the superb Trialeti hoards.

In classical times, the basic conflict was between the classical pantheons of the Greeks and Romans, on the one hand, and the Iranian cults of Mithra and Ahura-Mazda on the other. It is also interesting to note that colonies of Jews were established in Georgia from an early date. *The Life of Saint Nino*, which embodies traditions of the fourth

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century A.D., speaks of colonies of Jews living in Mtskheta, not far from Tbilisi; it also mentions Jewish priests at Bodbe, scribes at Kodi Spring, and interpreters of the law in Khoba. Elioz of Mtskheta went with Longinos of Karsani to be present at Christ's crucifixion in Jerusalem, and Elioz brought back to Georgia the seamless garment of Our Lord, for which lots had been cast after He was nailed to the cross.[2] Christianity first came to Armenia with the Mission of St Gregory the Illuminator, who converted King Tiridates around the year 301, and also to the Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast, who received the Christian message early in the fourth century direct from Constantinople. It was left for Saint Nino, a slave girl possessed of miraculous powers of healing, to complete the Christianisation of most of Transcaucasia by converting King Mirian of Iberia (eastern Georgia), about the year 330.

So much of the recent destiny of the Caucasian peoples is a direct result of their ancient history that we cannot pass too superficially over these events, remote though they may seem from present-day reality. For instance, it was the Council of Chalcedon, held in 451, which resulted in the eventual separation of the Armenian national or Gregorian Church from the Eastern Orthodox community. Although the differences are supposed formally to be of a theological character, with the Armenians classified as Monophysites or believers in the single nature of Christ, it is wrong to class the Armenian national church as heretical. The true apostolic character of the Church of St Gregory the Illuminator is beyond dispute. Originally, the separation of the Armenians from the Greek Orthodox Church was a natural result of Byzantine imperialism, which skilfully used the weapons of church discipline to annex and subjugate the Christian peoples within its sphere of influence. The cherished independence of the Armenian Church is only one facet of the brave, indeed, almost miraculous struggle of the Armenians, throughout the centuries, to preserve their national cultural heritage in the face of appalling persecutions and even partial physical extermination. In many ways, the differences between the Armenians and the Orthodox boil down to doctrinal and ritual matters of a secondary nature, and it is unfortunate that relics of sectarian prejudice, on both sides, block the path to complete reconciliation.

The Georgian and Armenian Churches parted company at the beginning of the seventh century. This was partly due to growing Persian dominance in Armenia, while Georgia was falling increasingly into the Byzantine orbit. Differences in language and cultural traditions also played their part in this assertion of religious separateness. Not long after this definitive split, Georgia attained the status of autocephaly or ecclesiastical autonomy, as a national church within the Eastern Orthodox community. The last Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia to be consecrated in Antioch was John III (744-60); since that time, the

[2] D. M. Lang, *Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints* (London, 1956), pp. 25–26.

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Georgian Patriarchs have been elected and consecrated by the Georgian Bishops at Mtskheta.

ISLAM first reached the Caucasus around the year A.D. 640. The conquering armies of the followers of Muhammad overran the whole of Armenia and eastern Georgia, also Daghestan and Azerbaijan, including Derbend, Baku, and Shirvan. The wild mountain tribes of north-eastern Caucasia were converted to Islam, though some of the medieval Muslim travellers later complained that large elements of paganism remained alongside orthodox Islamic beliefs. It is interesting to find that parts of north Caucasia soon fell under the influence of the Khazars of the Volga, who founded an important kingdom with its capital at Itil, and around A.D. 740 actually adopted the Jewish faith as their state religion.

We shall not attempt to chronicle the turbulent centuries between the first advent of Islam to the Caucasus, and the establishment of Tsarist power there, in which process the key date is the relatively peaceful annexation of eastern Georgia in 1801. The Georgians soon grew disillusioned with their new Russian overlords, who in some ways did not seem greatly preferable to the Turks and Persians against whom they had appealed to Russia for aid. By a stroke of the pen, Tsar Alexander I in 1811 abolished the autocephaly of the Georgian Church, and sent the Catholicos-Patriarch, Antoni II, into exile at St Petersburg. In 1820, the Russians arrested the Georgian Archbishops of Gelati and Kutaisi, the chief church leaders of western Georgia. Archbishop Dositheus of Kutaisi was beaten up so severely that he died soon afterwards.[3] It is worth noting that even the Ottoman Turks, despite their great persecution of the Balkan Christians, seldom went to the extreme length of actually abolishing an entire church hierarchy in this drastic manner. From 1811 until 1917, the Georgian Church was ruled by a succession of prelates with the title of Exarch of Georgia; all but one were of Russian birth, and did everything they could to stamp out the use of Georgian in church services and religious usage generally. One of the first acts of the Georgian bishops, on the news of the outbreak of the February revolution in 1917, was to assemble at the ancient patriarchal cathedral in Mtskheta, and declare the independence of the Georgian Orthodox Church from that of Russia. In September of the same year, Bishop Kyrion was elected Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, and the succession of supreme heads of the Georgian Church, all of them of Georgian birth, has continued unbroken to the present day.

The Armenian Church, as we have indicated, had parted company from the Orthodox community many centuries before, on theological grounds. By the time the Russians annexed the northern regions of

[3] D. M. Lang, *A Modern History of Georgia* (London, 1962), p. 56.

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Armenia in 1828, the Armenian Church was already a worldwide organisation, with its Patriarchs and Archbishops in Constantinople, Jerusalem, and many of the chief cities of the Near East and the Balkan regions. The most holy site in Armenia is Echmiadzin, the former Vagharshapat, royal city of King Tiridates, the first Christian king of Armenia. From this hallowed place on a fine day, one can see the twin summit of Mount Ararat, where Noah's Ark traditionally came to rest after the Flood.

The Russian tsars made no attempt to assimilate the Armenian Church, but contented themselves with stationing a representative of the Holy Synod permanently in Echmiadzin to keep a check on the activities of the Catholicos, and insisting on the right to approve or veto any candidate for the office of Supreme Catholicos before he could be formally consecrated. I have seen several ornate Imperial charters confirming the Armenian Supreme Catholicos in office, which have been preserved in the Cathedral museum at Echmiadzin and the Matenadaran Library in Erevan.

The Russian Church and state were thus able to reach some kind of working arrangement with the Georgian and Armenian Christians. It was the Muslims who put up the most dogged fight. In 1829, the Imam Qazi Mullah of Daghestan issued a general appeal in favour of a Holy War against the Infidels. He mobilised a picked corps of well-armed tribesmen, known as Murids, who were all adepts of a politico-religious movement, with puritanical features, devoted to the triumph of Islam. Muridism reached its zenith under the famous Imam Shamil, who kept the armed might of Russia at bay for a quarter of a century, until forced to capitulate at Gunib in 1859. Islam continued a militant force in north-western Caucasia five years longer, until 1864, when the warlike Circassians were finally conquered. Rather than submit to Russian rule, half a million Circassian Muslims emigrated to various regions of the Ottoman Empire, where their descendants can be found to this day.

The second half of the nineteenth century was an era of pacification and consolidation in Russian Caucasia generally. However, new and terrible cataclysms were only round the corner. The Treaty of Berlin which terminated the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 had the effect of aggravating the Armenian question. It made the unfortunate Armenians into dupes and playthings of Anglo-Russian rivalry, as the Great Powers raced to share the spoils of the 'sick man of Europe'. It is well known that Disraeli was more interested in propping up the decayed Ottoman Empire against the Russian advance towards the Bosphorus, and in annexing Cyprus for Britain, than in protecting the Christian minorities. The result of all this was a mood of bitter disillusionment among Armenians in both Russia and Turkey. The Dashnak nationalist and revolutionary society was founded in Tbilisi in 1890, and the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople was blown up by

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Armenian nihilists in 1896. The Russian government counteracted the supposed Armenian revolutionary threat by confiscating the property of the Armenian national church in 1903, and by enforcing various discriminatory measures against the Armenians, who by now represented virtually the main commercial and professional element in Caucasian society. Matters came to a head during the revolution of 1905–6, during which the Tsarist authorities encouraged the Muslim Tatars of Azerbaijan to engage in widespread pogroms of Armenians. The Georgian bishops tried to re-establish the autonomy of the Georgian Church, and many were beaten up by Tsarist police. A Tsarist general of Muslim origins, Alikhanov-Avarsky, was employed to suppress the national uprising which convulsed western Georgia for several months. In this way, the Caucasus became a hotbed of conflict in which national and religious issues became hopelessly intermingled.

THE war of 1914–18 and the events following on the October revolution had a cataclysmic effect on the peoples and churches of Caucasia. The Turkish genocide of the Armenians, begun under Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1895, culminated in the well-planned extermination of 1915, during which about a million-and-a-half Armenians in Turkey were stabbed, tortured, starved, and otherwise killed. This process continued during the Turkish occupation of Transcaucasia in 1918. In that year, short-lived national republics were set up in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, only to succumb in due course to the stronger forces of the new Soviet state, in association with the Turkish nationalists under Kemal Ataturk.

The Georgians were the last of the Transcaucasian republics to be absorbed into the Soviet Union, and a number of rebellions took place before the country was finally pacified. In 1924, three years after the Russian occupation of Georgia, a nationwide uprising took place, with heavy bloodshed on both sides. A leading part in national resistance to Russian communism was played by the Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch, Ambrosius Khelaia, who in 1922 addressed to the Genoa Conference a memorandum denouncing the communist oppression of the national and religious life of Georgia, and demanding the establishment of an international commission to organise a plebiscite in the country. In 1924, the communists staged a show trial of the Georgian Catholicos and eight other church leaders. The proceedings took place in the city theatre, in front of which a 'spontaneous' demonstration of four thousand workers, demanding that the prisoners be condemned to death, was stage-managed by the authorities. At the end of a ten-day travesty of justice, the Catholicos and his associates were found guilty and deserving of death. However, the regime did not dare to execute Ambrosius, who died in captivity in 1927.

Owing to the national church's role in anti-Russian resistance, the Godless campaigns of the 1930s were waged with more violence in

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Georgia than in many other parts of the Soviet Union. The man chiefly responsible for the suppression of opposition in Georgia, including religious opposition, was Beria, at first head of the Georgian GPU, and from 1932 to 1938 supreme chief of the Transcaucasian Communist Party organisation. Later, of course, Beria was 'unmasked' as an enemy of the people and an agent of British imperialism and foreign intelligence networks. He built up the Georgian League of Militant Godless from 101,586 members in 1931 to 145,413 in 1938, representing over 4 per cent of the total population of the republic. The Georgian atheist organisation was warmly praised by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, Chairman of the League of Militant Godless, and was used to stage hostile manifestations against Catholicos-Patriarch Kallistrates at the Sioni cathedral in Tbilisi.

During the second world war, the Georgian Church adopted a patriotic attitude, along with that of Russia itself. As a reward, Stalin personally gave instructions in 1943 for the newly re-established Moscow Patriarchate to recognise the autocephaly of the Georgian Church; the Russian clerics had previously refused to do so. However, the number of churches actually in commission has remained very small. Of the 2,455 Georgian churches of the pre-1917 period, only about a hundred are still officially open, including eleven in Tbilisi itself. It is instructive to run through the list of fifteen Georgian episcopal and archiepiscopal sees, as listed in the official Georgian Church calendar. In 1950, only five of the Georgian bishoprics were occupied, the Patriarchal see of Mtskheta and Tbilisi, the bishopric of Dsilkani, the Metropolitan archbishoprics of Manglisi, Urbnisi, and Gelati and Kutaisi. In 1962, we find the number of active dioceses increased to nine, though closer examination of the list shows that in four cases the diocese was being administered either by a neighbouring bishop, or by the Catholicos-Patriarch through a Vicar-General. At the time of writing, the picture is much the same as in 1962, except that the ancient see of Alaverdi in Kakheti, occupied for a few years around 1960 by Bishop David Burduladze, is again vacant.

Today, the Georgian Church, though poor, is undeniably accorded general respect as a visible symbol of Georgia's ancient national past. Gone are the days of anti-religious parades and show trials of leading clerics. The present Catholicos-Patriarch, Ephrem II Sidamonidze, is a man of cultured and benign appearance, and well loved by communist and Christian alike. On his installation in 1960, Ephrem was the subject of warm panegyrics in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*. He is in regular correspondence with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and also manages to cultivate friendly relations with the Supreme Catholicos of Armenia, Vazgen I, in Echmiadzin. Ephrem can be seen at official functions, such as the state session of the Georgian parliament on the occasion of the jubilee of Shota Rustaveli in 1966, occupying a seat of honour near the front of the hall, with an attendant bishop, and he is a

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council member of the Georgian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and of the Society for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments. In a sense, all this is a symbol of weakness rather than of strength, for the Kremlin knows that the Georgian Church no longer represents a danger to the regime. It has been thoroughly purged of rebellious elements, and the Georgians, never very prone to religious overindulgence, have found other, more harmless outlets for their cultural individuality, such as the world-renowned Georgian Popular Dance Ensemble, their football teams, their famous drinking rites, and the universal cult of their national bard, Shota Rustaveli.

A VERY different picture emerges if we survey the present state of the Armenian Church. The Armenians, thrifty, serious, and much persecuted, present a contrast in temperament to the more flamboyant, hedonistic, and extrovert Georgians. In 1920, when the communists came to power in Soviet Armenia, the Armenian Church was physically in ruins, the churches desolate, and the worshippers dying in the streets from famine, typhus, and the effects of systematic genocide by the former Turkish occupying powers. Both in Soviet and Turkish Armenia, the destruction of the church was terrifying in its magnitude.

Now there are very good reasons why the Soviet regime should show particular tolerance towards the Armenian Church. With its extensive lay participation, the Armenian Church is not so much a church of the Soviet Union as a rallying point of the world wide Armenian diaspora, which happens to have its supreme hierarchical head, the Catholicos of Echmiadzin, in Soviet territory. The bulk of the Armenian Church members live scattered all over the globe, from France to Indonesia, from California to Persia. Nearly three-quarters of all Armenian churches in the world are outside the USSR, and of the twenty-seven bishops, archbishops and Patriarchs which the Armenian Church had in 1954, only five had their permanent residence in Soviet territory. In this, the Armenian Church is very different from the Russian or the Georgian Orthodox Churches, whose members outside the USSR amount to an insignificant proportion of the total membership. The importance of Echmiadzin goes farther than this. The Armenians, kingless for six centuries, have always looked to their church leaders for political as well as spiritual guidance. The Echmiadzin Catholicos, or Supreme Patriarch of all the Armenians, is not only ecclesiastical head of a church, but a national symbol respected by Armenians throughout the world. The secular political power controlling Echmiadzin holds a key position which, if skilfully manipulated, can dominate Armenian national life all over the globe.[4]

These factors did not really begin to weigh fully with the Soviet regime until the second world war and after. During the 1920s and

[4] Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London, 1961), p. 151.

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1930s Soviet Armenia underwent a phase of militant Godlessness, fully comparable with contemporary developments in Georgia and in Russia itself. In some countries abroad, too, the Armenian Church became a scene of rival political passions, in which anti-communist nationalists and the supporters of Soviet Armenia—not necessarily communists themselves—fought each other with great fanaticism. This struggle reached a tragic climax on Christmas Eve, 1933, when Archbishop Levon Turian, denounced as pro-Soviet by his opponents, was murdered in Holy Cross Church in New York. The question of responsibility for this assassination has divided the Armenian community in the United States ever since. Within Soviet Armenia, the Beria terror of the 1930s weighed heavily on the Armenian national church. The Supreme Catholicos, Khoren I, who had for many years been associated with a moderate and conciliatory policy towards the Soviets, died in sinister circumstances on 6 April 1938. He was popularly thought to have been murdered at Beria's orders by a gang of NKVD cut-throats.

The second world war transformed the situation in Armenia, as it did in Georgia and Russia. Since the death of Catholicos Khoren in 1938, the Armenian national church at Echmiadzin had been under the care of a *locum tenens*, Archbishop Kevork (George) Cheorekchian, who mobilised the Armenian nation against the Germans and encouraged the formation of a tank column, named after the popular hero David of Sassoon. The reward for this came at the close of the war. On 19 April 1945, Stalin received Archbishop Cheorekchian in the Kremlin and discussed with him the outlines of a future concordat between the church of Soviet Armenia and the regime generally. Two months later, Cheorekchian was duly and unanimously elected Supreme Catholicos, with the name of George VI. The election was carried out in accordance with Armenian canon law by the National Church Assembly, including a large proportion of lay delegates. Over a hundred delegates came to Echmiadzin from various parts of the Soviet Union, and from all Armenian colonies abroad except those in South America. Countries represented at the Assembly included the USA, Britain, France, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Egypt, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, India, and Turkey. The Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople arrived in person. I well remember, as a young British Vice-Consul at Tabriz in Persian Azerbaijan, my surprise at the arrival of two smartly dressed individuals from the Armenian colonies in Manchester and London; they disappeared behind the then impenetrable iron curtain into Soviet Armenia and re-emerged some days later, highly pleased with the facilities extended to them and with the recognition extended to their national church by the Soviet government.

In retrospect, the coronation of Catholicos George VI marks the inauguration of a 'New Deal' for the Armenian nation, in Soviet Russia and abroad. From 1945 onwards, a tremendous build-up of Soviet Armenia has been taking place, and in this the Armenian Church

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has played an honourable part. Armenians from all over the world have been repatriated to Soviet Armenia, the capital of which, Erevan, has grown in half a century from a sleepy township of twenty or thirty thousand to a kind of Soviet Los Angeles, approaching three-quarters of a million in population, and bustling with enterprise and industrial activity.

When Catholicos Kevork VI died in 1954, at the age of 87, he left a church which, despite years of faithful collaboration with the Soviet regime, was still in a sore state, though there were signs of improvement in prospect. The Armenian Church Assembly electing the new Patriarch met in Echmiadzin in September 1955. It was a critical meeting, since it was boycotted by the leading Armenian clerics from Constantinople, Antilias, and Jerusalem, who made no secret of their reservations in regard to any pro-Soviet candidate who might be rash enough to stand for election to the supreme office. The delegates assembled in Echmiadzin had their hands tied. 135 out of the 137 delegates present voted for Vazgen Balgian, head of the Rumanian-Bulgarian diocese of the Armenian Church; he was known to be acceptable to both the Rumanian and the Russian communist regimes, and soon after assumed Soviet citizenship.

'God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform'. No more striking example of this truth could be found than the remarkable achievements of Catholicos Vazgen during the twelve years of his tenure of the office of Supreme Pontiff of Armenia. Only forty-seven years old on election, a schoolteacher by profession, Vazgen has established himself as a major force both in international affairs and in Soviet church and secular affairs. It is rather unfair to speak of him, as does my late friend Walter Kolarz, as if he were a mere mouthpiece for official Soviet policy. I have been informed to the contrary, by Armenian clerics in America that, on his visits abroad, His Holiness is exceedingly frank and candid when discussing the practical obstacles in an atheist state which hinder the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth. Vazgen has been described to me, by a young communist friend in Erevan, as one of the chief members of the national hierarchy, which commands respect both in Soviet government spheres, and among Armenians, even in countries openly hostile to communist policy generally. Certainly the public honours accorded to this austere and dedicated man of God, such as a large official car of the type reserved for government ministers, fully bear this out. Vazgen's conduct during the riots in Erevan, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Turkish massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, was heroic and statesmanlike in the extreme.

Under the pontificate of Vazgen I, several churches in Soviet Armenia have been reopened, and the central theological seminary has increased in size. The cathedral of Echmiadzin has been repaired and redecorated, and funds from wealthy Armenians in America have been

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allowed to flow freely into the church treasuries. An Orthodox dignitary, visiting Echmiadzin from Georgia, commented enviously that if the Armenians were really heretics, then their brand of heresy was much more lucrative than the strictest Orthodoxy could hope to be.

Considerable importance is attached by Moscow to developments in the rival Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, the headquarters of which is now situated at Antilias, near Beirut. This Catholicosate is the lineal descendant of the old Catholicosate of Sis, in the kingdom of Little Armenia founded in southern Turkey, in the era of the Crusades, which lasted until the fourteenth century. So long as the centre of Armenian royal power was in Cilicia, the supremacy of Sis over the other Armenian Patriarchs could be maintained without dispute. However, for Armenians all over the world, the sacred sites of Echmiadzin and Mount Ararat, cradle of the Armenian nation, are bound to be of sentimental value which cannot be rivalled by any church centre abroad, however rich in tradition and prestige.

This is not to decry the status and importance of the Armenian Cilician Patriarchate in Antilias, which governs some two-thirds of all Armenians living in the Middle East. Last year, 1967, its talented and scholarly head, Catholicos Khoren, undertook a journey to Armenian centres abroad during which he was received in audience by the Pope. However, the Armenian Churches in Milan and London declined to accord him an official welcome for fear of jeopardising their relations with Echmiadzin. In the long run, the existence of a parallel church hierarchy outside the Soviet Union may even be beneficial to the church in Soviet Armenia. If Echmiadzin were ever cut off from communion with Armenian centres abroad, these would rally round Antilias. This would damage the international prestige of Soviet Armenia as a promised land for all Armenians. In this way, the existence of a rival church establishment outside the USSR might even prove a useful deterrent against the Armenian militant godless, should relations between church and state ever become strained.

WE shall not attempt here to give a comprehensive picture of the current state of Islam in the Caucasus, since this topic is dealt with in more general terms in another article in this issue. Islam, as a way of life, is even more difficult to eradicate than Christianity; Kemal Ataturk and his successors found this to their cost. The extreme measures taken against the Chechen-Ingush and Karachay-Balkar Muslim communities in North Caucasia, by Stalin in 1943, are an indication of the resentment felt by the Caucasian mountaineers against the Russian infidel. The furious polemics which periodically break out around the historical personage of the Imam Shamil are also a measure of the difficulty of assessing the role and personality of this popular resistance figure of Tsarist times. The continued polemics against the cult of 'Holy Places', and the observance of Ramadan

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indicate that Islam, as a social force, is still very much alive in the Caucasus, though the spread of education and the social habits characteristic of a modern industrial economy will, no doubt, make their effect in the long run. At the same time, as the champions of Nasser and the Arab cause cannot come out too openly against Islam at home, the tempo of anti-Muslim propaganda in the USSR must necessarily be decently muted for the time being.

Before concluding this survey of the Caucasus, it seems appropriate to add a few words about the present state of the Jews of Georgia. As a recent special study states, 'the Georgians treat "their" Jews as an integral part of the area's population'.[5] Indeed, many Jewish intellectuals and writers are prominent in Georgian literary life; for the most part, they bear surnames in the Georgian form, ending in '—shvili' or 'son of'—for instance, Danielashvili, translator of Minsky's *Dybbuk*; Kurshishvili, translator of Sholem Aleichem; and Rose Tadvidishvili, chronicler of the Jewish community in Kutaisi, capital of western Georgia. In the 1959 Soviet census, 51,582 persons in Georgia declared they were of Jewish nationality, and of these, 35,322, or close to 70 per cent of the Jewish population of Georgia, indicated the Georgian language as their native tongue. Georgia is thus the only republic in the Soviet Union where the language of the majority—the official language of the republic—is also recognised officially as the language of declared members of the Jewish nationality. In the Russian Republic, in the Ukraine, and in all other Soviet republics of the Union, Jews cannot list the language of the majority as their 'national language'. There, only Yiddish and the languages of the Oriental Jews are the official recognised languages of the Jewish nationality.

According to Joshua Rothenberg, the Georgian Jewish community is 'at present the best organised Jewish community, or perhaps the only organised Jewish community in the Soviet Union, and a citadel of Soviet religious Jewry'. No fewer than thirteen of the sixty-two synagogues at present functioning in the USSR are found in Soviet Georgia, that is 20 per cent of all Soviet synagogues, while Georgian Jews number only 2½ per cent of the total Jewish population in the Union as a whole. About half of the former students of the Moscow *yeshiva*, now defunct in all but name, came from Georgia. There is a flourishing Georgian Jewish literature, written mostly in Georgian, but with strong Jewish overtones. Prominent in this field was the talented novelist Herzl Boazov, executed for 'nationalistic tendencies' in the purges in 1937. The Soviet Yiddish periodical *Sovetish Heimland* for November 1966 gives a comprehensive survey of current literary and theatrical activities among the Georgian Jews; in these, specifically Jewish life and customs are treated with a realism unknown in other Soviet republics.

* * *

[5] Joshua Rothenberg, 'The Special Case of the Georgian Jews', in *Jewish Frontier*, June 1967, p. 17. I owe this reference to my good friend Mr. Jay D. Frierman of the University of California, Los Angeles.

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A recent semi-official survey of Soviet nationalities remarked that the spread of a common Soviet way of life was proceeding side by side with the consolidation of separate, culturally distinctive nationalities. From now on, the ability of the churches in the multi-racial Caucasus to cope with the challenge of a modern, technological age, even with a new Soviet 'pop' culture, is going to determine their survival—or their eventual decline and disappearance. With their appeal limited to a few old women in the remote mountain villages, the extinction of Orthodoxy and Islam would be assured. However, there is no sign that this is the case. It is true that the grip of the church over the people in matters of family relations and morality, the enforcement of fasting, and religious taboos of various kinds, has been greatly weakened if not broken, though not necessarily more than in the emancipated countries of Western Europe. Nevertheless the prestige of the Georgian and Armenian national churches, as visible and honoured symbols of their countries' ancient past, has seldom been higher than today, and communist circles are extremely wary about permitting anti-religious propaganda that might offend local susceptibilities. One sees no early extinction of Islam in the Caucasus either. This may be because of the smouldering resentment of the mountaineers and the Azeri Tatars against the Russian infidels and the Armenians, also the continued economic and social backwardness of some parts of the area, not to speak of the need to soft-pedal anti-Muslim agitation in order to propitiate the Kremlin's Arab clients. It would be hard to improve on the Caucasus as a case-study, in the interaction of religious and national consciousness, and I see no reason to doubt that these same topics will be occupying our successors a century or more from now.

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Church and State and Schism

SOVIET BAPTISTS TODAY

Michael Bourdeaux and Peter Reddaway

THE recent history of the Soviet Baptists has aroused growing interest in the outside world. For the reform movement which arose among them in 1961, leading to a schism in 1965, and the various reactions of the state and the officially recognised Baptists to this movement, have shed much light on several areas: the Baptists' internal situation, their intricate relations with the Soviet state, and also with Soviet society at large. Dr William Fletcher has provided a detailed introduction to the subject,[1] and a book-length treatment by Michael Bourdeaux, reproducing the main documents in full, is shortly to appear.[2] This essay deals mainly with the activities of the Baptist reformers, and the material used comes from three main sources: that part of the reform Baptists' literature which has reached the West; the organ of the official Baptist leadership, *Bratskii Vestnik*; and the Soviet press in general.[3] The extent to which these three sources have confirmed each other, both on fundamentals and on many particulars, is remarkable. The Soviet press, for example, has on many occasions quoted from documents written by the reformers, thus incidentally underlining their authenticity, although this had never been seriously in doubt for informed foreigners.

THE schism among the Baptists stems from the Soviet state's unwillingness to relax its control over their church. This is exercised both through state organs and through the Baptists' official leadership, the All-Union Council of the Evangelical Christians and Baptists in the USSR (AUCECB). The title originated in 1944, when the state allowed the Baptist church and the Evangelical Christian church to unite

1 William C. Fletcher, 'Protestant Influences on the Outlook of the Soviet Citizen Today' in W. C. Fletcher and A. J. Strover, eds., *Religion and the Search for New Ideals in the USSR* (New York, 1967), 62–82.

2 Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy* (London, 1968).

3 Very few Soviet scholars have written in book form on the recent history of the Baptists. F. Fedorenko, *Sekty, ikh vera i dela* (Moscow, 1965), contains a little, but what is said by a Soviet reviewer (*Kommunist Kazakhstana*, no. 1, 1967, p. 76) to be the 'first serious treatment' of the 'schismatic Baptists'—*Na Iskhode Nochi* (Alma-Ata, 1966), by A. Sulatskov—has not been available to the authors. When this paper was finished two books with important material arrived which fully confirms our main points and much of its detail. L. N. Mitrokhin's and A. I. Klibanov's chapter, 'Rasskol v sovremennom baptizme' in *Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma*, III (Moscow, 1967), 84–110, quotes extensively from the crucial unpublished documents, both of the reformers and the official Baptists, and also contains statistics on the prominent part played by young people among the reformers. Mitrokhin's book *Baptizm* (Moscow, 1966), covers the same ground in less detail.

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under an all-union leadership. In 1945 it absorbed some Pentecostalists, and in 1963 some Mennonites. These sects (referred to as Baptists for short) form the only religious group, other than the Orthodox Church, now permitted to organise on an all-union scale. As such, they joined both the Baptist World Alliance (to which the Baptist Church had belonged since tsarist times) in 1955, and the World Council of Churches in 1962.

The Soviet Baptists are scattered throughout most of the USSR. Socially, they appear to come mainly from the urban working class and the peasantry. Only a minority belongs to the intelligentsia, although the Soviet journal *Nauka i Religiya* (1961, ix, p. 48) has mentioned the Kuibyshev community as containing two professors, several engineers, a surgeon, and an agricultural scientist. The Baptists have a widespread reputation for hard work, clean living, and practical concern for other people.

Since their birth in the Russian empire exactly a century ago, the Baptists and their allied sects have prospered remarkably.[4] This is so although, or perhaps in part because, the political authorities have tended, except in the early Soviet period, to harass them. But although the AUCECB statutes of 1960, 1963, and 1966 stipulate that accurate statistics be kept,[5] no exact figures for their present number have been released. However, in 1954 *Bratskii Vestnik* (iii–iv, p. 91) reported: 'we have . . . 512,000 believers baptised according to their faith. And if we take members of believers' families and other people near to our brotherhood, the total number of these people can be reckoned as three million'. In 1966 A. V. Karev, general secretary of the AUCECB, tentatively reported 250,000 baptised members and 250,000 non-adults and sympathisers, stating at the same time that it was difficult to say whether 'our brotherhood' was increasing or decreasing in size (*BV*, 1966, no. 6, p. 17).

Karev's apparently strange statement and the seeming incompatibility of the different figures can almost certainly be explained by the non-registration of very many communities, and by the recent schism. As will be seen later, the reform Baptists claimed in 1962 that two-thirds of all the ECB communities had never succeeded, despite strenuous efforts in certain cases at least, in going through the elaborate process of being registered by the state and put under the AUCECB[6];

[4] The most reliable history of the Russian Baptists is still chapter IX in W. Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London, 1961). Their pre-revolutionary history is given scholarly treatment in A. Q. Blane's unpublished Ph.D. thesis (1964), presented to Duke University, North Carolina.

[5] See *Bratskii Vestnik* (hereafter *BV*), no. 6, 1966, pp. 51–2.

[6] This process has been described in an important article by the lawyer Yu. Aleksandrov, *Agitator*, no. 13, 1966. It has been illegal since 1929 for a community to be unregistered, but the AUCECB has no control over registration, and article 13 of its 1960 statutes laid down that it should 'maintain contacts only with registered communities'. In the 1963 statutes all reference to the sensitive registration issue was dropped.

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and there is also evidence in the 1960s of registered communities either dividing in schism or losing their registration altogether.[7]

It thus seems possible that the 1954 figure of three million included not only the non-baptised members of registered communities, but also some or all the members of unregistered communities; and that in 1966 Karev's figures referred exclusively to the registered communities, while his doubt over growth or decline referred to the Baptists as a whole. There is in fact no convincing evidence of a decline in the Baptist ranks; rather the reverse. The available statistics on baptism,[8] the recent reports of the reformers on this subject, the impressions of foreign visitors,[9] and the heightened concern of the Soviet press at the success of the sects among young people, all suggest a thriving and probably growing church, of which a reduced proportion is represented by the official leadership. Naturally, though, all statistics on such intangible and shifting phenomena as religious belief and religious allegiance are highly unreliable, and our ignorance on these matters concerning the Soviet Baptists is especially great.

Most of the seeds of recent Baptist discontents appear to have been planted at the very birth of the AUCECB in 1944. A long and sober letter to Mr Khrushchev from two of the reform Baptists, dated 13 August 1963, asserts:

> the AUCECB was not elected by the church but was formed by state organs, mainly from churchmen who gave their consent both to deviate from Evangelical doctrine and to collaborate illegally with various state organs, for which purpose some of them were released from detention before their terms were up.[10]

The authors of the letter, G. K. Kryuchkov and A. A. Shalashov, then describe plausibly enough how the state ensured its control of the Baptists by penetrating their organisation: 'The state organs shaped church councils for local communities as if of clay, appointed senior

7 The conventional official figure of slightly over 5,000 registered communities dropped suddenly in 1965 (Fedorenko, loc. cit.), to 'about 2,000', parallel with the drop in membership figures. That this drop may be due to the schism is suggested by Aleksandrov, loc. cit., who writes that the state must withhold registration from a community if its members 'do not recognise Soviet legislation on cults and their religious doctrine and rituals incite believers to break state laws and the country's established order'. A RSFSR decree of March 1966 suggests that some schismatic communities may have deliberately not sought registration, perhaps because they considered it unobtainable or because they were reluctant to give the authorities information which might be used against them. The decree penalises 'refusal by the leaders of religious societies to register the said groups with the state authorities' (*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 12, 1966, p. 219). But in general the reformers have sought registration, and this statement in one of their documents of 1966 seems accurate: 'The authorities have refused our requests to register our communities, and now they are persecuting us because we are not registered' (*Possev*, 25 November 1966, p. 4).

8 See Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia* (London, 1967), pp. 233–34.

9 See the reports by Josef Nordenhaug and Adolfs Klaupiks of an official visit by a delegation of the Baptist World Alliance in the February 1967 issue of *The Baptist World* (Washington, D.C.).

10 This letter is published in full in Bourdeaux, op. cit. pp. 53–62.

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presbyters for regions, provinces, and republics from people suitable to them, and then subordinated them to the AUCECB'. Rank-and-file Baptists, they point out, could hardly afford to challenge these moves when they scarcely yet believed that the mass repressions of the thirties were at last over and the churches reopened.

On church registration, as on the composition of the AUCECB, early state policy seems to hold the key to later Baptist conflicts. Kryuchkov and Shalashov write:

> The registration of Evangelical Christian and Baptist (ECB) churches lasted for only two years—1947–48. In this period of time only a fraction of the churches were registered and made into a special showcase of freedom of conscience, behind which the majority of the churches were left concealed, without any rights and unregistered, despite repeated appeals, clearly in order that at any time they could be called illegal and subjected to repressions with the aim of their liquidation.

They then show how in the period of renewed terror before Stalin's death 'the foundations were laid for the consolidation of the illegal ties between state and church, with the purpose of disintegrating the latter from within'. They finish the historical section of their letter with these words:

> The direction and control over the church has come through two main channels: one more overt, through the representatives of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, the other more disguised, through the thousands of threads of a dense net of official and unofficial agents of the KGB.

In 1953–58 relations between the state and the different religious bodies in Russia became more normal as the new Soviet leaders relaxed the tensions built up by Stalinism. The Baptists received permission to publish small editions of a hymn-book, the Bible, and the Psalter. But in 1957–58 the weather changed. Since then the Baptists' only legal publication has been the AUCECB journal, *Bratskii Vestnik*, which aims, but often fails, to publish six issues a year.

KHRUSHCHEV'S new policy of closing down places of worship of all denominations and arresting protesters on trumped-up charges came to its first climax in 1960–61. It was at this time that his subordinates exerted pressure on the leaders of both the Orthodox and Baptist Churches to take actions contradicting the spirit and traditions of their respective faiths. The ten-man AUCECB, or its three-man executive presidium, now compiled a new set of Statutes,[11] and also a 'Letter of Instructions' for its carefully chosen senior presbyters (the

[11] According to article 6 of these statutes (published in full in Bourdeaux, op. cit.) the AUCECB 'meets as necessary'. Its three-man executive presidium was thus subject to no constitutional control. The previous statutes of the ECB Church, revised in 1948, have not, as far as is known, ever been published.

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equivalent of bishops). These were then imposed on the church by the senior presbyters, without any opportunity being granted for debate. There was a quick reaction to these acts. In May 1961, an 'Action Group (*Initsiativnaya Gruppa*) for the Calling of an Extraordinary All-Union Congress of the ECB Church' was formed as a focus for protest. On 13 August it put its case to the AUCECB, but was rebuffed. Its first statement to all the ECB churches, signed on 23 August by its leaders A. F. Prokofiev and G. K. Kryuchkov, declared:

> Today Satan is dictating through the servants of the AUCECB while the church accepts all sorts of decrees which openly contradict the commandments of God . . . . Because of the subservience of the AUCECB leadership to human directives, the church has deviated from the Lord's teaching and is cluttered with unworthy people; this is the reason for the schisms in our communities.[12]

Most directly contrary to the Baptists' evangelical traditions was this passage from the 'Letter of Instructions':

> The Senior Presbyter must remember that at present the main task of divine services is *not* the enlistment of new members; the duty of the Senior Presbyter is to check unhealthy missionary tendencies . . . neither should he become too involved in preaching; . . . the tendency to swell the membership in our communities is definitely to be discontinued . . .; in an effort to reduce the baptisms of young people between the ages of eighteen and thirty to a minimum, children of pre-school and school age should, as a rule, not be admitted to public worship meetings.[13]

The Action Group made clear from the start both its loyalty to the Soviet state and also the fact that its activity exclusively concerned the internal affairs of the ECB Church. In October 1961 it sent a long and enthusiastic greeting to the Chairman of the 22nd CPSU congress, wishing the delegates 'success in their work for the good of all mankind'; it vowed to play its full part in the noble task of building communism.[14]

The AUCECB's anxiety at the success of the Action Group soon showed. As *Bratskii Vestnik* records (1963, vi, p. 13): 'From 29 November to 2 December 1961, consultations were held by the AUCECB and senior presbyters in connection with the appearance of activity by the so-called 'Action Group,' led by A. F. Prokofiev and G. K. Kryuchkov'. Later, the AUCECB used *Bratskii Vestnik* to publicise

[12] *Nauka i Religiya*, no. 9, 1966, p. 19. The dates come from this source and from an unpublished appeal by the reformers to the leaders of the Baptist World Alliance, dated 19 September 1963. This also says that 'a considerable number of the registered churches have declared their non-recognition of the AUCECB as the centre of leadership for the ECB church'. See Bourdeaux, op. cit. p. 65.

[13] From an article by George Bailey, *The Reporter* (New York), 16 July 1964, p. 28. Similar extracts are given in the reformers' *Bratskii Listok*, no. 2–3, 1965; a fuller version has since been published in *Gospel Call* (Pasadena, California), March and April 1967, and extracts in Klibanov and Mitrokhin, op. cit. p. 86.

[14] *The Watchman Examiner* (Somerset, New Jersey), 26 January 1967, p. 43.

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a warning to the reformers: 'We caution all our brothers and sisters against various sorts of letters, which, representing attempts to place our brotherhood in an aggravated position with the leadership and government of our country, are dangerous and harmful to the entire work of the Lord in our country' (ibid. p. 52).

This message both implicitly admits the state's direction of Baptist affairs, and indicates the way in which the members of the AUCECB may have justified, or rationalised, their yielding to the state's demands.

In February 1962 the Action Group stepped up the pressure by organising a large-scale conference, 'attended by presbyters and churchmen of registered and unregistered ECB communities'. The extensive materials of this conference, printed and circularised unofficially,[15] are dated 22 March 1962, and record that the conference ended on 25 February. Of the AUCECB's conference held two months earlier, they say that it 'approved the activities of the AUCECB and adopted the shameful decision aimed at the suppression of the movement begun under the influence of the Holy Spirit for the purification and restoration of the church. The question is: who was at this conference and what is their spiritual attitude if they say that "black is white" . . .?' The conference decided

> to set up an organising committee for the calling of a congress of the ECB Church, and to authorise this congress, on the basis of materials concerning the activities of the AUCECB examined at the conference, to express a serious warning to the Council (i.e. the AUCECB) concerning its conscious deviation from the truth and the continuation of its persistent anti-church work.

The organising committee, headed by a five-man presidium and representing all parts of the USSR, now succeeded the Action Group as the focus of the reform movement. Its first declaration reads, in part:

> You all know that for the past eight months the Action Group has appealed to the church to sanctify itself and to unite . . . . We have gratefully noted that, in all our communities, this appeal has met with a wide response. During this whole period we have repeatedly addressed the leadership of the AUCECB, inviting them to repent and to cooperate in the great cause of restoring the evangelical principles of church services . . . . We must condemn the two principal documents of the AUCECB, i.e. 'the new statutes' and the 'letter of instructions' . . . these documents contradict the spirit of the New Testament, disunite the church, take away all its rights and banish its true churchmen, introducing dishonesty and confusion.

On the status of the AUCECB, the Organising Committee quotes 'a communication from the Kiev brothers' to the Soviet government:

[15] These materials are quoted here for the first time, but appear in full in Bourdeaux, pp. 32–7.

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> The now existing religious centre calling itself the AUCECB has not been elected by the local ECB churches, has not been authorised by them, and does not represent them. The members of the AUCECB have long since cut themselves off from the believing masses, followed the path of dictatorship, and abolished the rights of local churches to self-determination . . . [The organising committee] together with the whole church, censures the AUCECB . . . for including in the union only one-third of the communities (registered), while two-thirds (unregistered) have not been recognised by it.

The committee then warns the AUCECB's agents that 'unless they repent openly before God's people . . . they will be excluded from the church in the fulfilment of God's will . . . no-one should be excluded who has God's Spirit, and . . . no-one should remain in the ranks of the church, not one churchman, who has consciously deviated from the truth'.[16]

Before electing the committee, the Action Group had drawn up an agenda for an extraordinary congress of the ECB Church, and drafted new statutes for its consideration. Both documents were signed by Prokofiev and Kryuchkov. The draft statutes were composed by setting out the full text of the 1960 statutes and then amending or not amending each one in turn.

Instead of having no congress and an AUCECB which 'has been created' and 'meets as necessary' at the behest of its three-man executive, the church was to have a congress which elected the AUCECB, which in turn was to meet 'at least once every six months'; presbyters were not to be 'made available', as in the past, but 'properly elected in the communities'; the members of the AUCECB were to be elected not 'at special conferences', but 'at the All-Union congress'; the AUCECB was not to 'appoint and replace' senior presbyters, but merely to 'confirm their election or removal', as voted by communities or regional conferences; worship meetings in private apartments were no longer to be banned; anyone was to be allowed, at the discretion of the community, to deliver a sermon, not just the presbyter and the three on the executive organ; the statutes could be altered only by the All-Union congress, etc. etc.

Such a document, with autocracy and democracy juxtaposed on each page, was clearly capable of widely discrediting the AUCECB. The state, in response, stepped up the rate of arrest of reform Baptists. These arrests had begun in 1961, not long after the promulgation of the first of the RSFSR's 'parasite decrees' on 4 May of that year. The first decree, 'On Strengthening the Struggle against People who Avoid Socially Useful Work and Lead an Anti-social, Parasitic Form of Life', allowed sentences of two to five years of exile and forced labour. Most of the Baptists sentenced under this elastic decree got five years.

[16] At a conference held on 23 June 1962 the first excommunications of AUCECB members and others were made. See Bourdeaux, pp. 42–46.

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In 1962 the police struck at the very top of the organising committee's structure by arresting Prokofiev and trying him under article 209 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code (introduced in 1961 and roughly equivalent to article 227 in the RSFSR code, but with severer penalties). He was sentenced in August to ten years, five in prison and five in exile. These articles, as elastic as the parasite decrees, can be interpreted to encompass almost any religious activity at all.[17] They and their equivalents in the other Soviet republics seem to have been applied to Baptists, from 1962 to 1964 at least, in about equal measure with the parasite decrees.

By the end of 1962, according to the Kryuchkov-Shalashov letter, the organising committee had asked the government five times in writing for permission to hold an extraordinary congress, but without result. On 2 January 1963, it addressed a request to Khrushchev, and also asked him to allow all Baptist communities, registered and unregistered, to hold their services unhindered; and ' to order the release of ECB believers sentenced under various pretexts for their support of and participation in the organising work for the calling of the congress, and also to order the suspension of arrests in connection with the work of calling the congress '. Again there was no reply.

Throughout 1963 the persecutions did not abate, and on 13 August Kryuchkov (chairman of the organising committee) and Shalashov (presbyter and member of the committee) wrote their letter to Khrushchev. They were frank but restrained in tone:

> A lawful and just intra-church movement for the calling of a congress is being crushed by the state with repressions, as is evidenced by the court proceedings against ECB believers throughout the country over the last two years . . . . However, the committee considers it as its aim to go as far as possible not to aggravate tensions. This is why, in the annex to its report of 22 September 1962, the organising committee especially stressed the existence of humane laws in our country, so as tactfully to remind and indicate to those who create and defend lawlessness, how much by their actions they are contradicting the spirit and the letter of the existing legislation, how far they have gone on the road of arbitrariness and lawlessness. However, the acts of unlawfulness continue . . . . Today all doubts have been removed that the church, formally separated from the state, is completely under the illegal control of various state organs, for whom both secret and open access to the church has been opened up by the apostate ministers who have entered into illegal deals and collaboration with organs of the government and the KGB.

[17] The core of article 227, introduced in 1962, penalises ' the organisation or leadership of a group whose activity, carried on under the cover of preaching religious doctrines or celebrating religious rites, involves damage to the health of citizens or other trespass on their rights or person, or the incitement of them to refuse to take part in social activity or the performance of their civic duties, or equally the attraction of minors into such a group '. *Ugolovny Kodeks RSFSR* (Moscow, 1964), p. 91.

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Kryuchkov and Shalashov quote Khrushchev's own words at the 22nd party congress, about the need to investigate past crimes 'in order that similar occurrences should never be repeated'. But, they point out, the illegalities were continuing. They give the often gruesome details of recent beatings of believers, rasings of churches, imprisonments, evictions, and confiscations of property. More generally, they continue: 'Believers are being dismissed from employment, expelled from universities and technical schools, their homes are being searched, and musical instruments, tape recorders, religious literature and personal correspondence confiscated'. To those who claimed that 'all this is being done in accordance with the law', Kryuchkov and Shalashov reply that it was through violations of the law by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults that the churches 'are forced to accept as their ministers men pleasing to its representatives . . . On the basis of what law is this done? According to what law do the representatives of the Council demand from church ministers lists of church members, lists of persons baptised, and information on those interested or repentant?'

To the charge of political hostility to the state sometimes levelled against them with the object of 'creating hatred among the people', they reply:

> . . . it is rather surprising that in answer to such hatred and repressions, and despite the situation of complete lawlessness in which the ECB Church finds itself, we remain unshaken in our relationship to the state, and the above-mentioned actions have provoked in our midst no political opposition whatever and no discontent with the existing political regime.

The one aim of the organising committee was to keep the church free from interference by the secular power in its internal life, and Kryuchkov and Shalashov urged Khrushchev to permit a free congress of the church:

> If there is no interference by the state authorities in this matter, if the state does not start a war of new repressions, if it does not back its planted men, then the church by itself will painlessly and in a short time and without any complications re-establish the necessary intra-church order by removing the unrepentant officials and thus breaking the illegal tie between church and state.

The letter ended by stating the organising committee's conclusion that 'at present the official part of the AUCECB (the registered congregation) is under complete illegal and unlawful direction and control by state organs'. The AUCECB members and their staff 'have been excommunicated by the church, but are holding on, supported exclusively by the state'.

TWO months later, in October 1963, the AUCECB suddenly called an assembly of the church. About this assembly the leaders of the *Initsiativniki* (as the Soviet press calls the reform Baptists) later asserted:

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> When the great majority of the original members of the organising committee had been imprisoned you called a pseudo-congress without letting the organising committee know . . . you decided to announce at this pseudo-congress that the 'New Statutes' were no more than a draft . . . How customary it has now become for you to lie! After you foisted these documents on the church, A. V. Karev said, speaking to the young people of the Moscow church in 1961: 'The Statutes and the Letter of Instructions are the essence, the two rails along which our brotherhood is moving. They are founded upon the law. To refuse to recognise these documents is to refuse to recognise the law; this in turn entails refusal to recognise the Soviet state, which is the same as to oppose it'. And now, when hundreds of believers have lost their freedom, and some even their life, because of their refusal to recognise these anti-evangelical documents, you now say that they were merely a draft.[18]

Nevertheless some real concessions were made by the AUCECB at the assembly, which approved a revised version of the statutes, incorporating some of the amendments requested in the Action Group's draft of February 1962. Although most of these amendments were minor, the fact that the principle of a three-yearly congress was established, that any member of a church was now allowed to preach, and that the AUCECB became elective, were important gains. Probably because of the almost total absence of the reformers, however, the new AUCECB remained very similar to the old one. Moreover, the senior presbyters did not become elective and thus continued to be under full AUCECB control.[19] The reformers also pointed out that the new statutes made no mention of the fundamental ECB task of spreading the Gospel, 'which was always set out in the opening paragraphs of the constitutions of both the Evangelical and the Baptist Unions'.

After the congress the AUCECB launched a large-scale unity drive, some of its members touring the more remote communities, but apparently it met with only limited success. This was scarcely surprising, as the repression of reform Baptists continued, and on 16 February 1964, 120 members of the Kulunda Baptist community in the Altai circulated to church members a signed account of the death through torture of one of their brethren in the Barnaul prison.[20]

It was thus in an atmosphere of crisis that there opened on 23 February 1964, in an undisclosed place, the first All-Union Conference of Relatives of Prisoners belonging to the ECB Church. The extensive

[18] *Bratskii Listok*, no. 2–3, 1965, a key document printed in full in Bourdeaux, pp. 74–77.

[19] The new statutes and an account of the 1963 assembly are in *BV*, no. 6, 1963, and a full analysis in Bourdeaux, pp. 69–71.

[20] A full English text is in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* (hereafter RCDA), III, no. 16, pp. 122–25. A detailed atheist account of the trial is in *Sovetskaya Yustitsia*, no. 9, 1964. Both are reproduced in Bourdeaux, pp. 77–83. Another such case is described in harrowing detail in *The Church Times* (London), 15 September 1967.

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materials of this remarkable conference [21] show that its aim was to collect exact details about the trials and imprisonment of ECB believers and to pass on this information to the church at large. Most of the prisoners being men, women predominated at the conference.

The process of information-gathering had begun earlier. An appendix to the letter of Kryuchkov and Shalashov contains details of 42 Baptists sentenced or under investigation. The conference collected details on 155 prisoners. It elected a temporary council which met again on 5 July. Information was then available on 197 ECB prisoners sentenced since 1961; 22 prisoners had been released in this period; five had died in prison or under investigation. This left 170 in detention in June 1964, plus a further four known to be under investigation. Their dependants numbered 442, including 341 children. Baptist parents had lost twelve children by court order, 'for educating them in religion'. The average length of sentence was about five years. Thirteen sentences exceeded this, with ten years as the maximum.

The February conference came to the unanimous conclusion that all 155 ECB prisoners were sentenced not for violations of law or crimes against society or the state, but for their religious belief, and that the ground for their arrest and trial was the introduction in 1960 of the 'New Statutes' of the AUCECB and their dissatisfaction with this. It also challenged the right of the courts to take children away from parents. It pointed to a United Nations convention which had been announced as coming into force in the Soviet Union on 1 November 1962: 'Parents and, in appropriate cases, legal guardians must have the possibility of ensuring the religious and moral education of their children according to their own convictions'.[22] Finally,

> The conference noted that, in connection with such numerous persecutions and oppressions of ECB believers for their faith in God, in some of them a feeling of hostility towards their persecutors might appear. The conference deems it necessary to remind all the faithful that they should not allow a feeling of hostility towards their oppressors, and should pray for those condemning and persecuting them (Matt. 5. 44).

In October 1964 Mr. Khrushchev fell and a temporary lull seems to have occurred in 'the struggle against religion'. In any case, the reform Baptists turned increasingly to a form of action which they probably first undertook earlier in the year: group intercessions in person with the Moscow authorities. It is not known whether or not the February conference's instruction to the temporary council to gain an interview with Mr Khrushchev was carried out; but *Bratskii Listok* [23] states that 'at the beginning of the year' a delegation of 26 released Baptist prisoners appealed to the Procuracy and other bodies in Moscow for

[21] Published in English in Bourdeaux, pp. 85–93 and Appendix II.
[22] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 44 (113), 1962, p. 1047.
[23] Quoted in *Possev*, 15 July 1966, p. 3.

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the release of their fellows, for an end to the repressions, and for permission to call a free congress.

On 14 April 1965 the organising committee's activity reached a new and logical focus: if the elastic and contradictory laws of the country were not, despite many appeals, to be humanely administered, then the constitution and the laws needed to be better defined, and in their most liberal interpretation. Kryuchkov and Vins, the chairman and secretary of the committee, wrote a long letter [24] to Mr. Brezhnev in his capacity as chairman of the Constitution Commission appointed in 1962 to draft a new Soviet constitution; its main points may be summarised. It quotes Lenin's *To the Village Poor*, in which he inveighed against the iniquity of the Tsarist restrictions on the sects, and asserted that 'Everyone must have full freedom not only to hold whatever faith he wants, but also to propagate any faith'. Article 124 of the Soviet constitution, which guarantees freedom of conscience, 'is not ineffective by accident, for it has been deliberately made so. The article was not originally so, but having twice been changed, its democratic content has declined and it has come down to us degraded and ineffective'.

To make this key article effective, the 1918 decree on the separation of church and state must be better defined; the decree of 8 April 1929, which compels state registration of religious groups, must be repealed; and the constitution's article on freedom of conscience, changed on 18 May 1929 to exclude the right of religious propaganda, must return to its 1918 form, in which this right is guaranteed. Before wishing Mr. Brezhnev success in his work on the new constitution, Kryuchkov and Vins stress that this constitution 'must show whether the government of our country will, in its attitude to believers and the church, follow the path of freedom, equality, and brotherhood, or continue on the path of arbitrariness and force'.

No reply came, and on 25 May the two authors and N. G. Baturin sought an interview in Moscow with the then President of the USSR, Mikoyan. They were rebuffed. In September, however, Mikoyan agreed to receive an organising committee delegation. According to an undated Baptist document,[25] 'it was promised that our complaints would be investigated, but after this the situation of believers in no way improved'. The document also reports that at this time the organising committee gave way as head of the reformed church to a newly constituted Council of Churches of the ECB (CCECB).[26] It continues: 'the brothers and sisters are entering the persecuted church, leaving the communities of the AUCECB; non-believers, for the most part young

[24] Translated in full in Bourdeaux, pp. 105–13; Russian text in *Possev*, 5 August 1966.
[25] *Possev*, 25 November 1966, *Nauka i Religiya*, no. 7, 1966, p. 25, confirms the time of this meeting.
[26] *Liudina i Svit* (Kiev), no. 11, 1966, p. 33, reports that this occurred at 'an All-Union Conference of the followers of Prokofiev . . . on 18–19 September in Moscow'. It adds: 'In December 1965 the CCECB began to circulate its statutes'. The seven basic points from these are listed in Klibanov and Mitrokhin, op cit. p. 87.

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people, are turning to Christ', and describes how the harvest festival was celebrated by the Sukhumi Baptists on 7–8 November 1965, when 47 young people were baptised in the Black Sea.[27]

Of particular interest is the description of the descent on Moscow on 16 May 1966, of about 500 delegates of the CCECB, who 'represented more than 130 towns of the Soviet Union'.[28] The aim was to gain an interview with Mr. Brezhnev. A list of the standard requests of the reform Baptists was handed in at the Central Committee building. After waiting all day for Brezhnev in vain, the Baptists decided, for safety, to sleep in the Central Committee's yard.

> On the morning of the following day believers from the Moscow church came to the Central Committee building (in all there were now about 600 people). Soldiers, police, and KGB squads arrived, ready to disperse the believers. It was already the middle of the day when an official said that ten leaders could be received, and he ordered the remainder to go home. After a day and a half of waiting this statement seemed suspicious (the more so as the KGB had already been hunting for 'the ringleaders of the sect' for several months). 'We'll wait here calmly for our brethren, beside the building', said the believers . . . The authorities then drove up buses and started to put the believers in them by force.

The believers responded with passive resistance and floods of song, but then 'a squad of people in mufti forced the believers into the buses by beating them with their fists. Some were released the next day after interrogation, some were sentenced to 10 or 15 days in prison, then released. 'But the most active Christians, the leaders of the church and the preachers, are in prison under investigation. Trials have already begun. Believers cannot be sentenced for their faith, and so the most monstrous charges are concocted. Many of the members of the Council of Churches are in prison . . .'[29]

These events in Moscow set the pattern for a similar series of actions against reform Baptists in other cities. The worsening of the situation was attributed to the new laws introduced in March 1966. These were referred to in an interview in August 1966 by V. A. Kuroedov, the chairman of the government's Council on Religious Affairs,[30] in these terms:

> Previously Article 142 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR did not have such concrete definitions. Moreover, it should be especially emphasised that the range of offences resulting in judicial punishment has been significantly reduced . . . Essentially, there has been a reduction in the punishment of first offenders against the law

[27] See reports of other such meetings in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 23 August 1966.

[28] Translated in full in RCDA, VI, no. 10, 31 May 1967, pp. 81–85.

[29] These events, reported at the time by western press agencies, are described in *Nauka i Religiya*, no. 7, 1966, p. 25.

[30] In January 1966 the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church were fused to form this new council.

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> on the separation of church and state. However, increased penalties have been established for those citizens who have already been sentenced for such offences . . . Such an influential church publication as the *Bulletin of the World Council of Churches* (No. 17, 26 May 1966) wrote: 'In order to illustrate the easing of conditions which previously existed, it may be noted that some violations of the law which were previously punished by imprisonment now merely carry a fine of up to 50 rubles.' [31]

A careful study of the text of these laws suggests that the issue is not in fact so clear-cut. Three clauses may have been introduced with reform Baptist activity specifically in mind. They penalise:

> The preparation for the purpose of mass distribution, or the mass distribution itself, of petitions, letters, leaflets and other documents which call for the infringement of the laws on religious cults . . . the organisation and staging of religious meetings, processions and other religious ceremonies which are prejudicial to social order; the organisation and systematic holding of religious instruction courses for minors which infringe the rules legally laid down.[32]

Certainly, these were the principal activities of which the reform Baptists were accused in the press in 1966 and the reason why many of them were brought to court. The first of these clauses was a new provision, but the organisation and conduct of gatherings and processions which disturb public order had previously been prohibited by Article 143. The new version of the clause on the religious education of minors may also be significant. Article 122 of the pre-1958 RSFSR Criminal Code had stated that such education was illegal 'in state or private educational institutions and schools', and Article 227 (introduced in 1962) could be interpreted to similar effect, but judging by the series of trials for organising religious education for children which immediately followed the legislation of March 1966, it would seem that the latter signalled a new drive to try to stamp out such activity.

A further clause was as poorly defined as anything in Article 227; it penalises 'the performance of deceitful acts with the aim of arousing religious superstitions among the public'. On the question of penalties, the March laws were both more and less severe; a simple violation of Article 143 had previously been punishable by a year's corrective labour or a 50 ruble fine; the new version removed the first of these alternatives. For recidivists, however, the maximum penalty was raised from one to three years.

Later in 1966 further legislation appeared which was liable to affect religious activity, particularly that of the reform Baptists. On 16 September an addition was made to Article 190 of the RSFSR Penal Code which introduced a maximum of three years' imprisonment for 'organising or participating in group actions which grossly violate public

[31] *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1966. The correct title of the source of Kuroedov's partial quotation is the *Ecumenical Press Service*.
[32] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 12, 1966, p. 220.

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order, involve clear disobedience to the lawful demands of representatives of authority, or entail the disruption of the operation of transport, state and public enterprises or institutions'.[33] This law, if flexibly interpreted, seems to make it almost impossible for a group of Soviet citizens to seek redress by lobbying or demonstrating when they feel they have been wronged by authority, and clearly many types of reform Baptist activity can be brought to court under it.

For a deeper assessment of the significance of the 1966 laws as they affected the reform Baptists, it is safer to turn to the other evidence available—the campaign in the Soviet press which followed their promulgation. During the Khrushchev period there had been isolated articles published about Prokofiev and his followers, but the spate of articles on the subject which appeared in 1966 and early 1967 had no precedent. They are remarkable not least because of the detail given of reform Baptist activities, and the way in which they corroborate so much of the contents of the documents discussed here. Despite the difference in tone between these two sources, almost all the activities carried on by its adherents are in fact described in both.

The first mention of the subject in 1966 was by *Pravda* (19 February 1966) in a letter signed by two factory workers, but that this was the first stage in an officially inspired campaign is strongly suggested by the new legislation which followed within a month, and by the succession of later articles in other newspapers and periodicals throughout most of the country.[34] Six of the articles refer to judicial proceedings which had been or were about to be instituted against leaders of the movement. From these it is possible to collate the names of twenty-one people who were imprisoned for up to three years for their religious activities. A careful reading of the charges reveals that each one stresses the religious education of children as being a key activity of the reform Baptists, and the amount of space devoted to this subject suggests that it is the reason above all others why official displeasure has fallen on them. Indeed, one article (not principally devoted to the reform Baptists) tells of a movement 'demanding that special religious schools should be created and that the catechism should be introduced into the Soviet school curriculum'. Elsewhere, one woman 'managed to attract over 80 children of pre-school and school age into a religious class'. At Cheboksary a group of school teachers discovered in a private house 'the activities of the "circle" in full swing. The children were sitting at a table learning prayers and psalms. . . . A Bible was lying open on

[33] *Ugolovny Kodeks RSFSR*, 1957, p. 65; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 1966, 12, pp. 219–20; 38, p. 819.

[34] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 27 April 1966; *Izvestiya*, 5 June, 30 August 1966; *Komsomolskoe Znamya*, 16 July 1966; *Liudina i Svit*, 9, 11, 1966; *Nauchnye Doklady Vysshei Shkoly: Filosofskie Nauki*, 5, 1966, pp. 116–23; *Nauka i Religiya*, 7, 9, 1966; 3, 1967; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 4 October 1966; *Pravda Vostoka*, 22 October 1966; *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, 18 March 1966; *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, 15 September 1966; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 22 November 1966; *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 23 August 1966.

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the table and in front of every child was an exercise book or a pad into which he was copying out "texts"'.[35]

A reading of the Soviet press articles underlines how the reform movement has been unified by the production and mass distribution of religious literature, all of it *ipso facto* illegal, if only because the state, by not admitting the legality of the CCECB, has precluded any possibility that it might produce its own periodical officially. Despite the illegality, however, not only were the original appeals of Prokofiev and Kryuchkov circulated extensively throughout the Soviet Union, but the mimeographed *Bratskii Listok* has appeared with some regularity. The titles of at least ten other 'underground' publications are known, and it is noted by Soviet commentators that several of these are designed especially for children. One article lists seven such titles.[36]

Except for a few issues of *Bratskii Listok*, very little of this material has become available in the West. Most of it is known about only from quotations in the Soviet press. These have sometimes served to make the charge that the reform Baptists are politically subversive. One extract given to substantiate this charge is taken from *Pravda Vostoka*, 22 October 1966:

> Every wise man is powerless and before his Creator he is as insignificant as a worm . . . The Risen Lord wants to save us all from the captivity of dependence on the world . . . A state which . . . orders its subjects to behave in an unchristian way cannot, in the eyes of a Christian, be acknowledged as a power recognised by God.

For a final point in connection with the new laws of March 1966, it should be recalled that they specifically condemn the organisation of religious meetings and processions which are likely to threaten public order. The reform Baptists have been forced to hold services in places other than buildings registered for worship because they are not permitted to have their own legal church premises, and this would appear to have formed the basis for certain prosecutions.

CLEARLY the situation had become so critical by the autumn of 1966 that a great deal hung on the congress which the AUCECB was, constitutionally, bound to hold before the end of that year.[37] The atmosphere in which it opened, however, could scarcely have been less auspicious, for on the day in question, 4 October, news was reported in

[35] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 8 December 1966; *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, 18 March 1966; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 22 November 1966.

[36] See, for example, *Nauka i Religiya*, no. 9, 1966, p. 19, no. 3, 1963, p. 62; Fedorenko, op. cit., p. 167; *Liudina i Svit*, no. 10, 1966, p. 35; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 4 October 1966. Bourdeaux gives lengthy extracts from 3 issues of the *Listok* and it has been referred to in *Pravda*, 19 February 1966, *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1966, *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, 15 September 1966, *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 23 August 1966.

[37] For the congress see *BV*, no. 6, 1966; RCDA, vol. 5, 21, 1966, pp. 166–69; *The Baptist World*, February 1967, pp. 8–9.

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Pravda Ukrainy that I. D. Bondarenko, one of the youngest and most prominent of the leaders of the reformers, had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment. A further barrier to some kind of reconciliation with the *Initsiativniki* was the fact that although a few individual representatives of the reform movement were present and stated their case, none of the sources on the congress suggests any elected representation of unregistered communities at the sessions. It is therefore most doubtful how far the congress represented the whole Baptist movement in the Soviet Union. Indeed, Alexander Karev, in his opening address, declared outright: 'Unfortunately the "Council of Churches" not only itself refused to take part in the congress, but even called upon its supporters not to do so'. 1,026 people attended the congress, of whom 711 were delegates. This was nearly twice the total which had attended the previous congress in 1963. There is no indication of how many of these represented the views of the reformers, but Karev's words suggest they must have been few.

Despite the detailed reporting of some parts of the congress, the official record omits to cover what was presumably the most important item—a statement of the official position of the CCECB by two men who attended the congress in order to deliver it. The record reads: 'The leader of the session announced that there were two representatives of the "Council of Churches" in the hall . . . who had been entrusted with the mission of reading an address to the delegates at the congress and the statement to it of the "Council of Churches"'.

Some leaders of the reform movement could not attend because they were in prison or awaiting trial; others may have chosen to boycott the meeting. In either case it is clear that those past or present supporters of the reform movement who addressed the congress, stating either why they had already returned to the fold of the AUCECB or why they now wished to do so, represented no-one but themselves. Despite evident good intentions, the schism could not be deeply affected by the 1966 congress, at least in the short term.

Nevertheless, some of the congress discussions seem to have been very frank, and *Bratskii Vestnik* in several places shows that there was a much greater sympathy expressed for the position of the CCECB than anything which appears in the official account of the 1963 congress. A speaker from Odessa said:

> They [the AUCECB] are more Catholic than the Pope, for they are ready to call all the schismatics 'servants of the devil', 'children of Satan', or other unflattering names. Such 'zealots' cause only harm to our brotherhood, for this is not the spirit of Christ . . . . Everyone has made mistakes, so let us admit them at this congress, and then we shall the sooner return to unity. The work of unity is hindered by some presbyters who firmly maintain their position, being too sure of their sinlessness. They do not want to see their own shortcomings.

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More notable still were the words of a Baptist from Belgorod, who said he had still not made up his mind whether or not to return to the AUCECB:

> Here at the congress many have been blaming the 'organising committee' for the schism. But in fact some regional senior presbyters appointed by the AUCECB are to blame for it. These presbyters were not senior (*starshimi*) but terrible (*strashnymi*). The senior presbyter of the Belgorod region has caused much pain. Until such presbyters are removed we cannot be reunited.

The main business of the congress, as in 1963, was to adopt an entirely new constitution; this was done on the second day. It is much less equivocal than the 1963 version, with Articles 1 and 3 now clearly setting out what the aims of the ECB Church should be. It also seems that there were further concessions to the 1962 demands of Prokofiev and Kryuchkov, continuing the line which had begun to be adopted in 1963. For whereas Article 7 of the 1963 constitution stated that 'the AUCECB appoints senior presbyters for each district, region and republic',[38] Article 14 of the new constitution reads:

> (a) The AUCECB appoints senior presbyters and their helpers with the approval of the churches of which they are members and through their election at regional, inter-regional, and republican meetings of presbyters; (b) in order to help senior presbyters these meetings elect councils of experienced ministers of the church. . . .

Clearly, though, the exact mechanism for the appointment of senior presbyters is not entirely clarified by the unusual wording of this clause.

Greater independence certainly seems now to have been granted to local churches in the handling of their own affairs. Articles 19, 20, and 26, taken together, are a much more positive statement of the aims and position of the local church than anything in the 1963 constitution. Further concessions to the demands of the reformers stipulate that the members of the AUCECB must be 'worthy'; that there will now be courses and seminars for ministers, preachers, and choir trainers; the AUCECB must now represent the interests of its member churches in dealings with the state, and there can no longer be any question of government representatives working in the AUCECB headquarters in Moscow; places for worship can now be officially provided in private houses.

A final key matter at the congress was the election of a new AUCECB. The council was expanded to 25 members, of whom one is a past member of the reform movement. As the AUCECB plenum is not bound to meet more than once a year, however, the practical day-to-day running of affairs will be the responsibility of its presidium of ten members. The names of the latter include most of the long-established leaders of the AUCECB whom the *Initsiativniki* felt

[38] *BV*, no. 6, 1963, p. 44.

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compelled to excommunicate. It therefore appears unlikely that there has been any radical change of emphasis within the organisation of the AUCECB.

On the evidence available it would seem that the congress represented a further step forward by the AUCECB in the direction of meeting the demands of the reformers, but that several circumstances militated against an extensive healing of the schism. After all the wounds inflicted over seven years, such healing would appear improbable unless—and this is at present unlikely—the reformers' leaders, at least, were freed and given some real influence in a reunited church. However, more trials of reformers took place immediately after the congress, and meetings were held by their leaders in Kirgizia, where the decision seems to have been taken to reject the proceedings of the congress. Further arrests took place in 1967, and an extraordinarily vicious attack on the Baptists appeared in a report of the execution of an old Baptist woman for the alleged murder of her daughter, who was said to have refused to join the sect.[39]

But whatever the future of the Baptists' tragic schism,[40] the activities of the reformers will surely go down in Russian history as an original and remarkable form of challenge to the state's *de facto* authority in a particular sphere. Their example may even have inspired certain aspects of a similar attempt at reform in the Orthodox Church. Whatever wider political disaffection may have appeared in their ranks, their leaders have scrupulously limited their quarrel with the state, at least up to 1966, to peaceful pressure for constitutional change and respect for the law, all within the area of church-state relations. Here their patience, moderation, and persistence in the face of superior force have demonstrated their moral strength. The Soviet regime must either meet them at least half-way or risk their deepening alienation.

[39] *Pravda Vostoka*, 22 October 1966; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 22 November 1966; *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, 15 June 1967. This last article also records the discovery of a large illegal Baptist printing-works on the outskirts of Frunze.

[40] Two new important documents have just reached the West. They run to more than 20,000 words and list 202 persons, of whom 197 were imprisoned in 1966–67. The documents are signed by five prisoners' wives. Brief extracts from the document dated 5 June 1967 were published in *The Observer* (London), 19 November 1967. The full text of the second document, dated 15 August 1967, is given in *Possev*, 20, 27 October 1967.

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NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOVIET ISLAM

Geoffrey Wheeler

ACCORDING to the most recent Soviet statistics, Islam occupies second place among the religious communities of the USSR as regards the number of its adherents. In the absence of any official assessment, the total number of people who can historically be regarded as Muslims is between 25 and 30 million. Officially there are said to be 400 mosques and 'about 1,000 unregistered groups practising religious observances in their own homes'.[1]

The position of Islam in the USSR is unique in more respects than one: it is the sole religion practised by over 30 more or less compact but distinct nationalities, among whom it serves as a cultural bond of union; the traditional Islamic way of life, although to some extent affected by westernisation, especially in the towns, remains as a whole far more distinct and particularist than that associated with any other religion or ideology; the Muslim peoples of the USSR have much closer cultural, social, and biological affinities with the non-Soviet Muslim peoples living adjacent to them than with any of the non-Muslim Soviet nationalities.

Geographically, the Muslims are distributed in three main areas: three-fifths of them live in the five Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs, one-fifth in the Caucasus, and one-fifth in the Ural and Volga regions. The establishment of Islam took place at various times after the Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries: it was widespread in what are now the Azerbaijan, Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen SSRs by the end of the ninth century; it reached the north Caucasus, the Volga and Ural regions and the Kazakh and Kirgiz SSRs much later, in some instances not until the sixteenth century, its replacement of Zoroastrianism and Shamanism being often somewhat superficial. The final establishment of Islam as a cultural influence in the Kazakh steppes during the eighteenth century owed much to the deliberate policy of the Russian government.

Apart from small Arab (22,000) and Chinese (Dungans 21,000) communities, the Muslims fall into three ethnic groups—Turkic (80 per cent), Ibero-Caucasian (9 per cent), and Iranian (11 per cent). Within these groups the strongest link apart from Islam is language rather than race, the inter-resemblance of the 13 Turkic languages being very marked. On the other hand, the ethnic distinction between the Turkic and Iranian groups is in some instances (e.g. Uzbeks and Tajiks in the

[1] *Spravochnik Propagandista i Agitatora* (Moscow, 1966), p. 149.

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Zeravshan valley) very slight. Inter-marriage among the different nationalities and even among the ethnic groups is probably becoming more frequent, but inter-marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims remains extremely rare, and between Muslim girls and non-Muslim men virtually non-existent. In spite of the high proportion of non-Muslim settlers in the Muslim lands—more than one-third—in the Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs, there has been only a negligible degree of biological and cultural assimilation.

Islam as a bond of union

The nature of Islam as a religion is well known and needs no description here. But certain of its features assume a special importance in a Muslim community which is under atheist as well as alien rule. In the first place, Islam, being like Judaism a non-sacerdotal religion, depends less for its survival on the regular conduct of religious ceremonial worship by qualified clergy than the various Christian sects. Although congregational prayers form an important part of a free Muslim society, the need is not apparently felt for secret conventicles of the faithful. Secondly, the confession of faith required of every Muslim has to be made in the heart rather than openly. Although this seems to require less courage than the open profession enjoined by Christianity, it plays an important part in ensuring the perpetuation of theism. Moreover, the persistence of such rites and practices as circumcision and the giving of Muslim names—both still almost universal—and the frequent performance of religious marriage and funeral ceremonies, serve as a tacit admission that God exists. Whether or not such observances are in fact more common in Soviet Islam than in Soviet Christendom, the authoritative Soviet periodical *Voprosy Filosofii* has recently declared that 'the percentage of believers in the republics of the Soviet East is considerably higher than in the other Union republics'.[2] This is because the vast majority of the local inhabitants of these republics regard and speak of themselves as Muslims in a way that the majority of the inhabitants of the non-Muslim republics probably do not regard and certainly do not speak of themselves as Christians. In any event, the propagation of atheism seems to make less progress in the Muslim republics than elsewhere.

The strength of the Islamic bond of union is relatively unimpaired by sectarian differences, the great majority of the Soviet Muslims following the Hanafi rite of orthodox Islam.

If culture can broadly be defined as 'way of life', then the cultures of the various Soviet Muslim nationalities display remarkable similarities. In spite of the efforts of Tsarist and Soviet administrators, it remains different from and even inimical to western culture. If Professor MacIver's distinction that 'our culture is what we are, our

[2] Vagabov, M. V. 'Bolshe vnimaniya sovetskomu islamovedeniyu', *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1966, no. 12.

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civilisation is what we use' be accepted, then it can be said that western civilisation has made and is still making considerable progress in Soviet Muslim society, but that the impression made by Soviet or Russian culture is so far only superficial. What is known as Islamic culture is not entirely based on Quranic precept, nor is its persistence due to conviction that Islam is the one true religion. Its essence stems from the social and administrative systems introduced by the Arab and Persian conquerors from the eighth century onward which successfully outlasted the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century. Nearly all traces of the original Muslim administrative, agrarian, legal, and educational systems have now been removed; but a whole range of social customs, rules of behaviour and inhibitions, particularly those relating to family life, remain strongly entrenched in spite of official attempts to dislodge them. Many of these are pre-Islamic in origin, but have become associated with Islam; many of them have nothing to recommend them on Islamic or any other grounds; but they are preserved as something of the people's own which is not to be wrested from them by alien interlopers.

On the intellectual level the cultural bond of union has been to a considerable extent weakened by westernisation and by the secularisation of education. Up to the revolution literacy among the Muslims, even among such relatively casual believers as the Kazakhs, almost always included some knowledge of Arabic and Persian, and in multilingual areas such as the North Caucasus Arabic was used by intellectuals as the lingua franca. Today the great majority of even highly educated Muslims are almost completely ignorant of these languages and even of the Arabic script in which their own languages were formerly written. But, contrary to Soviet aims and expectations, the Turkic languages retain an astonishingly high proportion of Arabic and Persian loan-words, this in some instances, notably in Uzbek, being as high as one-third of the standard literary vocabulary. In general, the proportion of such words in the Turkish of Turkey is less, being now not more than a quarter. Somewhat paradoxically, the widespread use of Russian as the medium of higher education and as a lingua franca among peoples whose own languages are mutually unintelligible, has resulted in the various Muslim communities knowing more about each other than previously. A similar phenomenon occurred in India during the British period, where the use of English and the great improvement in communications brought together hitherto widely separated Muslim communities.

During the first quarter of the twentieth century two movements took place among the Muslims which aimed broadly at cultural and even at political union. They were not specifically separatist, but were fundamentally anti-Russian. The first of these movements was Jadidism (from *usul-i-jadid* or New Method), which was directed against both Russian influence and the reactionary Muslim clergy. It was a genuine

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reformist and even revolutionary movement, although it never contemplated the use of force, its principal manifestation being in education and literature. Originating among the Tatars of Kazan and the Crimea, it soon spread over the provinces of the Steppe Region and Turkestan. 'New Method' schools were set up all over these provinces, and even in the semi-independent Emirate of Bukhara, which competed successfully against the so-called Russo-native schools established by the Tsarist government with a view to extending some of the benefits of western education to the Muslims, and also to some extent against the *medresehs*, although they were bitterly opposed by the clergy, who in the last years of the Tsarist regime found themselves making common cause with the Russian government.

The Jadid reformers attended more to the cultural and social aspects of Islam than to its spiritual and doctrinal side; but the movement aimed at purifying rather than destroying Islam, as was claimed by its reactionary opponents. Its stand against the outward trappings of Islam, obscurantism, and the low status of women, seemed at first to afford ground for collaboration with the Soviet regime. When, however, the Jadids realised that the Soviets aimed at the complete destruction of Islamic culture, and the Soviets for their part awoke to the fact that the Jadids were interested in nationalism rather than the class war, a complete rupture became inevitable, and by 1930 all the Jadid reformers and men of letters had disappeared, many of them having been executed as counter-revolutionaries.

The second movement, that of Sultan Galiyev known as *Sultangaliyevism*, was more political, less cultural, and quite unspiritual in its aims; it was none the less essentially Islamic. Sultan Galiyev was a Tatar Muslim communist holding a high position in the Soviet Commissariat of Nationality Affairs. Himself a convinced communist, and perhaps even a convinced atheist, his movement was based on his further conviction that the German and Russian interpretation of Marxism was quite unsuited to the fundamentally agrarian society of Asia and particularly to the Muslim world. His aim was to unite politically first the Turkic and then the remaining Muslim peoples of Russia. Later, this new Muslim communist state would embrace the Muslim peoples of the non-Soviet world in a kind of colonial international, which would challenge the domination of the imperialist powers. Although the movement aroused the interest of many Muslim nationalist leaders, it had made little progress before Sultan Galiyev was denounced as a counter-revolutionary and dismissed from the party in 1923. He later disappeared and was probably executed.

Both Jadidism and Sultangaliyevism were physically suppressed by the Soviet regime. Together they convinced the Soviet authorities that Islam constituted a fourfold danger: it was not only, like other religions, ideologically objectionable; it was culturally, socially, and politically dangerous as well. Jadidism threatened to steal the cultural and social

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thunder of the Communist Party; and Sultangaliyevism aimed at removing the centre of gravity of the communist movement to Asia. This exaggerated fear of Islam was inherited in part from the Tsarist regime. As will be shown presently, it still exists, although there are some signs that new tactics are being employed to cope with it.

Tsarist and Soviet attitudes towards Islam

Russia has been longer and more closely in touch with Muslim peoples than any other European state. For over 200 years Muscovy was ruled by the islamised Mongols; from the middle of the sixteenth century the Tatar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan were an integral part of Russia; from the eighteenth century onwards the frontiers of the Russian state actually marched with those of the two principal independent Muslim states—Turkey and Persia; finally, from the middle of the nineteenth century Russian rule has been paramount over the Muslim lands of the Caucasus and what are now the Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs; none of these areas is separated from metropolitan Russia by any considerable geographical barriers.

All these circumstances have combined to produce in the mind of Russia's rulers an attitude towards Islam as a whole which can best be described as a mixture of suspicion and aversion. Tsarist governments regarded Islamic culture and society with barely concealed contempt, but their attitude towards Muslim religious practice and education was if anything more tolerant than towards those of Jewry and the dissenting Christian sects. Since the revolution, cultural contempt has continued and increased; relative religious toleration also continued for a few years; but after the liquidation of Sultangaliyevism in 1923, tolerance of Islam was reduced to the low level of other religions.

The Tsarist approach to Islam was vacillating and inconsistent. Until the 1880s it amounted to a belief that contact with the 'superior' Russian culture would result in its eventually dying of inanition. No positive measures were taken to restrict the practice of religion or religious instruction in the schools. Later, and particularly after the Andizhan revolt of 1898 and the rise of Jadidism at the turn of the century, a different approach developed, which involved a closer study of Islam and the alliance with the 'reactionary clergy' referred to earlier. Writing in 1927, Barthold stated: 'The alliance with old-style Islam completely changed the [Russian] attitude towards the old Muslim school. In 1876, it seemed that Russian influence in the East was confronted with an important and lofty task—that of breaking the intellectual shackles of Mohammedanism and of bringing the natives into the orbit of a humane existence. In 1907, however, the Muslim school was compared with the ancient Russian Christian school; the medreseh course was recognised as "a very serious one" compatible with the real requirements of the people's life.'[3] This change, as Barthold very

[3] Barthold, V. V., *History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan* (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 143–44.

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well knew, was dictated by expediency. A more real mitigation of the earlier attitude of contempt and suspicion was afforded by the work of such scholars as Barthold himself, Krachkovsky and Ostroumov, and of educationists such as Nalivkin and Ilminsky.

The Soviet attitude towards Islam has resembled that of the Tsarist regime in the sense that it began by gravely underestimating the staying power of Islam. The Communist Party believed that the influence of Russian culture, now combined with the benefits conferred by socialism, with secular education, cultural regimentation, anti-religious propaganda as well as coercive measures, to which the Tsarist government had never resorted once territorial conquest was complete, would soon work the oracle. Like its Tsarist predecessors, the Soviet government has realised that results have fallen far short of expectation and that Islam is much more strongly entrenched than they had been led to believe. At the same time the economic and strategic importance of the Muslim borderlands is seen as far greater than in the Tsarist period. The emergence of a hostile China over the 1,800 mile Central Asian frontier, and Soviet involvement in the Middle East, are other factors which would seem to point to the need for a revision of the stereotyped communist attitude.

There is now, of course, no longer any question of 'an alliance with old-style Islam': the influence once wielded by the reactionary Muslim clergy has been broken for ever in Soviet Islam and it has been greatly reduced, if not permanently undermined, in most of the non-Soviet Muslim world. The unwisdom of the campaigns of crude blasphemy and ridicule waged against Islam and other religions has long been realised and their replacement by a process of scientific exegesis advocated. A more recent development is the realisation that, particularly among eastern peoples, religion is not just a tissue of superstitions which militates against progress and productivity, but a powerful influence in social and political behaviour, whose nature must be carefully and even sympathetically examined before there can be any hope of countering it. Chief among eastern religions, and of the greatest import to the Soviet Union, is Islam, and reference must therefore be made to the considerable volume of Soviet writing on Islam published during the past few years.

Up to 1965 the principal exponent of the Soviet attitude towards Islam had been L. I. Klimovich. The constant theme of his numerous articles and monographs, and of his last work *Islam* (Moscow, 1965),[4] has been the denunciation of Islam as a fraud deliberately invented by a class society and exploited by the imperialist powers in their own selfish interests. Klimovich's work is raised above the level of crude propaganda by considerable scholarship, but he has not so far made any attempt to conceal the party's built-in hostility to Islam and all that it stands for. But even while Klimovich was still writing in this

[4] For a detailed review of this work see *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1965, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 73.

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strain, a new note was creeping into Soviet Islamic studies, which now began to pay much more attention to Islam outside the Soviet Union, a subject hitherto treated with great reserve. An Armenian scholar, M. Stepanyants, embarked on a careful study of Islamic socialism as practised in Pakistan[5]; another Soviet woman scholar, L. Gordon-Polonskaya, published in 1963 an exceedingly able work on Muslim nationalism in the Indian sub-continent,[6] and in 1966, in collaboration with A. D. Litman, an article entitled 'The Influence of Religion on the Social Thought of the Peoples of the East'.[7] The latter was the basis of a conference on the same subject held at the Institute of Asian Peoples in Moscow in the same year. None of this writing displays the carping hostility which pervades Klimovich's work. It recognises the power and prestige of Islam and seeks to understand its mainsprings. In even greater contrast to the Klimovich manner is Petrushevsky's collection of lectures on *Islam in Iran*.[8] In spite of its title, this is in fact a comprehensive manual of Islamic precept and practice throughout the Muslim world. It is probably one of the best and most impartial things of its kind which has appeared in recent years in any language, and no work by a non-Muslim could be less calculated to give offence to the average Muslim. It even contains, according to Hubert Evans, its British reviewer, an occasional 'courteous measured rebuke for Western detractors of the Muslim faith'.

It could be argued, probably with justice, that this apparent change of attitude towards Islam in general is dictated by considerations of expediency, and that the fundamentally hostile communist attitude towards Islam, particularly inside the Soviet Union, remains the same. But the article by M. V. Vagabov quoted above contains an implicit recognition that Islam is still—perhaps more than ever—a power to be reckoned with in the USSR, and that efforts to uproot it have so far proved inadequate. The author, evidently himself of Muslim origin, proposes, on the principle of 'know your enemy the better to destroy him', the creation in Soviet universities of schools of Islamic studies. It is difficult to know what to make of this proposal; if such schools involved lectures on the lines of those delivered by Petrushevsky at Leningrad University, they are hardly likely to achieve the desired result.

There is as yet no sign of any lessening of the official campaign against such traditional practices as child-marriage, bride-price, and the visitation of tombs. It has already been pointed out that Soviet condemnation of these practices as essential features of Islam, which most of them are not, contributes not a little towards their perpetuation. A more thoughtful Soviet approach to Islam could bring the authorities to

[5] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1964, no. 9, 1966, no. 2. For analyses of these two articles see *Central Asian Review*, 1965, no. 1, 1966, no. 4.

[6] *Musulmanskie techeniya v obshchestvennoy mysli Indii i Pakistana* (Moscow, 1963). For analysis see *CAR*, 1965, no. 2.

[7] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1966, no. 4. Analysed in *CAR*, 1967, no. 3.

[8] *Islam v Irane*, by I. P. Petrushevsky (Leningrad, 1966). Reviewed in *CAR*, 1967, no. 3.

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see that the best and perhaps the only way of finally abolishing these largely barbarous practices is for them to be firmly dissociated from Islam. Success in this is far more likely to be achieved by enlightened Muslim believers such as the Jadid reformers than by non-Muslims or Muslim renegades. Such a change of tactics would present obvious difficulties but it cannot be altogether excluded.

Islam, Nationalism, and Communism

It was earlier suggested that one of the chief respects in which Islam differs from other religions in the USSR and thus provokes a different attitude from the authorities, is its close historical association with distinct nationalities. (There are only three or four relatively small nationalities which are historically composed of both Muslim and non-Muslim elements.) Islam undoubtedly constitutes some sort of bond of union among the Soviet Muslim nationalities, and also between them and non-Soviet Muslims, but this does not necessarily mean that there is such a thing as Muslim nationalism or Turkic nationalism or Turkestani nationalism. There has been much misunderstanding on this subject in the West and perhaps even among Soviet authorities. This is partly due to failure to distinguish between national consciousness and nationalism. The former is a kind of group solidarity not unlike that of tribe or caste; nationalism, on the other hand, has the positive aim of creating a nation state with a government peculiarly its own. The term national consciousness can be applied to the feeling of common cultural heritage among the Soviet Muslim peoples; but its essence is negative in the sense of common resistance to russianisation rather than positive in the sense of creating a Muslim nation-state. Indeed, the formation in defiance of Soviet wishes of such a state, or even of a federation of several states, would present serious geographical as well as many other difficulties.

The Soviet authorities steadily confuse Islamic national and religious consciousness with nationalism. For instance, in the speech delivered in March 1966 at the XVth congress of the Tajik Communist Party, A. M. Bogoutdinov, Director of the Institute of the History of the Tajik Communist Party, specifically referred to 'the building and opening of new mosques' in the Tajik SSR as an indication of nationalism. Of interest also in this connexion is a recent article in *Nauka i Religiya*[9] in which the author deplored the still current conviction held by the Kirgiz, Tajik, and other historical Muslim peoples that they are ipso facto Muslims even if they are, according to him, unbelievers.

The Soviet identification of Islam with nationalism is largely due to the fact that Islam is quite correctly considered a greater obstacle

[9] S. Dorzhenov, 'Am I a Muslim?', *Nauka i Religiya*, 1967, no. 4. See also article by the same author in *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, 9 January 1966, and *CAR*, 1966, no. 2, p. 108.

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to assimilation than any other religion. They are now disillusioned about the extent to which communism serves as an antidote to nationalism, and realise that, thrown together, the two ideologies can produce that most dangerous of hybrids—national communism.

The confusion between Islam and nationalism current in the West, and to some extent in the non-Soviet East, stems from the belief that Islam stands as an impregnable bastion against communism. That this is not so has been forcefully demonstrated by Alexandre Bennigsen in his various writings on the subject.[10] In the Muslim republics there are many convinced Muslim communists who, so far from collaborating with the Russians in the extirpation of Islam, dream of the time when they will be able to assume complete control of their own affairs.

The Future of Islam in the USSR

The future of Islam as a religion and as a society must depend to a large extent on the continued existence of the Muslim republics. From being mere synthetic units created as an administrative expedient, these as well as many of the other republics have over the years acquired a certain reality, a phenomenon which gave rise to the plans for the eventual removal of national distinctions, and of the republics themselves, outlined at the 22nd CPSU congress. Probably as a result of deep-seated opposition in the republics as well as certain international considerations, these plans are now much less in evidence. As long as the republics remain in existence their political and economic stature is likely to increase, perhaps even to the point of their acquiring some degree of genuine independence, and of re-establishing contact with the non-Soviet Muslim world. Even if they remained socialist, which is highly probable, they would, with some possible exceptions, adhere even more closely to Islam, which is just as much an integral part of their national (Tatar, Azeri, Uzbek, Tajik, etc.) culture as the Orthodox Church is of Russian culture. Whether such a development would result in a revival of Islam as a religion, as a mainspring of life, is hard to say. A return of Islamic piety as practised, for example, in Pakistan, is perhaps unlikely; but the strength of Islam as a bastion against atheism, if not against communism, would certainly be reinforced.

In Alexandre Bennigsen's opinion 'the rapprochement of the Soviet Union with the Asian and African Third World must have a direct and profound influence on the situation of Soviet Islam. For some years now the great cities of the Caucasus and Central Asia—Tashkent, Baku, Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad—have seen a continuous procession of foreign Muslim visitors, cultural delegations, technical missions, students and professors; and in their turn a certain small number of Russian Muslims have been abroad. Contact has been made; Russiam Islam is emerging slowly from its isolation and this movement seems to be

[10] See particularly *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London, 1967).

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irreversible'. Stalin's original plan of using the Muslim republics as a cultural springboard to increase Soviet influence in the outside Muslim world has hitherto made little progress owing to the Soviet government's lack of confidence in the loyalty of its Muslim citizens. It may well be that in future it will come to regard the opening up of frontiers with adjoining Muslim states as a lesser evil than continued segregation. In Bennigsen's view such a development could in the short term have no result ' except the confirmation of the Muslims' belief in the superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. But in the long term, contact between the Muslims of the USSR and the new Asian and African states, newly freed from European tutelage and trying to carve out for themselves a path in history sometimes inspired by socialist ideas, might well produce a resurgence of the notions propagated in his day by Sultan Galiyev, and in particular that of building a Muslim socialism without the Russians '.[11]

[11] Ibid. pp. 227-28.

In the Winter 1967/68 issue of FRONTIER John Lawrence, who was in the chair at the Geneva Conference, analyses the current moods in the Soviet Union.

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THE JEWISH QUESTION

Zvi Gitelman

IN recent years the eclipse of the Jewish religion in the USSR has caused much concern among adherents of that faith in the West. Fears have been expressed that, should the present anti-religious policy of the Soviet government be continued, the Jewish religion cannot long survive in the Soviet Union. The continued closing of synagogues, the effective ban on the manufacture of religious articles and on the printing of Bibles and prayer books, and the unwillingness to allow any religious education, bode ill for Judaism's future. While this prognosis is probably correct, it must be realised that the seminal decisions concerning the Jewish religion, and all other religions as well, were made in the 1920s, and that the actions taken by the Soviet government in the 1920s decided the fate of Judaism in the USSR. What we are witnessing in the 1960s, then, is not a new Soviet policy but the continuation of a forty-year-old policy line, though some new techniques have been added, and some old ones abandoned, in the pursuit of that policy. It may therefore be fruitful to examine the campaign against the Jewish religion conducted in the 1920s and to take note of some of the continuities and changes in the strategies and tactics of the war against religion.

The most fundamental difference between the campaign of the 1920s and the contemporary campaign is that the former was part of a broad, sweeping effort to destroy traditional Jewish culture and institutions so that the Jewish masses could be communised, while the present struggle against religion is a more localised effort, the overwhelming majority of Jews having already been more or less integrated into the cultural, political, and economic mainstreams of Soviet society. Whereas the anti-religious effort of the 1920s was part of a 'revolution on the Jewish street', to use a communist phrase, the present effort is more in the nature of a mopping-up operation. The 'revolution on the Jewish street' was a strategic plan aimed at the extirpation of the Hebrew language, the liquidation of the Zionist movement and ideology, the dissolution of Jewish communal and social institutions, and the restructuring of the economic life of the Jewish people, as well as the elimination of the Jewish religion as a significant social and ideological force. At present there is probably no centrally coordinated 'Jewish policy',[1] and the campaign against Judaism is not coordinated with policies in other areas, though it may have broader social effects.

The earlier campaign was conducted largely by the Communist Party's agency for making the 'revolution on the Jewish street', the Jewish sections of the party, or *Evsektsiia* (*Evreiskie sektsii*). Thus it was Jews and only Jews who were involved in the struggle against

[1] See this writer's 'The Jews', *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1967.

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the Jewish religion. Today the campaign is conducted by individuals, including non-Jews, rather than by any single party or state organ whose functionaries are all Jews. This has important social and psychological consequences for both the Jewish and non-Jewish public. Similarly, the propaganda of the 1920s was largely in the Yiddish language, making it accessible only to Jews, whereas contemporary propaganda is exclusively in non-Jewish languages, allowing the non-Jewish reader to absorb and be influenced by attacks on the Jewish religion.

In the 1920s the main techniques used to combat religion were propaganda, pageantry, and coercion. Pageantry has been largely abandoned, coercion has become more subtle, and propaganda is now the main instrument employed. Many of the themes of anti-religious propaganda are the same now as they were forty years ago. In both periods religion is linked with capitalism and capitalist exploitation, as well as with ignorance, superstition, backwardness, and obscurantism, though there are short-term changes in emphasis as when, during the campaign against economic crimes in the early 1960s, much stress was laid on the purported financial chicaneries of religious functionaries who turned synagogues into 'nests of speculation'. The only important new theme in anti-religious propaganda is that religion is a pervasive, powerful, and reactionary force in the politics of the state of Israel and in the American Jewish community, and that it is therefore the handmaiden of Israel and American imperialism.

IT is erroneous to explain the decline of the Jewish religion by concentrating on recent propaganda and anti-religious measures. It was in the 1920s that most of the religious institutions were destroyed, the religious communities broken up, the opportunities for religious education closed off, and the main lines of anti-religious propaganda and action formulated. In order to appreciate the state of Judaism in the USSR today we must therefore examine the policies and activities of the *Evsektsiia* in the 1920s.

The *Evsektsiia*, staffed in part by former socialists, was able to exploit the anti-religious sentiments which had arisen among some elements of the Jewish community, notably among the poorer strata, in the nineteenth century. When Nikolai I ordered that Jewish communities supply a quota of recruits who were to serve twenty-five years in his army, and who, it was hoped, might in that time be converted to Russian Orthodoxy, the elders of the community often protected the children of the rich and learned, and it was working-class children who formed the bulk of the recruits or 'cantonists'. The community administration was directed by religious leaders, both lay and clergy, and so the resentment of working-class parents was often translated into hostility towards established religion.

The cleavages created in the Jewish community by the tragic episode of the 'cantonists' were widened by the refusal of Jewish

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factory owners to hire Jewish labour and by their vigorous opposition to the Jewish revolutionaries who wanted to undo the social and economic order. Since Jewish workers were often forced by economic necessity to work on Saturday, while Jewish merchants and entrepreneurs kept the Sabbath, the rabbis regarded the former as sinners and desecrators of the Sabbath, and the latter as pillars of the community. In addition, it was the Jewish middle class which gave financial support to the *Kehilla*, or community, and to the religious functionaries. Some rabbis were aware of the impossible situation of the workers, but others saw them only as dangerous sinners who threatened to disrupt the religious life of Russian-Polish Jewry. But the opposition of many rabbis to the socialist movement did not prevent religious workers from associating themselves with it. Some of the more naive among them saw it as a quasi-religious movement whose ideals of social justice were precisely those advocated by the Jewish religion. After the February Revolution in 1917 religion became a live political issue. The Bund, the largest Jewish socialist party, was opposed to an official state religion and demanded religious freedom for all citizens. There was to be complete separation of church and state, so that even the *Kehilla* would have no religious functions, and non-religious Jews would not have to provide financial support for religious institutions. The Bund carefully pointed out that 'We do not at all wish to uproot the Jewish religion. Religion, in its pure form, is an intimate feeling . . . like love—and we do not oppose it. We fight only against religion having the social power to force someone into doing something.' [2]

A more hostile and emotional attitude was displayed by David Zaslavsky, a leading Bund publicist, later to become a Soviet journalist, in a famous pamphlet, *Farshvekhte Rainigkeitn*.[3] He resented the efforts of the religious community to 'preserve your rule over the nation with your Torah'.

The *Evsektsiia* inherited this righteous indignation but, like the party as a whole, it refused to draw any distinction between religion and politics, and insisted upon giving the Jewish religion a class character. While the Bund was basically a-religious and anti-clerical, the *Evsektsiia* was both anti-religious and anti-clerical. As a socialist party, the Bund had a materialist philosophy and vigorously opposed what it saw as clerical subservience to the oppressors of the working class; as part of a totalitarian organisation, the *Evsektsiia* had a fiercely exclusivist outlook which could not brook the existence of any competing, dissenting, or merely different ideology, and in 1921–22 it launched an all-out anti-religious campaign. Basically, three methods were used: agitation-propaganda, feigned accession to the 'demands of the toiling masses', and naked force. This campaign was conducted almost exclusively by Jews against other Jews; the participation of non-Jews would have

[2] A. Zeldov (Nemansky), *Di religie iz a privat zakh* (n.p., 1917), p. 13.
[3] *Farshvechte rainigkeitn* (*An entfer di rabonim*) (n.p., 1917).

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smacked of tsarist oppression of the Jewish religion and was therefore tactfully avoided.[4] In fact, the *Evsektsiia* jealously guarded its monopoly over the persecution of the Jewish religion. When in 1921 the local revolutionary tribunal in Smolensk decided to seize the choir-synagogue and give it to the *Evsektsiia*, the latter refused to accept it as a meeting place because the tribunal had 'usurped' its prerogative. Offended, the Jewish party activists halted the anti-religious campaign just to spite the tribunal.

The *agitprop* and 'mass participation' phases of the *Evsektsiia's* war on religion included meetings and lectures at places of work, floods of articles in the Yiddish press, public debates reminiscent of medieval disputations, and elaborate show trials of religious functionaries and even of customs and institutions. At a workers' meeting a resolution to close the local *cheders*, or elementary religious schools, would be presented by the *Evsektsiia* and, of course, approved. A special commission would then be formed to aid in this project. Only then would the local soviet executive committee decree the closing of the *cheder*, but only feeble efforts were made to provide the children with another form of education.[5]

The press was mobilised for the fight against religion. In addition to a constant stream of articles, special newspapers and supplements were published, with eye-catching headlines and vicious cartoons which would have been branded anti-semitic if it were not for the fact that they were published by Jews themselves. The *Evsektsiia* was not above appealing to the prurient interests of the readers and sometimes printed lurid tales of rabbis who were sexual deviants, seducers of young girls, and the like. In the initial stages of its campaign, the *Evsektsiia* published more serious material, most of it in a mild, semi-scholarly tone.[6] Later on, the literature became more primitive, more frankly polemical.[7]

Despite the ferocity of the attack upon it, the Jewish religion continued to be an important factor in Soviet Jewish life. Even the *Kehillas* showed remarkable resilience, though they had been officially stripped of all their social welfare functions and remained no more than congregations of worshippers. In 1925 there were 418 *Kehillas* registered in the RSFSR, and in 1926 there were 1,003 registered in the Ukraine.

[4] Jewish communists failed to display a similar tact. Maxim Gorki, a sincere and devoted friend of the Jewish people, pointed out that when the Russians, especially the peasants, saw young Jewish communists wrecking the churches, anti-semitic feelings were aroused.

[5] See M. Levitan, 'Kulturnye dostizheniia evreiskikh mass RSFSR', *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, Kniga I, 1923.

[6] For example, the pamphlet *Yom kippur* by H. Lurie (Kharkov, 1923), used the writings of Edward Taylor, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and George Simmel. Other pamphlets in this vein were Lurie's *Peisach* (Kharkov, 1924), *Toire* (Kharkov, 1923), and *Shabes* (Odessa, 1922). Sometimes Yiddish translations of semi-scholarly Russian works were used. An example of this is Professor N. Nikolsky's *Yidishe yomtoivim: zeier ufkum un antviklung* (Minsk, 1925).

[7] See, for example, I. Sudarsky, *Farvos kemfn mir kegn religie* (Kharkov, 1931), and Y. Novakovsky, *Gots strapshes* (Kiev, 1930).

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But in 1929 a new and harsher anti-religious campaign was launched. Exemptions from the more rigorous applications of the anti-religious laws were abolished and foreign observers reported that 'The obstacles placed in the way of the faithful have become well-nigh insuperable'.[8] The children of religious functionaries could find no jobs and sometimes changed their names and moved to other towns in order to get work. Yet there were still small, isolated pockets of religious life. In the *shtetl* of Peresfe in 1929 there were eight Houses of Study, a *yeshiva*, a *cheder*, and a branch of the *Tiferes Bachurim* with twenty-four members, some of whom belonged to trade unions, among them a bookkeeper for the militia.[9] In many small towns the religious community was still the main welfare agency. There were still about five hundred synagogues and Houses of Study in Belorussia.[10] In the Ukraine the number of synagogues had declined only from 1,034 in 1917 to 934 in 1929–30. The number of rabbis in the Ukraine had fallen from 1,049 in 1914 to 830 in 1929–30. All in all 646 synagogues had been seized since the revolution.[11]

The 'second revolution' of the 1930s, which transformed Russia into a modern industrial society, produced similar effects upon religion as had been observed in America and western Europe. As the Jew was drawn into the social and economic mainstream of society, he assimilated linguistically, culturally, and religiously. In an officially atheistic society the decline in religious affiliation was, of course, accelerated, and a synthesis of socio-economic integration and religious identification was not possible. The Jewish religion in the Soviet Union fought a rear-guard action against the forces which would destroy it; but fresh reserves were not forthcoming, and the army of the faithful dwindled into an aging and exhausted band of believers. It is against these that the anti-religious campaigns of recent years have been directed.

THE revolution had to be made not only 'on the Jewish street' but in society as a whole. The Christian religion in all its variants was attacked with similar strategies and weapons, though the Islamic faith may have been treated more gently for purely practical and political reasons, which the leading Moslem Bolshevik, Sultan-Galiev, elucidated in 1922. But some western observers claim that today, when the revolution has been secured, the Jewish religion is being pursued more zealously than other religions, particularly the Russian Orthodox faith. There are only about sixty synagogues functioning in the Soviet Union; there is a dearth of religious articles and of religious functionaries; there is not a single Jewish theological seminary or academy. When this situation is compared with that of other faiths, it is often concluded

[8] Joint Foreign Committee, 'Report of the Situation in Russia', 5 March 1930. Lucien Wolf Archive, box 10, packet 73, item 9730. YIVO Archives.
[9] *Oktiabr*, 8 February 1929.
[10] *Oktiabr*, 1 February 1929.
[11] *American Jewish Year Book 5690* (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 68; *AJYB 5691*, p. 118.

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that the Jewish religion is being discriminated against as part of an overall policy of anti-semitism.

The Russian Orthodox Church, with about 8,000 places of worship open, is allowed to print Bibles and prayer books, to manufacture religious articles, and to publish a monthly journal and yearbook. It provides higher theological training in five seminaries and two academies. The three million people living in Lithuania are served by 600 Catholic churches, 1,500 priests, and a theological seminary. Two million inhabitants of the Latvian Republic are reported to have about 300 churches available. Half a million Baptists have 5,500 churches, a central church body and magazine. It is obvious, therefore, that the Jewish religion, with as many *potential* adherents—geographically dispersed though they are—as the churches in Latvia and Lithuania, does not enjoy anywhere near the same facilities as the dominant religions in those areas. Nevertheless, whether this is a result of 'official anti-semitism' may still be an open question. The unbalanced situation may be explained in terms of political considerations just as plausibly as it is in terms of 'anti-semitism'. Paradoxically, the Orthodox Church is both more trusted and more feared than the synagogue. It is the largest and politically best adapted group in the country. Its ties with churches abroad are above suspicion and, indeed, are manipulated by the Soviet regime for its own ends. For many years church leaders have successfully collaborated with the regime. In contrast, in the eyes of the Soviets the synagogue has its main centres abroad, and in unfriendly countries at that. Moscow sees the synagogue as promoting extra-Soviet loyalties, centred in Israel and the United States. Since the Jewish religion is essentially identified with a particular nationality rather than being ecumenical, and since its content is judged to promote national sentiments which focus on Israel, the Jewish religion cannot be *trusted* even as much as the Orthodox faith.

On the other hand, the Jewish religious community is not *feared* as much as the Orthodox congregation of the faithful. The sheer number of adherents of the Orthodox faith make the church a far more powerful social force—a potential pressure group—than religious Jewry. It has to be handled more gingerly, and it is. Because Soviet Jews generally are less secure and more fearful than most non-Jews, it is easier to dissuade them from adhering to and maintaining religious practices and affiliations. Every synagogue has its informers, usually synagogue officials, who carefully note the appearance of new and especially younger faces. A few visits by the local party propagandist are enough to persuade a Jewish worker that his chances for promotion are seriously harmed by synagogue attendance. Furthermore, demographic factors work against the Jewish faith. A recent survey taken in Belorussia showed that of eleven population samples in various cities and towns the Jewish sample —taken in the town of Bobruisk—showed 98.5 per cent of the respondents declaring themselves atheists, while the average for the other ten

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samples was only 65.1 per cent. Even allowing for the methodological shortcomings of the survey and the likelihood that Jews were more reluctant to declare themselves believers than others, we cannot dismiss this figure entirely. Jews are very highly urbanised and concentrate in the larger cities, precisely where it is most difficult to practise religion and even where religion is weakest.

It must be acknowledged, however, that while the Soviet attitude towards Judaism and its treatment of its institutions may not have anti-semitic motivations, they often have anti-semitic effects. Since the Jewish religion is associated exclusively with the Jewish nationality, attacks on the Jewish faith are easily generalised into attacks on the Jews. The average Soviet reader of atheistic articles and pamphlets directed against the Jewish religion—all of which are accessible, since they are no longer published in Yiddish—would have to make a constant conscious effort to differentiate between anti-Judaism and anti-semitism. And even the writers of such articles are not always careful to bear this distinction in mind.

* * * *

Is there any future for the Jewish religion in the USSR? The decision taken in the 1920s to eliminate religious education has probably sealed its fate. Many young Jewish people are intensely interested in Jewish culture and history, but few are religious believers. The thousands who dance in the street near the synagogue on the holiday of *Simkhat Torah* do so because they are Jewish, not because they are religious. They are affirming their national identity, not their religious faith. Only in the unlikely event of the Soviets permitting a general revival of Jewish culture might some religious forms and practices survive—and they would survive as national customs, not as religious ritual. For example, the holiday of Passover might be celebrated as a festival of national liberation without any theological overtones and without religious content. If such a revival does not occur, then it must be assumed that the eclipse of the Jewish religion in the USSR will become total.

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SECTS AND THE SURVIVAL OF RELIGION

Ethel Dunn

THE men who found themselves in power after October 1917 were, so to speak, 'programmed' in a certain way. They believed that they could remake society, and, taken as a whole, they had a pretty good idea of what they wanted. But society cannot be transformed as easily as Lenin and his followers supposed, because, putting the matter very crudely, they thought that if you changed the way men lived, you could change the way they thought. But this has been a slow process in Russia and, in order to understand why, we must take a quick look at the history of religion there.

There are a few important dates to remember. The first is the tenth century, when Russia got religion, a form of Christianity originating in Byzantium. Religion brought to Russia a written language, worked out by two monks, Cyril and Methodius, and a way of looking at life, and a church, the Russian Orthodox Church, derived from the Greek Orthodox. In the fifteenth century, the Orthodox Church was already quite powerful; it had control of the schools, and the ear of the tsars, and when Byzantium (that is, Constantinople) fell to the Turks, a kind of ideology arose in Moscow which said that Rome (the first seat of Christianity) had fallen, Byzantium (which lasted much longer) had also fallen before the infidels; Moscow was now the Third Rome—a fourth there would not be. The slogan, Moscow the Third Rome, assumed that the Russian state had a mission, but almost from the very beginning there was disagreement about what the mission was. Moreover, Russia was an underdeveloped nation desiring to be more western, more progressive, and having to borrow much from the West in order to reach an uncertain goal. Matters came to a head in 1666, when a wing of the Orthodox Church refused to accept the church reforms of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Nikon. These reforms were intended to bring Russian Orthodoxy into line with more modern ideas, and thereby make it more acceptable to non-Russians—such as the Greeks, the Slavic peoples like the Bulgarians and Southern Slavs, and the Rumanians. To have these peoples obedient to the will of the Russian Church, and through it to the Russian tsar, would, in a sense, have guaranteed Russia's borders. The group which denied Nikon's authority were called Old Believers, and the disagreement between the New Church and the Old was more than doctrinal—it was between an old and a new culture. The Old Believers maintained that the Orthodox Church since Nikon was a captive of the state; the church, in its turn, asserted that Old Believers were dangerous heretics who had to be closely watched lest they overturn the state.

THIS schism is important for the history of Russia because it reflects a situation which still exists: the presence of two cultures, the

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culture of the town and the culture of the peasants. From the seventeenth century onward, the Russian Orthodox Church was a servant of the state, in the sense that it was controlled by a Holy Synod whose head was appointed by the tsar. It was the duty of the servant church to go into virgin territory—Siberia, the Far East, the Caucasus—and look after the faith and morals of all Russians. Moreover, since membership in the Russian Orthodox Church was the only way of assuring that a man was a loyal citizen, the church felt a certain obligation to convert non-Orthodox minorities, often by force.

There was, however, a 'servant problem'. Although the church had originally brought learning into Russia, and was therefore, as Marxists were later to assert, progressive at that stage, it soon became conservative: it was a large landowner, with three million desiatins of land (nearly seven million acres) at the time of the Revolution, capital resources of twelve milliard rubles, and in addition it received a yearly subsidy from the state. The church did not want to lose what it had; it was deeply suspicious of new agricultural methods—indeed of science of any kind—and by the time of the Revolution most priests preferred to live in large cities, where their livings were assured, but in any case not in the vast countryside, where what they ate and wore depended on what the peasant could be persuaded or forced to give them. The priest was entitled to charge whatever the traffic would bear for any religious service, from a kopek to approach the cross to many rubles for a wedding or a burial. In fact, it was precisely these mercenary aspects of religion which caused the thinking peasant to found his own religion, to become, in the eyes of the church, a sectarian. One of the forerunners of the Baptist movement in Russia was a peasant named Siutaev, who renounced the church when the priest demanded 50 kopeks of him before his granddaughter could be buried. Siutaev did not have the money and buried the girl himself.

One of the tragedies of the Russian Orthodox Church was that it did not take very much to become a sectarian. The church was supposed to keep an eye on them, but in fact it could not do so, simply because it did not have enough people to do the job. And there were so many sectarians: there were Old Believers who were able to consecrate their own priests and were called *popovtsy*; there were Old Believers who, because of Nikon, rejected any hierarchy; these were called *bezpopovtsy*, the priestless ones. But with each man his own priest, and the country so large, so poor, so ignorant, new sects were being formed all the time. There was really no way to control these sects, and to deprive them of rights as enemies of the state would after a point mean that the state had alienated part of its citizenry without just cause.

THIS picture of Russian religious history is, of course, much too simple. Russian Orthodoxy is one of the world's most majestic religions, and one which, as the Moscow Patriarchate pointed out in 1962,

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has preserved virtually intact the positions held in church councils in the fourth to the eighth centuries. There is something to be said, then and now, for a religion which holds firm against time and change, and many honest people can and do believe in a church almost incapable of reflection. Though the Russian Orthodox Church at the time of the Revolution was extremely unpopular with the mass of the people, there were good and learned priests, on the village level and much higher, who knew that the time had come for change. As it would be a mistake to paint the Russian Orthodox Church as the villain, so it would be a mistake to paint the sectarian as, in every encounter, the hero. Russia at the time of the Revolution was changing rapidly, but not rapidly enough—industrialisation was proceeding at a respectable rate, but the elements which make for democratic government were pitifully few, and deliberately stunted by the autocratic power of the tsars. There was no part of Russian society which did not realise that radical action was called for, but each group, virtually each man, had a different solution. Some sectarians were revolutionaries in the fullest sense of the word: they wanted the complete abolition of private property, the family, and the state; but other sectarians (and this term, by Russian usage, covers Old Believers too), favoured a return to the past, complete rejection of the modern world; they were reactionaries, though not, perhaps, in the usual political sense.

What happened to Russian Orthodoxy, the Old Belief, and the sectarians in the first decade of communism? Lenin announced the decree of the separation of the state from the church and the church from the school in 1918. For about a decade, it seemed that religious communities with ideas of their own about the transformation of life would have comparative freedom. That part of the Old Belief which held that priests were permissible was given a centralised Old Believer organisation in Moscow to administer its affairs. Unfortunately—or perhaps that was part of the plan—this concession from the Bolshevik regime immediately made the *popovtsy* suspect to the other half of the Old Belief, the *bezpopovtsy*. It was a compromise, and the Old Believers had been fighting compromise since 1666. The Orthodox Church had within it parties or factions who saw in the Revolution a chance to renew the church. By supporting this group, which called itself the Living Church, the Bolsheviks hoped to break down the Orthodox Church. This tactic almost succeeded, because the church needed only the slightest pretext to label opponents sectarians. By 1927, the Patriarch had capitulated, saying that his real enemy was not the communists but the Living Church. And the Living Church 'went underground', to reappear in the villages as the True Orthodox Church or the True Orthodox Christians—in other words, as Orthodox sects.

What about the Protestant sects? They had been very busy in this period making converts from other Christian faiths, and they had been

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building agricultural communes. The success of these communes depended very much on their size, location, and technological level. By and large times were bad, but the communes were making headway. Then came the decision to collectivise agriculture; all other competing systems, including the religious communes, were to be discredited. In 1929, a decree on religious communities restricted the sphere of activity of religious bodies to activities within the four walls of their church or meeting house. Soviet scholars insist that there is freedom of conscience in the Soviet Union, but if one follows the course of legislation on this question, one thing becomes abundantly clear: the weight of the Soviet government is on the side of the right and the obligation of the Soviet citizen to be an atheist.

IT is the post-war period, particularly since the death of Stalin in 1953, which we must examine in order to know how successful the Soviet regime has been in bringing about cultural change. The old Russia is gone, and we must ask ourselves if there is such a thing as Soviet culture.

Let us assume that if there is not now one Soviet culture, there may be one some day. What will it be? Will it be atheistic and materialistic? The early Soviet leaders sincerely believed that no properly educated person could be religious, and so they tried very hard to provide education in an atheistic spirit.

The Russian peasant—and most workers in those days were no more than one step above the peasant—was a God-seeker. Marxists explain this by saying that peasants are peculiarly at the mercy of nature. When the peasant understood that he could control nature, he would no longer be religious. Here, in brief, is the Soviet theory interpreting Russian history: in the beginning Christianity (Russian Orthodox style) was progressive, because it educated and united the people. But then the church got richer and more powerful, with interests to defend at the expense of the people; this is an example of class struggle, which is inevitable; then the church split into the two wings of the Old Belief, which was at first progressive, then reactionary; new sects were constantly arising. These sects were of two sorts, those which arose before the emancipation of the serfs, like the Khlysty, the Skoptsy, the Molokans, and the Dukhobors; one prominent Soviet historian also calls these sects 'democratic' because, by and large, they were opposed to absolute autocracy and wanted more freedom. But with the development of capitalist industry after the emancipation, new sects arose, in order to deal with the new situation: these were the Baptists, the Evangelical-Christians, the Pentecostals, the Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses. These sects were of western origin; Soviet scholars describe them as bourgeois in origin, and, especially after 1905, as reactionary. No doubt the truth lies somewhere in between. The leaders of the new sects had been educated in the West, but their origins were among the Old Russian

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sects, and when they were allowed some measure of freedom by the tsar's declaration of toleration in 1905, new protestant sects spread rapidly. Not every member of the new sects was reactionary; as a matter of fact, Lenin owed some of his financial support to sectarians and Old Believers, and he allowed Canadian Dukhobors to return to Russia to farm land in the ancestral places because he hoped their farming methods would be an example to the rest of the country. After collectivisation these matters were hushed up, and newly imposed legal restrictions made it very difficult for the churches to operate.

The result was not quite what the Soviet regime expected. Religion was not dead, perhaps not even dying. The Orthodox Church has lost most but not all of its following; the old still come, both men and women, but mostly women, and the young come sometimes, out of curiosity, or to hear music. The Old Belief has lost many followers, but not all—the old people remain, and in the villages some young ones as well. Furthermore, though a village may contain six versions of the Old Belief, the six now know that very little divides them, and that their only hope of survival lies in unity. Nor is this all: some Old Believer communities have registered membership gains, mostly from among those people who have tried another faith and found it unsatisfactory. The Baptists are the single largest sect in Russia today. But they are not just Baptists: the official title is Evangelical-Christian Baptists, and this includes not just two groups but four, because Pentecostals and Mennonites also form part, as do those who were once Molokans or Dukhobors. Some Pentecostals refused this union of sects because it was a compromise with the world. But Pentecostals in the Soviet Union, if they form a separate group, are an illegal organisation. So are the Adventists, the next largest sect after the Evangelical-Christian Baptists, and so are the Jehovah's Witnesses. What makes them illegal? They refuse to work in collective farms, state farms, or factories. They do not pay taxes or visit clubhouses; they do not vote or serve in the army.

Under tsarism, the growth of sects was one of the indications of the alienation of a part of the population from the state. It is difficult to know what the present situation is in this respect. Not even the people there who should know, know the answer. In the first place, to inquire about a man's religion (say, for purposes of census taking) is not allowed by the constitution. In the second place, only religious communities or groups which register with the authorities can be supervised. Lastly, by Soviet law, a person can be a member of a religious community only if he is 18 years of age or older, and this may even suit religious communities: religious choice is a serious matter and should be undertaken in full awareness of the consequences. One of the few things known about religious communities with certainty is that 70–80 per cent of the membership is female. What does that mean? 49 per cent of the total labour force is female, and 60 per cent of all workers in agriculture. The Soviet woman who is a doctor, or a teacher,

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or a collective or state farm worker is also a wife and mother, and after she does her bit for society, she must care for her family. And in many cases she cannot run to the corner shop for a loaf of bread, she must bake it—every day. She has no time to wonder what's whiter than white: she has a wash to do by hand, and if she has hot running water, the chances are she lives in the newest part of a big city. And so it goes. Everyone in the family reads, a Soviet child told the inquiring sociologist, except mamma. Everyone goes to the club and to the movies, except mamma. The bitter truth is that mamma may want to, but unless she has a mother who will run the house and rear the children, she can't. And then it is 'everyone reads and goes to the movies and the club except grandmother'. What is left to these women after they have put in their sixty hours a week? In most cases, only the church, for amenities are largely youth-oriented. Clubs, where they exist, are for the young. Adult education classes are for the young. Another fact of Soviet life is that the best cultural facilities are found in the cities, and that is where not only the boys are, but the girls who want to marry young. So in the countryside the churches fill an enormous gap. By Soviet law it is illegal for churches to provide cultural and educational facilities, but by all accounts they do in thousands of Soviet villages. Who needs religion? the Soviet regime asks; but one can add: how often does the question come up?

We can get part of the answer by looking at the state of the churches among non-Russian nationalities. In the Baltic countries the dominant religions before Soviet power was established there were Catholicism and Lutheranism. Evangelical-Christian Baptists, Adventists, even Witnesses are to be found there, but we are not told how many, or what the result of their presence is. In the Ukraine sects are strong, and religion and nationalist feelings run together; part of the church in the Ukraine supported the Germans, part of the population left with them, either voluntarily or as prisoners. The church in the Ukraine may be loyal to the Soviet state—but then all churches are formally loyal, except those which are illegal. In other words, no one knows for sure. In Central Asia the dominant religion is Islam, but many Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans have lived in Central Asia and Kazakhstan for years. Both Orthodoxy and the sects are there. Islam too declares its loyalty, but a distinct effort has been made to curtail the Moslem clergy. In Georgia and Armenia there are independent Christian churches, more ancient than the Russian Orthodox Church, as any Armenian or Georgian will tell you with considerable pride, even if technically he considers himself an atheist. In other words, here again, religion and nationalism go hand in hand. Here, too, you have much worship of holy places and things, which has little to do with Christianity and is in fact pre-Christian. Among the Buriats, Buddhism or lamaism is the dominant religion, but for the most part an adequate hierarchy is lacking—as the Soviet government took great care that it should be—and

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what remains is the shaman, the medicine man. One Soviet anthropologist, a Buriat, asked a woman why she had come a considerable distance from her home village to Ulan-Ude looking for a shaman; she replied that there was a sick person in her family, and the shaman was to come and perform services over him. But, said the anthropologist, in your village shamanism is long forgotten, and the lama has taken the place of the shaman. Besides, you have medical people in your village. I know, said the woman. Our medical people treated my sick man and could do nothing. They sent him to the district hospital and he got worse. We called the lama, and he didn't help; maybe the shaman can.

So here we have one answer to who needs religion: those whom no earthly power can help. But science is making advances every day, not everyone is sick, or even likely to be. Well, babies are born: it is not enough to say 'congratulations'. People are married—whether it's love or not, it's a turning point in their lives: it's not enough to sign the new name in an official book. And people die; the living must be consoled. All the peoples mentioned have very ancient ceremonies with which to mark these events—to make them solemn, mysterious, noteworthy. Even the most primitive group in the Soviet Union—the socalled 'small peoples of the North', a group which includes Eskimos—have these ceremonies. Officially the small peoples of the North were converted to Orthodoxy under tsarism—some of them, anyway; and even today, though they are no longer obliged to conform to Orthodoxy and have reverted to shamanism, they take no chances; they keep ikons in their homes and offer sacrifices to them, notably to Ilya-prorok, Elija, here identified with the forces of nature, and St. Nikolas (Nikolai ugodnik), here identified as patron of agriculture.

So it is not just the sick, the elderly, the bereaved, the ignorant who need religion—it is man-in-the-world, if we define religion as the process by which man makes sense of and gives meaning to his world. Arnold Toynbee has called Marxism a Christian heresy, and so considered it is little wonder that Marxism took hold and developed in such a peculiar way in Russia. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union understands very well, at this point, that it must compete with religion. It has done this in two ways: first by dominating religious bodies: the Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, the Moslem and lamaist organisations, the Armenian and Georgian Churches, the Baptist community, depend for their existence on the state's tolerating them. The state has strongly inhibited the organisation of churches in the Soviet Union, but it has not made organisation impossible; in Turkmenia, for example, in the period 1961–63, more than a hundred new mosques were opened. They called themselves 'clubs' and 'tea houses', and this in itself indicates the scope of the problem. In the villages, the Soviet government has not provided the necessary cultural facilities for the population in ways

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which it finds acceptable. On another level, churches are tolerated because old habits die hard, and the regime must have a way of reaching people who would otherwise feel persecuted. Furthermore, most religious bodies of any size maintain what the regime feels are 'positive' international connections.

Yet it is quite clear that the churches in the Soviet Union are an anomaly, at least as far as Marxist theory is concerned. According to this theory there are no more class-hostile elements in the USSR, only the urban workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia (a term which covers almost anyone with higher or specialised education). The sociologists suggest that religion survives because the peasant is still influenced by it. Most of the churches, they point out, are in rural localities, and as the peasant moves to the city he brings his religion with him. However, as the peasant becomes better educated and moves into jobs which utilise machinery rather than laborious manual labour, he will become less religious.

To some extent, perhaps, this is true. Sociologists question believers at great length and seem genuinely puzzled by the fact that there is little understanding among them of dogma or articles of faith, that the difference between the Orthodox and the Old Believer, between the Baptist and the Adventist, is really small. But here we come to the second way that the regime tries to compete with religion. There is a growing recognition in the Soviet Union of the fact that man—no matter how educated or intelligent—cannot live without ceremony on the occasions with which *rites de passage* are concerned. And so the regime has begun to work hard at providing 'communist christenings', 'komsomol weddings', 'Soviet holidays' of all types. But remaking society is no easy matter. The communist ceremony is bound to have echoes of the old religious ceremonies, even if in a formal sense the wedding is a komsomol one; and not even the most dedicated communist or komsomol wants the party breathing down his neck at the most solemn moments of his life. Thus, as the ideological content goes down, the amount of tradition goes up, and the struggle between the Old and the New Culture goes on. Only time will tell if the new Soviet culture can rid itself of religion. Everything indicates that man *needs* religion, and in the new culture, religion will rely less on ceremony and more on the entire way of life as a reflection of belief.

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THE SPIRITUAL IN RECENT SOVIET LITERATURE

Albert Todd

IN quest of perspective on things Russian, one might begin with a deliberate effort to see the present Soviet Russian religious experience as more general and less uniquely Russian than is usually supposed. There is no need to recultivate that over-ploughed, over-sown, and over-harvested idea of Russia as being somehow distinguished from other nations by having a special religious calling, destiny, or spirituality. *Pace* Berdyaev, it seems possible to observe comparable elements of spirituality in other nations. However, the fact that many have made Russia's religious uniqueness such an issue is important and becomes a historical force to be reckoned with. In addition, we might do well to emphasise that the Soviet state's fantastic effort to root out and efface all forms of belief other than the state's own ideology is also by no means a uniquely Russian experience.* Finally, at the risk of talking about the obvious, we should remember the great vitality of the highly developed Russian tradition of the writer, and the poet in particular, as a prophet and seer unto his nation. Although Pushkin created and left for future PhD dissertations differing images of himself, none is better remembered than that of 'The Prophet', the spokesman of Jehovah.

> *Arise, O prophet, watch and hearken,*
> *And with my Will thy Soul engird,*
> *Roam the great seas, the roads that darken*
> *And burn men's hearts with this, my Word.*

In the twentieth century Blok, Bely, Merezhkovsky, Briusov, and Mayakovsky revived and enlarged this Old Testament image, carrying it well past the Revolution. Briusov especially made clear, what was at least implicit elsewhere, that it was also a call to martyrdom. 'And in the hour of your crucifixions without mercy—Glorify the frenzied pain.' [1]

In the post-Stalin era the mantle has again been claimed by members

* In order to keep this essay within manageable size, it is necessary to avoid dealing with a number of writers of great importance. Although the writings of Pasternak, Akhmatova, Tsvetaeva, and Zabolotsky, some of it in the recent past, are deeply involved in the religious aspects of literature, for our present purposes they can be seen as an older generation whose heritage is different from that of those writing today. Their work has an enormous influence today and they did much to keep alive earlier religious aspects of literature. Sinyavsky and Daniel are not touched on if only to keep the discussion from seeming prejudiced to those who would mistakenly want to see them as an exceptional, fringe element.

1 Valery Briusov, 'Poetu', *Izbranye stikhotvoreniya* (Moscow, 1945), p. 173. Unless otherwise stated all the translations are my own. They are only rough literal approximations of the original.

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of the new generation. Andrey Voznesensky, like a modern Isaiah, condemns, brands, and damns forever the barbarians, tyrants, and tsars of all ages in his poem 'Master Craftsman'. Evgeny Evtushenko begins his epic-size *Bratsk Station* with a prayer before the poem in which he defines the role of the poet.

The poet in Russia is more than a poet.
In Russia it is fated that only those are born poets,
within whom the proud spirit of citizenship is in ferment,
for whom there is no comfort, no peace.
The poet in Russia is the image of his century
and a foreshadow of the future.
The poet, without timidity, sums up
all that has happened before his time.

This, of course, should not be misunderstood. The prayer Evtushenko utters to ask assistance from the great poets now dead is to most readers quite secular, and while the traditional idea of the poet-prophet is a spiritual phenomenon, it is by no means related to the life and role of the church nor addressed to a divine being.

THERE has been considerable effort by Soviet ideologists recently to preempt interest in spiritual questions, as indicated by publications of the Academy of Sciences. For example, there is L. V. Sokhan's *The Spiritual Progress of the Individual and Communism*, and the encyclopedic *The Building of Communism and the Spiritual World of Man*, which attempts to show exhaustively in 600-odd pages how successfully the party programme answers to man's varied spiritual needs.[2] Despite its detail it is an antiseptically abstract discourse that is almost impossible to read. Years of silence on questions of religious significance have impoverished the Russian language, at least in its printed form. One recent clearly measurable change in this regard has been the restoration of at least some of the syntax, vocabulary, and symbols of the religious tradition. Several well-written short stories (though dealing in an officially approved manner with the problems of combating religious survivals among the peasants), have given real life and vitality to lost forms. Vladimir Tendriakov's intriguing story, 'The Miracle-Working Ikon' and Yuri Kazakov's 'The Goblins', not only resurrect the forgotten language of simple belief but credibly portray some of the appeal of religious life.

Recently literary scholars and historians have made direct appeals for the publication of religious texts, including the Bible, to provide students and scholars with sources for greater understanding of

[2] L. V. Sokhan, *Dukhovny progress lichnosti i kommunizm* (Kiev, 1966). A. I. Arnoldev et al. eds., *Stroitelstvo kommunizma i dukhovny mir cheloveka* (Moscow, 1966). See also F. V. Konstantinov, ed., *Dialektika materialnoy i dukhovnoy zhizni obshchestva v period stroitelstva kommunizma* (Moscow, 1966).

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literature, history, and art. An interesting example of this occurs in O. Chaikovskaya's *Against Heaven on Earth.*[3] In a preliminary note the author explains that it is reasonable that Russians should know the world of ancient Russian art, poetry, and mythology, just as they know Greek mythology for example. The book, however, is a remarkably straightforward account of the religious legends and traditions of Holy Russia.

The rehabilitation of the language has an importance that should not be underestimated. It is not that the actual words were lost but that their content had been emptied of its former significance and now is being refurbished. Such terms as 'evil', 'soul', 'salvation', in particular have been affected this way. Still other religious words are losing the peculiar negative taint they acquired in the glow of anti-religious revolutionary ardour. It is now possible for a whole generation of writers to relate themselves to the syntax and vocabulary of religious life without the emotional inhibitions of their parents' generation. Now Bela Akhmadulina can write a quiet lyric poem called 'God' that is neither ironic nor blasphemous. Evtushenko can write of Christ with deep reverence without contamination from Christianity, even in poems of ironic jest. Evgeny Vinokurov straightforwardly uses Adam and his innocence as the proper perspective for grasping the evil of the ovens of Oswiecim. Voznesensky can freely borrow the forms of Orthodox prayers—a whole prayer on one occasion—and religious services and use powerful images of the crucifixion with an effectiveness that does honour to their solemn spiritual significance.

Another aspect of this general milieu derives from the rehabilitation of manuscripts written for the desk drawer and from published works of the preceding generation that were doomed to oblivion; both were unacceptable to a harsher censorship under Stalin, evidently because of the religious nature of their subject-matter. Mikhail Bulgakov's novel *Master and Margarita* never saw the light of day while the author was alive.[4] Full of irony, pathos, and delicate humour, the novel treats with unique creativity the New Testament account of Christ's meeting with Pontius Pilate. It takes liberties with the Bible text, but adds a modern subtlety and complexity to the problem of evil and responsibility that runs throughout the book. The contrast between the sensitive chapter on Christ and Pilate and the succeeding scenes of petty philistinism among the good and honourable men of Soviet Moscow society is overwhelming.

Equally surprising has been the recent publication of two volumes of stories by Andrey Platonov, some of which were never published during Platonov's life.[5] Like other writers of the present period,

[3] O. Chaikovskaya, *Protiv neba na zemle* (Moscow, 1966).
[4] Mikhail Bulgakov, 'Master i Margarita', *Moskva*, XI, November 1966, I, January 1967. See the article by Michael Glenny in *Survey*, no. 65.
[5] Andrei Platonov, *V prekrasnom i yarostnom mire* (Moscow, 1965), and *Izbrannoe* (Moscow, 1966).

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Platonov returns to the age-old questions of solitude, inability to adjust to the terms of life, and the tragic meaninglessness of death. The most extraordinary story of all is 'Dzhan', which is told in the style of narrated legend. Images and symbols of both Christian and Iranian religious traditions inform the strange quest of Chagataev, the prophet-like leader, to guide his tiny, nearly obliterated nation of Dzhan through death and destruction in the Central Asian desert. The leader finally succeeds, literally after a descent into hell, in fulfilling the party's commission to save his people and to bring them within the Soviet regime. One day his people just decide to break up and each go his own way, and he is forced to recognise the inherent limitations on the power of the state to satisfy the spiritual needs of man. 'But the people themselves can see better how they can be better off. It is sufficient that he helped them to remain alive, and now let them obtain their happiness beyond the horizon.'

As we look more closely at the more significant aspects of spiritual elements in contemporary literature, we discover that what is important in current writing (both underground and state-approved) is not just a static attitude towards religious questions from the past, but an engaged creative search for values, dimensions, and ultimate meanings that is both new and at the same time ancient.

THE fundamental requirements of art under the canons of socialist realism have had the constant tendency to narrow the scope of approved themes, which helps to account for the detachment of Soviet Russian writers from the subject of man as a suffering human being. The liberalisation (relative though it may be) in contemporary literature has allowed a return to this most fundamental requirement of a religious literature—the capacity to deal with man as a frail and suffering human being.

The first themes and motifs in the new post-Stalin writing came to be expressed by clusters of images of dawn, hope, spring, and a thaw from winter. The first truly religious themes and motifs in recent Soviet writing found their expression in images and portraits that disclose the central importance of man and his sufferings. Devoid of all tendentiousness, the wonderful, timeless, though incisively contemporary stories of Yuri Nagibin and Yuri Kazakov appeal for this reason to the widest possible circle of readers. Their heroes are the most ordinary men—farmers, labourers, fishermen, and the grey nameless petty intelligentsia, all in their natural habitat devoid of high adventure and romance, but all perishable and perishing, inextricably bound to man's real world of loneliness, poignant meetings and partings, suffering, and death. With natural wisdom the editor (and translator) of an American edition of Kazakov groups the stories thematically under such general headings as 'A Cry for Help', 'The Strange Girl', and 'Stories of Love and

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Parting', etc.[6] In 'Here Comes a Dog', Kazakov's artistic centre is the moment of sudden rapture in his hero Krymov's idyll alone at his favourite fishing spot. Nothing physical or visible occurs in the narrative to change him in one moment from 'being totally happy' to groaning, breathing hard, and beating his knees painfully with his knuckles as he remembers his failure to respond to a lonely girl's pathetic, unexpressed cry for help. In 'Going to Town' and 'The Smell of Bread', Kazakov's protagonists grope silently in vague terror with the need to face death and dying. Nothing and no one responds to the cry of their spirit for help, and they find only a muted revival of the joys of life in contemplation of a return to the diversions of shallow material comforts. The sudden, sharp longing for undefined things and worlds throughout his stories hints at the enormous submerged part of his heroes' souls that yearns for expression and meaning not of this world. One might see in the figure of Bushuev in Tendriakov's 'Three, Seven, Ace' a man alienated from a given society. Similarly, in Vasily Aksenev's 'Half-way to the Moon', in terms relative to the historically preceding norms of socialist realism, the aimless, happy-go-lucky Kirpichenko is alienated, a light-hearted proletarian version of the superfluous man.

In contrast, again of course in relative terms, Kazakov's 'The Outsider' and other of his heroes are not just anti-social or asocial, but more accurately are alienated from life itself. Kazakov's richly metaphorical 'Adam and Eve' treats the common themes of alienation and parting in a parable of the first man and woman in a Soviet setting that includes a symbolic church which appears in every crucial scene as the dominating visual image which the hero Adam never actually approaches or paints (he is an artist), as everyone and every circumstance constantly urge him to do.

> Turning away from the lake, he again saw the great old church with the little hotel hiding in its shelter. Lights were burning warmly in the hotel, while the church looked closed and forbidding. But there was something powerful in the church that aroused thoughts in him about the genius of the people, about history, about peace and solitude.

Death as man's constant companion is existentially the root question of modern western literature. Solzhenitsyn acknowledges the failure of Soviet life in general (not just in its literature) to face up to the reality of death.

> And most of all we have begun to fear the dead and death. If there is death in a family, we try not to write nor to go there: we don't know how to talk about it, about death. . . . All nations set aside such a day to think of those who died for us. And for us in particular—for us more have perished, but we have no such

[6] Yuri Kazakov, *Going to Town and Other Stories*, Eng. trans. (Boston, 1964).

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> a day. . . . We, we indeed will never die. This is the high point of philosophy in the twentieth century.[7]

An element of acknowledged spiritual dread and helplessness before the mystery of life and death has returned with new force to Soviet writing. Tendriakov's powerful story, 'Rutted Byways', reflects the helplessness of the bureaucrat, of officials who represent 'Soviet authority', and even of the party to cope with death. The hero of the story struggles desperately to force the leaders of a village to free themselves from the ordered life of official values to obtain the means to try to save a man's life.

> How is it possible? A man, just like all those now lying in their warm beds, will perhaps not see tomorrow's day! It's impossible to let this happen! It's impossible not to help! . . . But everyone is asleep . . . What he wanted to do or how to astonish them he didn't know. There was only the desire, uncomprehended, unknown, demanding.

The tragedy of his failure makes it clear that no help in such a matter will come from the state. Only by the personal concern of individual men, their faith and their works, can even elementary physical help come to a dying man. The narrator allows nature to symbolise man's fate: 'The more it grew light the more evident it became that a heavy fog had settled on the earth. From the beginning this fog seemed grey, something unwashed'.[8]

'The Blue and the Green' is Kazakov's exquisitely fragile tale of a boy's first love that gives meaning and hope to life and its mysteries and a bitter portrait of life without it. 'There's nothing constant in this world but sorrow. Life doesn't stop. No, life never stops, it just absorbs your soul, and all your sorrows, your little human sorrows, dissipate like smoke by comparison. Such is the excellent construction of the world.'

In spite of his new stoical resignation to the world's nature, the hero, now full grown, plans to go where his first love Lilya is, even though he knows she is now a married woman. He must deceive himself about the reason: 'I'll be going north soon. I don't know why, but something calls me north. Probably because I went hunting and was happy there. I've forgotten Lilya completely, so many years have passed! It would be hard to live if you didn't forget . . . I don't think about her at all.'

But the truth lies buried within him and makes its demands known through dreams. The story's conclusion is symbolic of all man's unfulfilled dreams and inner desires: the things he painfully denies himself and even fears.

[7] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Sochineniya* (Frankfurt, 1966), pp. 300–01.

[8] Vladimir Tendriakov, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomax* (Moscow, 1963), I, pp. 415–22.

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> It doesn't happen often—four times a year maybe. But then those dreams. Those dreams, those uninvited dreams. I don't want them. I love it when I dream about music. They say if you sleep on your right side, you stop dreaming. I've started sleeping on my right side. I'm going to sleep soundly and wake up happy in the morning. Life is an excellent thing after all! But oh God, I don't want dreams!

The same new sensitivity to human anguish and travail is of course everywhere in poetry. Through the special prisms of the lyric, new images and motifs of mystery, transcendental worlds of meaning, and the search for immortality appear, expressed in a variety of forms. Even the little poem of Kostia Barranikov that recently became so famous as a song has no other meaning than a child's yearning for an immortality that needs no further elaboration.

Let there always be sky.
Let there always be sun.
Let there always be Mama.
Let there always be me.[9]

Vinokurov's direct statement of his yearning is for that specific, personal immortality which so much of Christianity promises.

I feel the reasonableness of existence,
I sense, know, understand,
Howling with all my flesh quivering
Against nothingness. I don't accept it.
My entire organism resounds
Like an organ in glory to life.
Is it possible for me not to be?
An infinite age is given to me,
Nothingness no longer destroys me.
I am ready to stand. To know everything.
To endure everything.
I hear with my blood. I believe without limits.
And if this is so, then it really is so.
It could not be otherwise; the body believes.[10]

Vinokurov elaborates his own modest proposal (almost as if he thought it were original) of how the universe should be run, adding the second half of the Christian promise—justice—to eternal life.

Every railway station keeps a book for complaints
And, if you ask for it, they have to give it to you:
It wouldn't be a bad idea, I think,

[9] Written in 1928 by a four-year-old child, its significance lies in the extraordinary popularity it has only recently obtained in the Soviet Union.

[10] Evgeny Vinokurov, 'Ya chuvstvuyu razumnost bytiya', *Slovo* (Moscow, 1962), p. 33.

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If eternity had a book like that,
Then people wouldn't have to keep silent about their sorrow.
Timidly, cautiously at first, they would all come, bringing
The griefs they endure, the wrongs they are made to suffer,
To universal attention and judgment.
How we should then be struck, I know,
By one entry of half a line written
By that woman who, slumped against its railings,
Was crying in the park last night.[11]

With sharper focus, though with some aesthetic unevenness, Soviet underground poetry concerns itself with the moral side of things and often seeks to express the way out of the Soviet and modern man's moral predicament by using traditional religious formulas. The moral issue that occupies everyone begins with the admission of the existence of evil and the search for responsibility for it both under Stalin and today. But, as Evgeny Rein makes clear in the poem 'My Neighbour Kotov', the question of guilt is bewilderingly elusive.[12] There is widespread agreement that, above all, engagement, commitment, and a faith are needed. Dmitri Bobyshev shows that the rebellion is primarily against those who don't care.

Indifference—
A house
Packed with ice,
Full of snow.
Indifference—
A house
For freezing,
Not for living.
A vault. A plush crypt.
Indifference. A house.
Mouldy bread and boxes.
Peels, dead birds, combings, scrapings.
Peer closely—here are also people,
Two-humped people—freaks!
And they kick off from boredom.
And people!
O people are camels!
And virgins are whores.
Peer closely.
But try to enter in
Only try!
I am like a physician,
I tear out an eye, knock out teeth,
But I will give back!

11 *Slovo*, p. 40.
12 *Sintaksis* (Moscow), April 1960, in *Grani*, No. 58 (1965), p. 183.

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Indifference.
The coffin. Dead flesh.
Ants and mouse dung on the floor.
Dead flesh.
House of the dead. Bird feathers.
Broken claws.
Indifference. A house. Indifference.[13]

Sergei Chudakov gives clarity to the community of responsibility by an incisive analogy in his short poem 'Man Overboard', which with equal vigour identifies that it is man's spiritual self that is at stake.

When they cry:
'Man overboard'
An ocean liner, huge, like a house
Stops suddenly
And they try
to catch the man with ropes.
But when
the soul of man is overboard,
When he is choking
from horror
from despair,
Even his own house
Doesn't stop
and sails on.[14]

This corresponds closely to Voznesensky's reflection in 'Oza'.

All progress is retrogression
If the process breaks man down.

The most religious of all his themes may be (in this age not necessarily of unbelief, but of science and vast knowledge about everything except man himself) his fascinating excursions into the question 'Who Are We' and what is the real nature of things? The mystery, the ineffableness of man, the terrors of the unknown which exist in the world of science, are characteristically treated in a semi-comic, semi-serious but always enthralling, always disturbing way. The imaginative absurdities of Voznesensky's fancy alternate across a wide range of possibilities of existence, back and forth through time and the reversal of time, from matter to anti-matter, in a fashion that suggests both the joyful heart of Marc Chagall and the ultimate concern of Vladimir Soloviev. He celebrates the hunger of the human heart that finds fulfilment in poetry:

Then why, when we pack the Luzhniki,
Do we crave verse like a cure for scurvy,
Our souls bursting shyly forth like buds? . . .

[13] Ibid., p. 163.
[14] Ibid., p. 131.

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He asks those fundamental questions that can come only from ultimate concern:

Who are we? Ciphers or great men?
There is no physicist or lyricist blood.
Genius is in the planet's blood.
You're either a poet or a Lilliputian . . .
Walking along. Who are you?
You look into bookshop windows and men's eyes,
A toy telescope you scan the skies
Of their motionless pupils. Who are you?

The poets are more united in themes, concepts, and even images and epithets concerning the nature of man's condition than they are in their vision of the way out. In the underground world the Christian religious conception is expressed in traditional symbols and images. P. Vladimirov's vision is of a union with the historic churches of Russia and the God they proclaim.

Across Russia our dear churches stand
Forgotten, oppressed,
Across Russia our dear churches stand
Celebrated for nothing.

They sigh, moan, groan
And cry like old women,
Grieving the bygone past
Remembering youth . . .

But wind carries time away.
Not little and not great.
Our dear churches stand across Russia
And wait for God.[15]

Yuri Stefanov invokes the concept of Christian purgation in hell and the efficacy of vicarious suffering to bring redemption. In the poet's image of himself he is not just a prophet but a Christ-Saviour figure. The poem intermingles both Christian and classical legends of salvation. After portraying the horrors of Russian history, the poet intones twice: 'Russia, Russia, Russia/ Is dead/'. The poem concludes dramatically:

O Lord God
Hear my prayer!
I know—you also
Grieve with me,

And to me alone
You show the way—
To the underground darkness
To descend for Russia.

[15] *Grani*, No. 59 (1965), p. 23.

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On slippery steps
I will silently descend
To Russia in Gehenna
To Russia in Hell.

I'll approach not boldly,
I'll say, hardly breathing:
For you my body,
And blood and soul!

I bend to the head of the bed:
You, Russia, wash
Your tears and pus
With my blood.

Rend my flesh
Into halves,
And as if with
Unbleached linen,
Wipe thy face.

And in glory and in power
Go to the stars.
In the place of Russia
I'll remain in Hell.[16]

Many writers probe the alternatives to salvation which often include suicide. But the most powerful if not the most frequent theme is the suicide of a martyr's death redeeming Russia, or even the whole world. Perhaps the most powerful poetic statement of this is from Yuri Galanskov, in his violent and rebellious 'Human Manifesto'. He too is most concerned that 'Man has disappeared./ Insignificant as a fly/ he hardly stirs among the lines in books'. The poet despairs of the evil of the world, plans suicide, and is saved by a descent and a soaring in which humanity begins to flower in him. He concludes:

You're accustomed to see
as you stroll
along the streets in a leisure hour,
faces as distorted
as your own.
And suddenly—
like thunder pealing,
like Christ manifesting Himself to the world—
there ascended
a trampled and crucified
human beauty.
It is—I,
summoning you to truth and revolt,

[16] Ibid., p. 56.

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desiring to serve no longer,
who tear your black fetters,
all woven of falsehood.
It is—I,
bound by the bonds of the law,
who shout forth the human manifesto!
And may a raven peck out
a cross
on the marble of my body.[17]

Information about the underground writers is limited at present and it is quite impossible to explore much more than the most obvious lines of development and interrelations between them and the officially acceptable literature. No writer in the Soviet Union, neither underground nor even grudgingly published officially, has yet had the impact that Alexander Solzhenitsyn has had with his few published works. With unprecedented integrity and artistic brilliance he has faced in terms of abiding human values the reality and complexity of the evil of Stalin's era. If the writer's religiously oriented morality is evident in *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* only for those who have eyes to see it, then in 'Matryona's House' the absolute worth of a single human soul is the story's moral and literary central axis. The religious significance in the story is not only in the natural way in which it accepts without argument the facts of religious practice in rural Russia today—many stories by other writers are equally significant in this—but in its profound spiritual conclusion.

> She made no effort to get things round her . . . She didn't struggle and strain to buy things and then care for them more than life itself.
>
> She didn't go all out after fine clothes. Clothes, that beautify what is ugly and evil.
>
> She was misunderstood and abandoned even by her husband. She had lost six children, but not her sociable ways. She was a stranger to her sisters and sisters-in-law, a ridiculous creature who stupidly worked for others without pay. She didn't accumulate property against the day she died. A dirty-white goat, a gammy-legged cat, some rubber plants . . .
>
> We had all lived side by side with her and never understood that she was that righteous one without whom, as the proverb says, no village can stand.
>
> Nor any city.
>
> Nor our whole land.[18]

It should be evident to even a casual student of literature with an elementary knowledge of the Bible that this is not just an allusion to

[17] *Phoenix I*, in *Grani*, No. 52 (1962), p. 23.
[18] *Half-Way to the Moon*, eds., Patricia Blake and Max Hayward (New York, 1965), p. 91.

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the Jewish tradition of the 'Just Man' but is in effect a literary parable of the life of Christ.

A recent extraordinary underground essay written under the pseudonym of D. Blagov entitled 'A. Solzhenitsyn and the Spiritual Mission of the Writer'[19] seeks to add a profound historical dimension to *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.* It is a sweeping and impassioned survey of world history in full accord with the Christian world view, though with unique judgments and emphasis in the manner of Vladimir Soloviev or Nikolai Berdyaev with whom the author is evidently well acquainted. He begins with man in a state of paradise, followed by a fall therefrom, and an historical development towards a goal of freedom that brings him to our present age, in which man is distantly removed from his spiritual world of origin and inhibited by his limited 'scientific' way of thinking. It is in today's world, so full of complex and contradictory evils, that the nadir of man's pilgrimage is reached in the concentration camps of the Stalin era. Blagov develops his underlying concept that 'the spiritual mission of art is to give revelations of the spiritual world when direct revelations have become impossible'. The project of man is the liberation of the human personality, his 'I'. However, there has been an evolution to a condition, unlike past ages, in which apparently two things prevail: first, man 'completely denies the spiritual world; in particular, he has begun to reject art as an alternative way of knowing'. Second, man has lost both his freedom and his sense of moral responsibility. Like others in the young generation, some of whom have been cited here, Blagov draws up a major indictment of indifference. He says that 'the very greatest sin, the most terrible form of spiritual death, is indifference to the fate of others, of all of society, and by this token to his own fate, to his own future'. In our present condition, he argues, 'the only possible link with the spiritual world that can be established is *art*'. 'So far the only salvation, or first aid is in the descent of art into Stalin's concentration camp.' This is what Solzhenitsyn has done. In Blagov's words he has written 'not a memoir, not a historical analysis, or an exposé, but a *poem*, a rhythmical text and composition, more correctly a *bylina* similar to the "Lay of the Hosts of Igor"'.

It is tempting to dwell at length on the brilliant and comprehensive way that Blagov's essay integrates many of the most important themes that have appeared in this discussion. It is also tempting to turn to non-belle-lettristic works that emphasise spiritual values, such as Nikolai Amosov's *From a Surgeon's Notes*[20] (which has already been claimed as an achievement of atheistic humanism), or Aleksei Dobrovolsky's essay 'The Mutual Relationship Between Faith and Knowledge' in the latest available issue of the underground journal *Phoenix 1966.*[21]

[19] *Grani*, No. 64 (1967), pp. 116–49. A second part is to be published.
[20] Nikolai Amosov, 'Meditation and the Heart: From a Surgeon's Notes' in *Humanism, Atheism: Principles and Practice* (Moscow, n.d.).
[21] *Grani*, No. 64 (1967), pp. 194–201.

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He argues that faith and religion are not products of man's weakness or the ignorance of antiquity, but correspond to man's greatest need, which is to commune with absolute truth.

Evgeny Vinokurov's poetic art is hardly as arresting, at first glance, as that of some of his contemporaries. Although less excited by words as sounds and less concerned with imagery than is Voznesensky, though less political, daring, and oratorical than Evtushenko, he is more traditionally lyrical and philosophical than either. A major concern of his later poems is his own religious-existential identity. For him it is not a question of 'who am I' among different men, but who am I and what am I because I am now alive and because one day I will die. Death must be explored for an illumination of life and to satisfy a compulsive need to protest the final end of human personality in death. Earth is a 'World of Adventure' where dying man signals his SOS.[22] Elsewhere, in the poem 'The Game', the earth is a place where a gigantic game is being played and when in the end the game grows dangerous the player cannot protest.

A card beats a card. Odd! Again even!
The stakes rise. You're asked to surrender.
'You lived?'—'Yes, I lived!'—'So comes the settlement.
Come on, pay up! Now, brother, could it be otherwise!' [23]

In the poem 'I' he begins by defending his right to pronounce the personal pronoun that implies the whole problem of existence. He concludes:

There is the word 'I'. There's a reason
Why in me it is hostile to non-being.
It's in me. With one blow it was hammered
Into me, like a nail, right up to the head.[24]

'The depths', *'de profundis'*, *'iz glubiny'*, in the quasi-mystical religious sense of the earlier tradition recurs often in Vinokurov: as the title and subject of 'The Depths' or repeatedly as the central or final symbolic image in diverse poems such as 'Teacher of History', 'I Visited that City', or 'Fashion'. For him as for Berdyaev 'the depths' is a cosmological metaphor or symbol of the source or location of ultimate value and meaning. Like Evtushenko in his poem 'Secrets', Vinokurov pays tribute to the primary religious urge or hunger that is throttled by life as one grows up, but which never really departs from man.

In the days of my youth, as long
As I didn't know the world quite,
I always believed that a miracle

[22] *Akhillesovo serdtse*, p. 157.
[23] Evgeny Vinokurov, *Ritm* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 74, 40.
[24] Evgeny Vinokurov, 'Ya,' translated in *The New Russian Poets: 1953–1966*, ed. George Reavey (New York, 1966), p. 52.

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Was surely going to happen.
Already now I know: miracles
Don't occur, and nevertheless in the midst of cares
The heart forgets about this
And still waits for something, and waits . . .

Without committing himself as to the divinity of Christ, he nevertheless readily acknowledges a relationship of the whole community to Christ's crucifixion in a poem with an extraordinary subject for a Soviet poet entitled 'In the Dresden Gallery: Before the Painting "Golgotha".'

We all slept soundly that night,
Both those who didn't eat and those who were sated.
We awakened: but he was crucified!
We look about: but he's already hanging . . .
And as if on a caroussel—
Suddenly in the distance everything begins to turn around . . .
And Pharisees gesticulating pass by the window.
A decorous group of Saducees quibbling about good and evil pass.
And the reason for all this
Was the one that came riding an ass.[25]

IT may be fruitful to consider the very natural possibility that the interpretations that have been given or implied here are not really correct, or at least were not intended by the writers themselves. For example, the alienation of writers young and old is always a relative matter, according to the orientation and values of a given society and its 'establishment'. A Soviet youth's turn towards religion might be merely a directional reversion of an American beatnik's rejection of it, not governed by a search for higher values, but a mere reaction to circumstances. In the same way as an alienated American college student searches for ideals and values in the 'new left' and in the resurrected Marxism that his professors and parents long ago discarded, the alienated young Soviet intellectual experiments with the ideals and values of the traditional religious life that his parents and teachers abandoned in their time.

Yet the comparison can be overstressed. As reflected in Russian literature of the post-Stalin era, the spiritual awakening indicates a phenomenon more transcendental in character than a mere historical or sociological comparison would suggest. Its manifestations are many:

First, an important contribution or possibly essential foundation to future development has been made through the restoration of the vocabulary and syntax of religion to the current literary language; second, the image of the poet as prophet is being recultivated by younger writers of great talent with most of the trappings of the Russian

[25] Evgeny Vinokurov, in *Slovo* (Moscow, 1962).

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tradition, which is so steeped in religious significance; third, in a literary sense we can identify religious elements of image, epithet, theme, and, we might add, mood or atmosphere; fourth, we can observe in recent literature moving evidence of a new concern for man's spiritual welfare, with man taken as a suffering, lonely, frightened, simple human being detached from ideological and economic categories. This also may be taken as an important pre-requisite for further literary religious expressions; fifth, there is an abundance of expressions of a need for help, for a way out of the human condition in a sense that alternates between a personal and a social-historical meaning of salvation.

* * * *

This essay began with the caveat that not everything in Russia's experience is unique to Russia. Revolutionary changes are occurring in theology and concepts of faith elsewhere too. Religion and spiritual life are as subject to change, development, or new revelation in the future as they have been in the past or as is any other aspect of man's existence. There is a well-known frontier—I don't wish to say *the* frontier—in religious life in the West which is very far from the traditional religious practice within churches. I think that it must be accepted as genuine religious life even though many see in it dangers of destruction to everything religious. The forms of religious life in Russia no more need to be traditional to be genuinely religious than do the forms in the world outside Russia.

There is a tension between local (Russian) elements and universal elements in the forms and impulses of religious expression. This is perhaps as it has always been. We are accustomed to infer universality in religious experience elsewhere (say, in ancient Israel in the time of Isaiah or Jeremiah) when it was really local in its impulse and original expression. The universality is a product of the validity of the creative experience at the local level and our own appreciation of it as tested and hallowed by time. We do well to watch with respect the impulses and forms of contemporary Russian religious expression, stimulated as it is by all the trauma and hungers that have accompanied the great revelations of the past. Literature remains a valid subject for our continuing observation, for although poetry is not religion, religion seldom exists without poetry.

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VATICAN POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE

Hansjakob Stehle

VATICAN policy towards eastern Europe has always differed in one essential respect from that of western secular governments. The Holy See could never accept the idea of a regulated relationship with communist-controlled countries referring to external coexistence alone, to a *modus vivendi* between the central authority of the Catholic Church in Rome and the communist governments. Since the church is by its nature supranational, yet exists at the same time within the frontiers of actual nations and states, Vatican policy towards the East must always, whether it will or no, affect also the internal affairs of the countries concerned. The question was and is whether the relationship between believing Catholics and (governing) atheists is to be determined by conflict or by mutual respect; whether the interests of state and church can be so far reconciled that their division under constitutional law—acknowledged as a modern principle only reluctantly and tardily by the church—may prove to have two positive consequences: mutual non-interference in matters of spiritual or political authority, and mutual assistance in matters touching the national interest.

No sooner does such a specific point make its appearance among the basic considerations than we encounter also the difficulties of interpretation, showing how inadequately a theoretical approach, whether philosophical-theological or based on international or ecclesiastical law, measures up to the phenomenon of Papal policy towards eastern Europe. It is true that this policy follows the guiding principles referred to—and it is as well not to overlook this—and that it employs the legal machinery evolved through centuries of curial practice, but in character and procedure it is pragmatic; that is, dictated by the necessities of the given moment, although only after diplomatic considerations of many kinds have been duly weighed.

A classic example of Vatican policy towards eastern Europe is provided by one of its most recent measures, the appointment of four apostolic administrators in the Oder-Neisse areas, a step whose significance was the subject of much speculation in both Poland and Germany. According to the definition in the 1967 Pontifical Yearbook (p. 1393), such administrators are nowadays appointed 'for disciplinary reasons, in cases of change in national frontiers or of difficulties with secular governments'. Their rights, duties, and privileges are laid down in the papers of nomination, but in the given instance the contents of these are unknown. The official announcement by the *Osservatore Romano* (28 May 1967) states merely that the four administrators, Bishops Kominek, Jop, Drzazga, and Pluta, whose sees in Breslau,

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Oppeln, Allenstein, and Landsberg/Warthe are given in Polish only (Wroclaw, Opole, Olsztyn, Gorzow), were invested 'with the authority (*facolta*) of bishops residentiary', and that they are administrators '*ad nutum Sanctae Sedis*', that is, they may be recalled by the Pope. But according to canonical law (c. 315) only an administrator appointed permanently can be given the powers of a bishop residentiary; and so in this case there has been a deviation from the rule, probably because these bishops have in any case possessed the full jurisdiction of ordinaries within their territories ever since 1951, and have been exercising it since 1956.[1]

A glance at the Pontifical Yearbook reveals further that these four bishops had not, as the *Osservatore Romano* in fact erroneously stated, hitherto been vicars-general of Cardinal Wyszynski. Only the nine other assistant bishops to these four ordinaries are named in the Yearbook as being suffragan bishops to Wyszynski in his capacity as Archbishop of Gniezno; whilst the four new administrators were previously described only as titular bishops, in a footnote relating to the diocese of Breslau, without clear definition of their position under ecclesiastical law. In practical terms, however, there has been for years in the Oder-Neisse areas a Polish church organisation which, far from being provisional, is firmly established and has thirteen bishops who regard and administer their areas of ministry *de facto* as clearly bounded dioceses, even if under formal canon law they are not. The *Osservatore Romano* listed the reasons which nevertheless impelled the Vatican to make a formal change: 'the greater good of souls, which is in no small measure dependent on an organic administration even without alteration to the existing diocesan boundaries or the establishment of new ecclesiastical units; the Holy See's recent opportunity to examine the religious situation in these areas [an allusion to the three journeys of Monsignor Casaroli to Poland]; repeated requests by Cardinal Wyszynski and the Polish episcopate; and other pastoral reasons which—particularly since the Second Vatican Council—make it necessary to adapt the ministry more and more . . .'

In this motivation, which in modified form determines almost all the Vatican's measures in east European policy, the pragmatic procedure of the Curia reveals itself especially clearly, for the appointment of administrators does not alter the actual status of the ministry but rather its function—already completely assured beforehand—amid its political surroundings. Out of respect for the Reichs Concordat of 1933 which makes changes of diocesan boundaries conditional on German assent (Art. 11), requires the priests to have German nationality (Art. 14), and demands an oath of fealty to the German Reich from the bishops (Art. 16)—conditions which in part can no longer be fulfilled in the Oder-Neisse areas—the episcopal boundaries are not violated, it is true, even

[1] '. . . *plena jurisdictio episcopi residentialis in eodem territorio competit*', was the wording of the original decree of appointment.

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though the Polish administrators under the title of bishops residentiary enjoy complete power. But on the other hand the Vatican draws its political conclusion from the fact that these areas are no longer inhabited by 2·7 million German, but by almost seven million Polish Catholics.

Only in the Pontifical Yearbook for 1968 shall we see how the status of the administrators is clarified, or whether—more probably—it is left deliberately obscure. This applies equally to the direct political consequences, which are considered far less systematically in the Vatican than is generally believed. The geographical index of the Pontifical Yearbook has for years drawn attention to the fact that its divisions exclude considerations of 'the attachment of individual ecclesiastical areas to the territory of various states', especially 'where changes in the situation have not yet been ratified by valid international treaties'; the information given is therefore 'purely geographical or practical for postal purposes'. The imprecise nature of this reservation becomes obvious when (in the 1967 edition) we find listed 'Russia, Siberia, Lithuania, Latvia', but not the 'Soviet Union'; 'Palestine' but not Israel; when Lwow (Lemberg), Wilno, and Pinsk appear under 'Poland', and Breslau [2] and Ermland under Germany, but the addresses of the 'Free Prelature of Schneidemühl' appear as 'Münster, Germany' and 'Gorzow, Poland'.

Apostolic administrators may provide short-term emergency solutions, as in the second world war with the controversial appointment, seen by Poland as a violation of the Concordat, of the German bishop Splett of Danzig as administrator of the Polish diocese Chelmno (Culm) [3]: they may become an almost permanent arrangement, as in the Yugoslav areas of the Backa and Banat, or (since 1922) in the Slovakian diocese of Trnava, formerly attached to the Hungarian diocese of Esztergom; they may take the form of an emergency solution, as in the diocese of Wilno which is today partly Polish and partly Soviet Lithuanian, or in the half Yugoslav half Italian dioceses of Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume), where clearly neither side has any quarrel with the status quo. It took the Vatican forty years to raise the apostolic administrator of Innsbruck in 1964 to the status of bishop residentiary, thus following the political border friction between North and South Tirol—which cut off Innsbruck from the diocese of Brixen (Bressanone)—by the founding of a new bishopric: it took equally long for the

[2] In the Pontifical Yearbook for 1930, Breslau was followed by the word 'Prussia'.

[3] Illuminating on the background of the Splett case is volume 3 of the Vatican collection of documents on the second world war (*Le Saint Siège et la Situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes*, 1967). Note, for example, the reprimand that Splett earns from the Cardinal Secretary of State for refusing—under Gestapo pressure—to hear confession in Polish: 'One may not give in to the unreasonable demands of secular authority when the demands involved are unjust' (p. 327). Compare the dispute between the Holy See and the Lithuanian government 1940–41 over the Polish bishop of Wilno and the Lithuanian vicar-general assigned to him.

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administrator of Burgenland, cut off after the first world war from the Hungarian diocese of Györ, to become the Austrian diocese of Eisenstadt in 1960.

ADAPTATION, not swift but as discreet and as painless as possible, is the basis of this method of Vatican policy. The apparent leaving open of matters in reality long since settled is part of this, likewise the conscious improvisation which makes use of legal niceties as constructive aids where ministry and politics conflict. An '*aggiornamento*' thus construed dictates also the style of papal policy towards eastern Europe —and not only, as is often believed, since John XXIII.

'We have indeed rejected and condemned certain ideologies, but in so doing we have acted neither against particular peoples nor against particular states as such. . . .' So said Pius XII as early as 2 November 1950. In 1955–56, when destalinisation began to herald changes in world communism and in the practice of its leaders, the *Osservatore Romano* in a long series of leading articles fought against trends in Catholicism towards coexistence and insisted—in view of a presumed 'immutability of communism'—on the 'impossibility of a dialogue'. The Pope on 23 December 1956 uttered a warning against the 'illusion of a false coexistence' and against the temptation to 'sit at the table of the Lord and that of His enemies'; but added: 'that which the proper ecclesiastical authority believes its duty to accomplish is sufficient to secure the freedom of the Church and the recognition of its rights'.

The adviser to Pius XII at that time, Professor S. J. Gundlach, astonished his listeners at the 'Church in Distress' congress at Königstein on 12 September 1956 with the remark: 'the Church will under all circumstances seek every opportunity to assure a minimum of ministry in areas where there is now none. And it will explore all avenues in order to achieve this in some measure. It will explore all means of finding a *modus vivendi*'.

Efforts of this kind can be traced back as far as the twenties and were not abandoned until the early thirties, when Stalinism in the Soviet Union and the militant anti-communism of Pius XI had made all contact impossible. The almost total destruction of the organisation of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union at that time led the Vatican to fear the worst when, in the course of the second world war, it became clear that wide areas of eastern Europe would come under the control of communist regimes. Early moderation in Stalin's policies towards religion was received sceptically by the Vatican, and in fact soon gave way to reprisals differing only slightly from those of the German church politics in the occupied territories. This scepticism was further reinforced by the liquidation of the Uniate Churches in the formerly Polish Ukraine and in Rumania. Indications that the church politics of the 'people's democracies' of the fifties were not a schematic repetition of Soviet policies in the twenties and thirties—even if the reasons

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behind them were purely tactical—were barely heeded by the Vatican. Its precautionary attempts to build up an underground church organisation by, for example, the secret ordination of bishops without consent of the state, in case the legal one should be destroyed, hastened rather than slowed down the disintegration of the church administration, and made stalinist 'salami tactics' towards the church easier, especially as the Vatican was at the same time moving more and more openly towards the 'western' stand in the cold war. Most deeply affected were the Catholic churches of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary, but also that of Yugoslavia where the catholic-communist conflict sharpened despite the split with Moscow, chiefly because Croatian Catholicism still bore the stigma of wartime collaboration. Only in Poland, the one purely Catholic country in eastern Europe, where the communists in the Oder-Neisse areas had even found themselves carrying out a belated counter-reformation, was an attempt made to establish a *modus vivendi* —and this without sanction from the Vatican, in the 1950 agreement of Cardinal Wyszynski with the government. The agreement did not, however, check the friction resulting from the coercive measures by weak Polish communism and the defensive moves of powerful Polish Catholicism. This continued after the second agreement of 1956, concluded with the express approval of Rome. Despite—or perhaps because of—the East-West détente that had begun to appear in the meantime, this was subjected to even stronger pressure, which no longer took the form of direct oppression but of rivalry and confrontation between two powers, one seeking compensation for its spiritual, the other for its material impotence.[4]

AFTER John XXIII Vatican diplomacy intensified its efforts to put aside the encumbrances of the past and to become reconciled to the continuing if variable existence of communist states in eastern Europe; efforts including both the cautious pacification of national ambitions (Poland) and the attempt at a gradual understanding with the Soviet leadership in the East. A decisive step along this path was the visit to Moscow of the curial bishop Willebrands on 27 September 1962. By giving assurances that the Second Vatican Council would not help to encourage political anti-communism, Willebrands gained the participation of observers from the Moscow patriarchate and made it possible for almost all east European bishops to visit Rome. Tangible indications of the change in climate were the release from Soviet detention in February 1963 of Archbishop Slipyi of the Ukrainian Uniate Church and the visit of Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubei to the Pope in March 1963; but above all a notable easing of pressure on the oppressed Catholics in the Baltic, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. To the foundations laid by Pope John XXIII in his encyclical

[4] See the article on the Millennium dispute of 1966 by Hansjakob Stehle in *Wort und Wahrheit* (Vienna), 1967, No. 4, page 263 ff.

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Pacem in terris of April 1963, Pope Paul VI added further by the encyclical *Ecclesiam Suam* of August 1964: the possibility of dialogue and cooperation—'not with error, but with those in error'.

For papal diplomacy the concrete meaning of this is negotiation with the communist governments. In the early months of 1963 Agostino Casaroli, formerly under-secretary and as from June 1967 secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Church Affairs, began a series of visits to east European capitals.

After five periods of negotiation in Budapest he reached on 15 September 1964 a partial agreement with the Hungarian government which he himself described in the *Osservatore Romano* as a 'valid contribution to true progress and to the fundamental interests of the country in all fields'. By this it was possible—avoiding the problem of Cardinal Mindszenty—to ordain five bishops and so fill four completely neglected dioceses, three of them admittedly only by the expedient appointment of an 'apostolic administrator *ad nutum Sanctae Sedis*'. At present the Vatican is debating further appointments, since five older Hungarian bishops have applied for retirement. But the agreement which, as the Viennese Cardinal König, instrumental in its conclusion, expressed it, 'gave the church a chance to breathe', was not able to withstand the consequences of the heavy blows suffered by Hungarian Catholicism in the fifties. There were certain setbacks after the agreement, and many problems such as those of the disbanded orders or priests deprived of office were left unsolved. Yet it became possible to free the church and its adherents from the odium of 'hostility to the state' as a matter of principle; and this not least by concessions to 'progressive' left-wing Catholic forces which in the time of Pius XII had been threatened with excommunication.

Casaroli's discussions have hitherto proved less successful in Prague, where the communists over the past 20 years have succeeded in virtually starving the Catholic Church to death, both personally and spiritually. The imprisoned Cardinal Beran was permitted in February 1965 to move to Rome: formally he remained Archbishop of Prague. But Bishop Tomasek was chosen to take charge as 'apostolic administrator *sedi datus*' of the diocese which had been neglected for fifteen years, thus virtually precluding a return by Beran. But eight Czech dioceses are still without a bishop; their chapter vicars, most of them not only of loyalist but of pro-communist sympathies, are not considered by the Vatican as suitable for the office of bishop.

LEAST progress has been made in understanding with Rumania, which is not prepared to abandon its policy of compulsory incorporation of Catholics of the Eastern rite, the Uniate Church, into the Orthodox Church. All bishoprics of the Latin rite are empty except Alba Julia, where the Hungarian bishop Marton has recently won some freedom of movement after years of imprisonment. As yet no official contacts have been made between the Vatican and the government in

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Bucharest; and the Rumanian patriarchate was the only one not represented at the Vatican Council. A number of Catholic prelates loyal to the government and functioning in Rumanian dioceses as *Ordinarius-Substituti* have been for discussions to the Vatican. One of them—Petru Plesca from Jasi—was in December 1965 ordained titular bishop in Rome in the presence of the Rumanian ambassador, but without receiving any kind of jurisdiction over the diocese of Jasi—again a very pragmatic solution not in keeping with the traditional practice of the Church.

In June 1964 Casaroli began talks with the Yugoslav government. After 38 days of hard negotiation and four conferences in Rome and Belgrade, these led to the signing on 29 June 1966 of a protocol which is the most far-reaching agreement concluded so far between the Holy See and a communist government. The Vatican 'acknowledges' the principle of the separation of church and state but also the state's guarantee of religious freedom and of papal authority in questions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 'in so far as this is not contrary to the internal order of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. In paragraph II of the protocol the Vatican endorses the principle of restricting pastoral activity within the limits of 'religion and church', and expressly renounces the exploitation of religious functions 'for purposes which might subsequently be political in nature'. The Holy See 'in conformity with the principles of Catholic moral thinking', goes so far as to 'deplore and condemn every act of political terror or similar forms of violence, irrespective of who commits them', and promises the Yugoslav government ecclesiastical sanctions against priests who offend against the Republic in this respect.

This agreement, which was crowned by the despatch of a Yugoslav ambassador to the Vatican and an apostolic delegate to Belgrade, is regarded by Vatican diplomacy as the best attainable model for its further east European policies. Within a year it led to a perceptible increase in the activity of the Yugoslav Catholic Church: in April 1966, for the first time in twenty years, there were even two groups of Yugoslav pilgrims in Rome who, with their bishops, numbered more than three thousand believing Catholics. Reconciliation was also made easier by the Yugoslav episcopate whose leader, Cardinal Seper, eight months after the death of the controversial Cardinal Stepinac in 1960, sent a profession of loyalty to the Belgrade government, and who had declared earlier, on 24 September 1965 during the Vatican Council, that it was necessary 'not to condemn atheism but positively to demonstrate that human progress is not retarded, but rather promoted by belief in God'.

The attitude of the Zagreb cardinal made it easier for Vatican diplomacy to get the episcopate of the country concerned to play a part in the Belgrade contacts—a procedure which in Poland, for example, is not so readily imitable. For a long time the episcopate here, under its militant primate Cardinal Wyszynski, has been a self-confident negotiating partner of the state. Wyszynski, mistrustful of the intentions of

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the communists and lacking faith in Rome's east European policies, had told the Pope during an audience on 13 November 1965 in more or less plain terms: 'from a distance it is very difficult to appreciate our situation. All events in the ecclesiastical life of Poland have to be judged in the light of our experience . . . If anything offends us, it is above all lack of faith in us . . .' No mean proportion of Polish bishops believe that the position of the Polish church is so secure, despite or because of recurrent friction with the government, that any new agreement, any compromise, could only lead to a deterioration in the status quo. In the Vatican, however, it is felt that a *modus vivendi* agreed between Rome and Warsaw is preferable to an unstable and in the long term somewhat risky policy of strength. And yet it is acknowledged that the views of the episcopate cannot be ignored. To put an end to judging 'from a distance', Monsignor Casaroli made three journeys to Poland early in 1967, the pastoral—and tactical—result of which was the appointment of administrators in the Oder-Neisse areas and of a second Polish cardinal, Wojtyla, in Cracow. The next stage may well be the initiation of talks between Warsaw and the Vatican.

POPE PAUL VI has summarised the guiding principles of present day Vatican policy towards eastern Europe in a message to President Tito of Yugoslavia which was published in the *Osservatore Romano* of 12 February 1967, on the eve of Casaroli's departure for Poland. Catholic subjects, it says, and likewise '*dans la domaine qui lui est propre*' the church, are prepared to make their contribution to the progress and prosperity of the country. They are aware of the duties 'imposed upon them by the persuasion of their faith towards the national community, in all things which are just and honourable'. The church for its part demands respect and a legal freedom of action 'directed solely towards the spiritual and moral benefit of its members and of the nations within which it exists'.

The Vatican press spokesman was asked on 10 March 1967 whether these were new nuances in papal policy towards the East. Monsignor Vallainc spoke in his reply of a development in recent years 'which in some of these countries has made possible the practical realisation of Christian striving for cooperation in the common welfare of the national community'. The Vatican appears to have been strengthened in this cautious optimism by the conversation of Paul VI on 30 January 1967 with the Soviet President, Podgorny—to date the crowning point in papal 'overtures to the East'. The encounter had been preceded by a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, on 4 October 1965, during Paul VI's visit to New York, and by a visit to the Vatican by Gromyko on 27 April 1966. 'The Holy Father also talked with President Podgorny on problems concerning religious life and the presence of the church in the territories of the Soviet Union'; so reads the official communiqué on the working discussions held across the papal writing desk. Six weeks later the only two freely active

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bishops in the Soviet Union were allowed to travel to Rome, Matulaitis-Labukas (Lithuania) and Vaivods (Latvia), who, both of them well into their seventies, had been ordained during the Council. They were able to report on a recent decree by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania calling attention to the provision that 'any suppression of civic rights on grounds of religious persuasion' is a criminal offence.

In Rome it is thought that the first fruits of Podgorny's visit have already become evident. Many difficult problems still await an understanding with Moscow which could not fail to affect the Catholic presence in other countries. But it is a far cry from 'a diabolical alliance of the Soviet revisionist clique with one of the most dangerous forces of world opinion, the Vatican', to quote the Albanian party organ *Zeri i Popullit* of 18 January 1967. What has been achieved is that Stalin's derisive question, how many divisions can the Pope muster, has been silenced.

(*This article appeared first in* Europa Archiv, *Folge 17/1967.*)

(Postscript—Edit.)

Since this article was written, a four-man Vatican mission headed by Bishop Willebrands has visited the Soviet Union and taken part in an exchange of views with the Orthodox theologians at the Leningrad Theological Academy. TASS reported that the conversation took place in a 'fraternal ecumenical atmosphere'. Is this an indication that the Soviets no longer intend to stay outside the Christian-Marxist 'dialogue', and that they may attend the meeting in Geneva planned for that purpose in 1968? The TASS comment certainly stands in contrast with the opinion recently expressed in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* by M. P. Mshchedlov (whose book on the subject has been criticised by the Austrian communists—see p. 126): 'The alleged tendency to renovation in the Catholic Church has no other purpose but to consolidate an ideology hostile to the working class. For this reason we have to unmask and combat Vatican ecumenism.' Clearly, there is no symmetry in the attitude of the Kremlin and the Vatican towards *aggiornamento*. The reasons are not far to seek. Soviet ideological conservatism is reinforced by the ideological contest with the Chinese. While Christians, after centuries of schisms, begin to think in ecumenical terms, the communists are only now beginning to face the problems of schism in the era of polycentrism. Moreover, secular ideology is more vulnerable to the erosion of faith.

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DOCUMENTS

Last Year in Marienbad

While 'ideological coexistence' is officially rejected by Soviet ideologists, on another plane a Christian-Communist dialogue is taking place, extending from Garaudy's 'De l'anathème au dialogue' *to the April 1967 meeting at Marianske Lazne (Marienbad), of theologians, philosophers, scientists, and journalists from East and West. As the* New York Times *(1 May 1967) reporter noted, 'both sides used the symposium to further their own ends; the Christians want better treatment of Church members in the communist countries, and the communists are looking for political advantages in countries with a heavy Roman Catholic population'. It is thus understandable that the 'dialogue' is most in evidence in such countries as Italy, France, and Austria. Yet while it is clear what both sides expect from the dialogue, it is uncertain what its outcome will be. The contrast between the acceptance by the communists of the dialogue with religious believers in the West, and their treatment of such believers in the East, is the greatest obstacle to its further development; but the Christian participants hope that this will change. The Austrian Christians and the Austrian communists have shown a particular inclination to take part in the dialogue. The Austrian communists even criticised (see below) the Soviet stand on the question of religion. We reproduce two articles from the Austrian press, giving an assessment of the Marienbad meeting from two points of view.*

EPILOGUE TO MARIENBAD

Hermann Stoger

'This year in Marienbad' was fascinating. All of a sudden Marxists began asking questions about the meaning of life, and Christians just as suddenly stopped talking about going-to-heaven and talked instead about responsibility for the future of man on earth. 120 years after most Marxists discovered something like transcendence and 1,600 years after St. Augustine, Christians began with an exercise in immanence.

This surprising occurrence does not exempt the hard-boiled journalist from asking the routine and reasonable question: what actually was the result of this meeting? Ought it be continued; can it be continued, and if so how? From experience I would say that 90 per cent of all discussions are held because concepts have not been made clear enough, and that only the remaining 10 per cent are a genuine intellectual debate about concepts which have the same meaning for both sides, and are therefore a genuine productive dialogue. May I therefore first

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of all try to define the partners in the Marienbad discussion, although such definitions are bound to be incomplete and imperfect.

People at Marienbad spoke casually about a dialogue between Christians and Marxists. But who were the Christians? They were Catholics and Protestants, theologians and laymen, Westerners and Easterners, those who were free and those who were 'captive'. Their common denominator—which in the Christian camp itself had no universal acceptance—was simply the belief in God and the belief in Christ as God's son who became man. (Perhaps that might suggest thoughts for all ecumenical endeavours: how little is really enough to find a common denominator? It is enough to have opponents whose ideas are basically different.)

And who were the Marxists? There were really only *communists*. All other kinds of Marxism were missing at Marienbad. Those who were invited and those who spoke were all communists, and as such were also atheists. (Some perhaps were atheists from the communist countries who were using Marxist terminology.) Both the so-called Christians and the so-called Marxists had one thing in common—a firm position of faith or ideology.

Were these Christians and Marxists, so broadly defined, actually the only partners in the dialogue? Only too eagerly did they ignore, overlook, and forget that 'third force' of mathematicians, natural scientists, sociologists, and political scientists, who to be sure came only from the West, who so to speak stood in between, and who in the war on two fronts of the de-ideologisation of left and right were concerned to clarify the concepts being used and to bring the sometimes overheated and over-refined discussions down to a more sober level. The contributions of this group could have been most valuable but their efforts were without result. We are forced to deal with just the Christians and the Marxists. This restriction confronts the critical observer at Marienbad with such great difficulties that he can extricate himself only by establishing his *own* position. The following theses are intended to provoke contradiction, and following contradiction discussion, and following discussion perhaps clarification. For this reason I shall restrict myself to one aspect only of the discussion at Marienbad, largely ignored elsewhere.

1. A discussion between Christians and Marxists is primarily not a scholarly one but an ideological one. Whatever these two partners advocate, often with the help of numerous scientific disciplines, is in its ultimate tendency and aim stamped with their belief and ideology. It is basically of little use if each participant (and both sides specifically said this during a press conference at Marienbad) speaks only for himself and not on behalf of his side: he obviously remains in all decisive respects and utterances 'true to the line'.

2. We might simply take note of this basis of the discussion—especially as it is valid for both partners—and let the matter drop. But in doing so we would overlook one factor which seems highly relevant for a

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judgment of the dialogue and its results: in the Marienbad type of discussion between Christians and Marxists the Christians are from the beginning at a disadvantage. Not because the Marxists are better trained in dialectics, nor because they have a younger and more impulsive messianism, but for quite another reason which must be briefly explained here.

However much Marxism keeps insisting that it is strictly scientific, that it is above all only a method, it is ultimately in tendency and aim an ideology and a political messianism. (As Dr. Kalivoda of Prague said in Marienbad: 'In its ontology Marxism is ideology—beyond that it must be scientific'; and Professor Luporini of Florence said: 'Freedom and justice are for us ideological concepts, not scientific ones'.)

Marienbad also showed once again that an important dogma of the Marxists can be rewritten: a basic supposition for the self-realisation of man is the socialisation of the means of production. That is a clear picture of society demanded by the ideology which was introduced into the dialogue even if it was not always realised by the partners of the Marxists or for various reasons was belittled. An alert Marxist scepticism can have nothing against this basic dogma. Of course the Marxists are not spared the experience of the delay in the second coming which decisively influenced and left its imprint on Christianity in its first century. Such a phase of sceptical stocktaking gives new, sharper, and more modest tones to this basic dogma, rather in the sense that the 'expropriation of the expropriators' in no way leads *automatically* to communism and the self-liberation of man, but remains an inalienable precondition for the achievement of this aim. As Professor Garaudy of Paris said at one of the sessions: 'The destruction of capitalism and the construction of socialism does not in itself solve everything, but this is the starting-point for the realisation of creative man.' Similarly Professor Hollitscher of Vienna said: 'Socialism is the means *to* and not the realisation *of* freedom!' Professor Lukacs of Budapest put it in the most comprehensive way: 'Communism is a movement which destroys present conditions but is not the final possibility open to man.'

Taking all shades of differences into account, the Marxist is always in accord with Marxism so long as he advocates the basic dogma about the necessary socialisation of the means of production. How supremely important this is for the Marxist was shown in Marienbad when Professor Fiamengo of Zagreb said: 'For Marxism the most important thing is the change in the social system and not the question of religion'. But the Christian faith has no concrete answer to this problem. Its expectation of the Messiah is 'not of this world'. (At least it is not since the experience of the delay in the second coming began to take effect. The genuine Jewish expectation of the end of time, in which Christ himself believed, could be interpreted as being immanent.) The Christian belief in redemption, although it demands that one should

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prove oneself in the world and master the world, is not political and therefore never has an unequivocal political meaning. If the Christian is provoked into developing a model of society he does this at his own risk, for he hopes to realise Christian values in this society, and realise them in the best way. But if he is honest he must always connect this endeavour with the restricting confession which makes possible the opposite point of view: '*God help me—it may surely be otherwise*! '

3. Once such starting points for the discussion are recognised and endorsed, there is a certain logical inevitability in the continuation of the discussion which is quite consistent and takes the following shape:

(a) Once the Christian has accepted the starting point for the discussion (and nobody in Marienbad asked the communist doctrinaires of socialisation how they obtained their certainty), he can afterwards only legitimately ask about the practicability of his belief and the realisation of his belief in the Marxist social system. (There is no genuine Christian system which he would have to advocate.)

(b) Thereupon the Marxist legitimately asks for the recognition of his social system by the Christian. (He is primarily concerned with the social system and not religion.)

4. These questions are legitimate from both sides once the starting point has been accepted. But on both sides the answers—assuming that the dialogue does not come to an abrupt end—are in a certain sense forced on them. Since both sides make totalitarian claims, at least within their own quintessential sphere (and in the peripheral areas into which they are bound to extend), their answers can only be affirmative, and with far-reaching consequences:

(a) If the Marxist says 'yes' to the Christian, he admits that he must tolerate Christianity. But he remains of the opinion that within the communist society, once it is established, Christianity is doomed to die away, because it will have lost its meaning, even if he recognises that in the present historical context it still has real meaning. In this the Marxist is returning to Marx, although previously he has given a relativist interpretation of Marx's critique of religion.

(b) If the Christian says 'yes' to the Marxist's question, he admits the Marxist concept of society, of the socialist and eventually the communist social system. In doing so he excludes the Marxist's 'atheism' as a 'non-integrating' part of this ideology; he insists that Marx's critique of religion was historically conditioned, and points out that Marxists today should be ready to grant meaning and function to religion, as part of the total self-fulfilment of man.

5. This reciprocal 'yes' also has consequences:

(a) The Christian demands of the Marxist the fullest religious freedom. The demand challenges the Marxist claim, derived from their ideology, that the achievement of their society will lead to the disappearance of religion.

(b) Equally justifiably, the Marxist demands of the Christian unreserved cooperation in the realisation of the Marxist social order. This implies,

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however, that the Christian must actively cooperate in promoting his own disappearance (not liquidation). This in turn challenges the optimism of the Christian, derived from his religion, that Christians will be 'in demand' even in a communist society, because religion will still remain essential to man's self-fulfilment.

6. After the logical exposition of the dialogue from its basic assumptions, some critical qualifications are called for, a kind of pause or delay if the debate is conceived in dramatic terms (which does not mean that the dialogue should be seen as theatrical in its nature). Clearly, neither side realises that the debate as outlined here—which, in contrast to the anthropological and philosophical aspects of the 'superstructure', is still today decisive—is being conducted on two different levels:

(a) The Marxist wants to build a particular social system, and insists on the cooperation of the Christian.

(b) The Christian wants to live according to his faith even if (since there is no specifically Christian social system which would provide an alternative) this has to be in a Marxist society. He asks for the same freedom that the Marxist system has already granted to the atheist.

More precisely: The Marxist asks the Christian to cooperate. The Christian asks the Marxist for freedom. The Marxist social system must be made a reality. The Christian faith, irrespective of the social system, should be given the chance to demonstrate its abiding justification.

As against the assertion that the debate is conducted on two levels, it can of course be said that it is being conducted on one level only, the political. It can be argued that the demand for religious freedom within a particular social system is a political demand, just as the demand for cooperation in bringing that system about is political.

But this gets us nowhere. Religious freedom cannot be granted by individual Marxists, but only by those who rule a country, whereas cooperation in realising the Marxist social system cannot (apart from a definite doctrinal prohibition of cooperation) be legitimately given by the Christian churches collectively, but only by individual Christians, each speaking for himself. And since there is no specifically Christian order of society which the Churches are in a position to declare the only true social order, since they can maintain only that a given social order is wholly incompatible with Christian values, the Church can never make a positive judgment, but only a negative one. And even then experience shows that such a judgment must be given with the utmost caution.

Hence it is clear that the dialogue is in fact being conducted on two levels.

7. Historical proof can be adduced for this. Obviously, at this stage of the debate, neither Christians nor Marxists realise that the failure to recognise the two levels must lead to a repetition of earlier tragic errors, namely that, with the authority of the Church behind it, a

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particular social system is at first justified, then supported, and finally declared sacrosanct:
(a) Marxists do not grasp this because, in this case, it would be themselves, and not the class enemy, who are recognised by the church. (A genuine atheist, who does not recognise Marxists as atheists, wrote to me in connection with the Marienbad dialogue, and referring back to developments in the nineteenth century, that 'the Marxists are making an obvious attempt to bring the priests over to their side'.)
(b) The Christians likewise fail to grasp the true state of affairs, because otherwise they would have nothing to bargain with, whereas now they can offer the blessing of the church on Marxism (once atheism is excluded) in exchange for religious freedom in a Marxist society.
8. It is now possible to draw up the balance sheet of the dialogue (which consistently and deliberately excluded such fascinating topics as transcendence in Marxism and immanence in Christianity). Such a balance sheet could logically take the following form (from which, however, the present writer dissociates himself):
(a) In this dialogue the Christians take as given the premise that communist society is *the* society of the future. On this assumption, accepted at first only tentatively, but in the course of the dialogue fully, they enquire whether they as Christians can accept this system, or whether they must reject it. If they do not reject it—since they have no specific social order of their own to put in its place, and atheism is excluded as non-integrating—their refusal to reject falsely implies an affirmative, since this affirmative is a position to which the individual *may* subscribe.
(b) The Marxists in their turn agree, in view of the apparent and in many cases genuine cooperation of the Christians, that religion is not necessarily the opium of the people. In doing so they give a relativist interpretation (in the best Marxist manner) to Marx's assertion that it is the opium of the people. They acknowledge that religion can make a contribution to the future of mankind, but in the final analysis this amounts, from their point of view, to accepting the active cooperation of Christians in a society which will eventually become communist and in which religion will in any case die out (not by compulsory methods, which would be counter-productive).

At this stage of the dialogue, the Marxists ask the Christians the all-important question about cooperation. The question is put without any such qualification as 'On what specific points can we collaborate?'; it is put as an all-inclusive question. The Christians are not in a position to differentiate between various aspects of the question. On the contrary, they are led to examine, and at the same time to overcome, certain reservations arising from past history: for example, on the question of property, on the rights and wrongs of revolution (as Paul VI did in his encyclical *Progressio populorum*) only in order to give an all-embracing (and hence, in the opinion of this writer, false) reply. They are prepared to accept any variant of a future Marxist

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society, fascinated, like a rabbit by a stoat, by a preconceived and absolute image of a society to which they cannot offer their own alternative based on religion—provided they are granted religious freedom.

This is a wholly ridiculous reversal of a historical situation, and in itself demonstrates the relativity of all historical realities.

(a) In the nineteenth century, and even at the beginning of the twentieth, it was precisely the Marxists who insisted again and again that the state must be neutral vis-à-vis religion. This was particularly marked in Austria, where the alliance of church and state worked to the disadvantage of the social-democrats. Very often it was the church rather than the state which demanded and defended this alliance, from the time of the Concordat in 1855 (abrogated in 1870) right up to 1934 and even 1938.

(b) But today in eastern Europe it is the church which is at a disadvantage, and which therefore demands neutrality of the state, and their claim is supported by independent (Marxist?) scholars who assert that it is in the interests of scholarship and humanity that all systems of thought should be left in freedom. How times change!

On both sides it is clear how historically determined their attitude is, and how unjustified it is to commit a total dogmatic authority to particular historical situations, for this runs the risk of undermining the credibility of the authority.

The picture so far has been presented in black colours, or rather in black and red. We must be fully aware of the dangers inherent in the dialogue. This is more important than criticism of the procedures, the loosely defined concepts, or tactless behaviour. Only when these dangers are grasped is it possible to give unqualified approval to the dialogue as important, useful, and necessary. Approval in this sense is given from an entirely different point of view, which could and should add a new dimension to the dialogue that goes beyond its inherent dangers.

9. For at least a decade, probably longer, Christianity and Marxism have been undergoing a process of transformation, a process set in motion by the realities of a world to which both Marxists and Christians have for too long been blind, imprisoned as they were in their doctrines, maxims, and aspirations, to which they wished to make reality conform, but in which the realities time and again proved the stronger. This process is far from complete. Indeed, it is only beginning.

In this situation, the dialogue should help Christians and Marxists to do each other the same service which up to now they have rendered each other as opponents: to question the position of the other side; to examine and if necessary to revise their own position; but measuring themselves against each other, and not only in respect to their ideology but also to their real position, to allow themselves to be judged by the realities not of their own side, but of the other side; to continue with this examination, to reach a better understanding, to withdraw from

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untenable ideological positions and so transcend themselves and reality, in the Hegelian and Marxist sense.

In the dialogue in which the two sides remained opponents, but opponents on speaking terms, the sincerity of the other side was recognised by each: they cast aside demonology, passions, and prejudices, which in the past had led from intellectual hostility to physical annihilation without, however, diminishing or neutralising the explosive power of the opposing argument.

As opponents in argument, both finally recognised how much each conditions the other, how often their positions are built on those of the opposite side.

Because this process is still in full flood, and should continue to be so, neither side should seek to pin down the other, the opponent who is at the same time the partner in the dialogue. Otherwise the potentialities on both sides will be inhibited. Any pinning down of the other side leads to greater rigidity in one's own position. If one side succeeds in harnessing the other to its own chariot—by forcing it to recognise its programme, by enforced cooperation—the opposing position, which compels one to question one's own, will become virtually untenable, and there will no longer be any need to examine one's own position.

A dialogue as suggested here is of course very difficult, for it demands not only *an* understanding, but understanding, not conformity but recognition of differences, not a search for non-existent common standpoints but honest disagreement. There is no point in advancing unreal common standpoints and false identifications, as was sometimes attempted at Marienbad. It does no good to use the same terms, while consciously or unconsciously overlooking the fact that they have different meanings, merely in order to create the impression that a common language has been found.

The dialogue of the future must consist in establishing and weighing the balance of differences, after finding a shared or apparently shared position, as for instance in a common dedication of Christians and Marxists to the future welfare of mankind. Both sides must examine and question what it is on each side that divides them, and with trust and patience await developments—even promote them—and remain open minded about each other and the realities of the situation; to question not in the certainty that one knows all the answers, but in the desire to hear answers from the other side; not to be arrogant about one's own ideas, but to question in the hope of a final answer—which can never, in any case, be final, whoever gives it and whatever it may be.

This sounds abstract. So let us be concrete. Who, in the Austria of the 1920s, would have thought a dialogue between church and social-democracy possible? Nevertheless it has been attempted by those who were not discouraged. Since that time, and particularly since 1945, a great deal has changed, and the changes have had their impact on the two great opponents of yesterday. Perhaps a similar development, even though it seems utopian now, will occur in the relations between

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Christians and Marxists, between Christianity and communism. Such a development might invalidate the formidable objection which maintains, not without reason, that, while it is true that so long as there is a dialogue there is tolerance, each side is conducting the dialogue in the conviction that he will ultimately be proved right, that the superiority of his views will finally assert itself. Will the tolerance exercised today last, once this has happened?

If the development sketched here does take place, the question of tolerance will have to be put again and again, and as a matter of urgency, until tolerance is no longer problematic, but taken for granted by both sides in respect to the other. Christians and communists would then no longer be what they are now; they would be the same and yet different.

This may and perhaps should be the goal and achievement of the dialogue.

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THE AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST VIEW

Leopold Gruenwald

FOR more than five years the establishment of a new and better relationship between communists and Christians has been one of the most important concerns of most communist parties of the capitalist world. It is a result of the realisation that since the Second Vatican Council—disregarding temporary fluctuations—changes are occurring in the Church ' which have objective causes and which are rooted in the scientific-technical revolution, in the strengthening of socialism, in the successes of the colonial liberation movement, and in the recognition of the catastrophic results of an atomic war ', as a speaker put it at the 19th congress of the Austrian CP. These communist parties realise today ' the irrefutable fact of our century, that the future of mankind cannot be realised either by opposing the faithful or without them ' (Garaudy). Ultimately they represent the view ' that the old atheistic propaganda of the workers' movement is no longer helpful ' and that everything must be done ' so that the Catholics will not consider our outstretched hand as a means to an end or even as hypocrisy ' (Togliatti).

With these new realisations we have entered on the first stage of a world-wide dialogue between Christians and Marxists. Without idealising, but at the same time without underestimating its significance, we know today that it will reach a true turning point only when the dialogue extends beyond the relatively narrow circle of initiates and has become a true dialogue between the masses of Christians, socialists, and communists.

In these circumstances, the position of Soviet atheists concerning these questions is especially interesting not only because they are

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frequently used by right-wing circles in the Church to reproach western European Marxists, but also because we consider it very desirable to have a clarification of the position of all Marxists in the dialogue. A recent book by M. P. Mshchedlov on the evolution of modern Catholicism (Moscow, 1967), can be taken as an example because it essentially represents the same viewpoint as many other pertinent publications of atheistic propaganda in the USSR, and also because the author participated at the Council in Rome as correspondent of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and hence appears to speak with a certain authority!

The facts from which the Soviet writers proceed are admitted—the colossal effect of social turmoil in the last decade on the faithful, their longing to avert a world-wide catastrophe, the participation by millions of Christians in revolutionary and progressive movements, etc.

The conclusions that many Soviet publications draw from these facts, however, are essentially different from our interpretation. The most striking feature of Mshchedlov's book is the fact that he indicts all positions of the conservative hierarchy or reactionary leaders of the Christian parties of the Church, in other words, the entire institution. We consider this an unreliable generalisation. We believe that special care must be taken to differentiate between such a position and the manifold currents of the tendency towards renovation in the Church and in the whole of Christendom . . .

> Mshchedlov writes that ' This " cleaning " of religion makes it more flexible and thereby strengthens the position of this ideology which is inimical to the national interests . . . Therefore the unmasking of the latest methods for defending religious ideologies requires the energetic efforts of all supporters of the materialist world outlook, of a scientific ideology ' (p. 9).

He views the development in the Church which has gone from the crusading views of Pius XII, through the Coexistence Encyclical of John XXIII, to the anti-colonialist Encyclical *Progressio Populorum* of Paul VI as nothing more than a manoeuvre which serves as a cover for the clergy and which requires ' unmasking ' because it appears to be especially dangerous.

We do not think that this is a case of manoeuvring or of opportunist adaptation. We consider the revival tendencies taking place in Christendom, as well as among the clergy, to be genuine. The fact that religious elements in the Church and in the Christian movements are more and more frequently connected to progressive and revolutionary elements is something which needs closer analysis. All such examinations by west European and Latin American Marxists have shown that many Christian ideologies which are striving to dissociate themselves from capitalist and imperialist influence are in no way ' anti-popular ', but are an expression of objective, genuine counterparts within the Church. These are counterparts and contradictions which are characteristic of our epoch. This is especially true of the left-wing Catholic movement,

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which considers the reform of the Church as a return to the original ideals of Christianity.

The representatives and supporters of such ideologies are especially welcome to us as partners in the dialogue. But they should not be identified by their belief in 'unmasking', but rather by values which, disregarding conflicting world outlooks, are common to us all and which can be the basis of joint action for peace, democracy and social justice. The dialogue with the Christians and their Church is not a tactic for us but rather a genuine concern that comes from our realisation that millions of faithful Christians will be our brothers and fellow-travellers in the struggle for socialism . . . It is also the recognition of the fact that by proceeding from religious concepts, one can also work for a socialist transformation of society. We consider that the honourable participation of eminent leaders of communist parties in this build-up is no more 'tactical' than the appeal of Church prelates to Christians in socialist countries.

The author of the Soviet publication repeatedly asserts that religious-social theories are essentially nothing other than 'the usual bourgeois apologia', or that they are merely 'new sermons, new songs' which are well suited to the new times. Now we Austrian Marxists have continued to have differences with Christian social theory. Nevertheless, we would wish for nothing better than to hear such 'new songs' in as many countries as possible, so long as they are accompanied by struggles which can be considered serious attempts and which are supported by the clergy. Even Mshchedlov must admit such facts. But does he believe that the mass struggles and protest strikes against the Franco regime, the demonstrations against the Vietnam war in the USA, the peasants' movement for the break-up of large estates and the strikes by food workers in Brazil, the student strikes directed against conservative despotism at Latin American Catholic universities which are led and supported by Catholic priests and organisations, only present the 'usual bourgeois apologia'.

Our author speaks of the harmfulness of revolutionary movements which take a religious form and even predicts that they will 'turn in the opposite direction'. According to this concept, which appears over-simplified to us, liberation from religious beliefs is a prerequisite for progressive social action. However, he does come to the conclusion that 'at present, conditions have arisen in which the theory and practice of socialism are exercising an enormous influence on every popular mass movement, including religious ones as well'.

To what can we trace these and other contradictions in the explanation which many Soviet authors try to give for the processes which are taking place in the Church? All of them are tireless in stressing the extent of the revolutionary changes in the productive forces, the collapse of the colonial system, and the formation of a socialist world. And it cannot be denied that as a result, great changes in the ideological superstructure of society are taking place.

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But can all this have by-passed the Church without leaving a trace, or have done no more than give it a 'new mask'? If Mshchedlov is right, not only the Roman Church, but all the religions of the world have remained more or less untouched by the effects of these compelling forces. Yet he argues that the social function of modernism or, in other words, of church reforms is 'to serve the needs of preserving and strengthening capitalist society'. He believes that the Church is now only carrying out the same 'class policies of the bourgeoisie' as it did before, 'disregarding a certain independence and mobility' . . . 'Objectively, everything remains the same as it once was: The earlier social function of the Church is being realised in a modernised form'.

Such simplifications, however, cannot stand up to a confrontation with the facts. The appeal of Paul VI for an end to the Vietnam war apparently runs counter to the policy of American imperialism. The latest Encyclical *Progressio Populorum* is directed against the class policies of the bourgeoisie and has had a massive shock effect on those circles which wanted to maintain the previous social function of the Church, as is the case in Austria, for example, in the Industrial Alliance and the right wing of the Austrian People's Party. This view ceases to regard the private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right; it recognises, even though with reservations, the justification of social revolution; it is practically throwing scholastic 'natural right' overboard, and it is accomplishing a thoroughgoing change in its concept of the world and of the position of man in the world. How can all this be reconciled with what Mshchedlov maintains is 'the realisation of the earlier social function of the Church' in today's world?

The pessimistic viewpoint of Mshchedlov and of other Soviet friends unfortunately does not contribute to a fruitful development of the dialogue with the Christians. But how differently the cause of socialism could have progressed in countries such as France, Italy, or Austria had there been an alliance with Catholic workingmen who maintained their religious convictions—to say nothing about socialism becoming a reality. Even during the thirties, communists, disregarding their atheist ideology, appealed to their fellow Christians, and in so doing brought into prominence the cultural values of the Christian religion in its defensive struggle against fascism and the acute danger of world war. Today, unmistakable tendencies are in operation which are raising this development to a new level. To an increasing degree, the Church is playing an independent and self-reliant role, and within its fold, as in all of Christendom, new forces are being liberated for the struggle for progress and socialism. This is contributing to an ever-increasing transformation of the function of the Church. This realisation in no way prevents us from seeing the tremendous difficulties and the unavoidable obstacles along the way. But the Church is just as important for the future of the workers movement and for socialism as it is for Christianity.

(*From* Die Volksstimme (*Vienna*), *26 August 1967*.)

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THE HUMAN COSTS OF REVOLUTION

Sidney Hook

TO speak of the human costs of revolution already presupposes that revolutions are not merely natural events. For although natural events like earthquakes and storms may take a great toll in human life and suffering, we do not reckon these consequences as costs. Costs are the result of human actions. Although we may not be aware of the costs or ignore them, they flow from intended actions—individual or collective.

That is why it is perfectly intelligible to raise questions about the validity and justification of revolutions—social or political; all the more so when theories of revolution abound designed not merely to explain revolutions but to bring them about. Reflections about revolution therefore are not like reflections about chance, love, death, and other human happenings which are unaffected by whatever conclusions we reach about them. They contribute to a climate of opinion that may have fateful consequences for the living and the still unborn. To be sure, individuals, even an entire generation, may be caught in a revolution just as they may be caught in a storm in whose making they have had as little to do, but until the weather is brought under control it remains a natural happening in a way that no revolution is. For revolutions are made by men even if not by all men who are affected by them.

The 50th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution is an appropriate occasion for an assessment of the rationale of social revolution, of the gains and costs of those measures of revolutionary violence undertaken to bring about not the Bolshevik programme of a socialist society, for this is still in the limbo of the unrealised, but the incontestable complex social changes that differentiate pre-revolutionary Russia from the Soviet Union today. Such an enquiry is difficult but not impossible to make. The questions related to it certainly make sense. We ask similar ones about many different things. Looking back on the past we assess important actions in the light of what is presently known not in order to determine whether we would perform them again if time were reversible, but whether, assuming that they were not inevitable, that they were genuine choices, they were justified by their consequences; whether, in short, the gains or the glory or the freedoms won were worth the pains or the agony or the freedoms lost. An experience may be justified by its consequences even though we have no desire to live it over again. Unless such judgments can be validly made there can be no such thing as wisdom in human affairs—or foolishness for that matter. Regret about the past may be vain, particularly if it has no bearing on future conduct; but *judgment*

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about the past is so much a part of the business of living that whoever forgoes it has lost all sense of direction or purpose or has become a creature of other people's purposes. What is true of the small crises in personal experience is also true of the great crises in history. Only those who regard the world of historical events as completely irrational or in Hegelian fashion as a pattern woven by the Cunning of Reason can forswear judging it.

WITH respect to the Russian Revolution we can rule out the negative judgments that stem from two different sources. There is first of all the class of judgments that condemn the October Revolution on grounds of pacifism or opposition to all war and *a fortiori* to civil war, which is usually the most barbarous kind of war. The difficulty with the pacifist condemnation of violence lies in its absolutism. It is one thing to charge the Bolsheviks with *unintelligent* and *unnecessary* use of violence in consolidating their power, in industrialising the country, and in collectivising agriculture. It is something else again, and far from legitimate, to condemn them *a priori* for the use of violence, since a similar condemnation would have to be made of any and all their political rivals. It would have required violence, even if not very much, to prevent the Bolsheviks from seizing political power violently.

The other class of negative judgments about the October Revolution which must be ruled out are those derived from acceptance of the premises of orthodox Marxism. This may appear surprising to those unfamiliar both with doctrine, and with the form of the question posed to which we are seeking an answer. The question posed is whether the industrialisation and modernisation of the Soviet Union which followed the Revolution required the totalitarian system established by Lenin and Stalin and its various degrees of terror. One increasingly popular answer is that those costs are comparable to those paid in England, Japan, Germany, and other European countries for *their* industrialisation and modernisation. And since these costs are accepted almost as a matter of course by liberals, it is the veriest sentimentalism to indict the Soviet Union and other communist countries embarked on the same social programme of modernisation, for moral callousness and the systematic brutalisation of man.

The Marxist rejects the whole question out of hand as irrelevant to the problem: when is a revolution justified? For according to him this problem has *actualité* in modern society only when industrialisation and the phenomena integral to it, have already occurred. For Marxists the political revolution which marks the development from capitalism to socialism already presupposes that the industry and technology, without which socialism spells merely the socialisation of poverty, have developed. To the extent that the costs of revolution are calculated, in the eyes of the Marxist they refer only to the advisability of the immediate political action of taking and keeping power. The question for a

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Marxist is *not* whether the costs of revolution are to be weighed against the benefits of industrialisation, but only whether the existing forms of industry are to be socialised through due legal process or by the extra-legal act of revolution.

This way of posing the problem begs all the important questions. It ignores the fact that the orthodox Marxist dogma, according to which no social order disappears until all the potential productive forces within it have been actualised, has been proved to be a myth. The Bolshevik-Leninists succeeded in doing precisely what the theory of historical materialism declared to be impossible. The industrialisation of the country did not prepare the way for the revolution but the revolution prepared the way for industrialisation. By jettisoning Marx, the Bolshevik-Leninists gave sense to a question which had no significance on Marxist premises but had worlds of meaning on other premises. It is a question that has become focal in every underdeveloped country striving to modernise itself and tempted to adopt totalitarian methods to do so. It is a question that did not exist for Marx because for him no underdeveloped country could be ready for socialisation. Underdeveloped countries could become less underdeveloped only by following in the path of the more developed which showed them the face of their future.

Leaving aside the context of Marxist presupposition, the problem is a genuine one for any country convinced of the desirability of industrialisation and aware of alternative routes and costs by which it may be reached. It is in connection with this problem that the discussion of the costs of the Russian Revolution has acquired an additional interest. Some of those who have been critical of Soviet developments have argued that these costs have been of a dimension which renders any attempt at a rational assessment of this period grotesque. Others who have been critical believe that a rational assessment can be made, and that in the light of the costs of industrialisation in other countries, as well as the alternatives open at various times to the communist leaders of the Soviet Union, these costs were much too high. Both forms of criticism have been rejected on several grounds by writers who claim to be not altogether sympathetic to communism.

It has been argued that the costs of industrialisation in the Soviet Union are comparable to the costs of the industrial revolution in Great Britain, Japan, and Germany. The inevitable references to the conditions of the English working class as discussed both in Engels's early work and in Marx's *Capital* are introduced. It has also been argued that the costs of revolution have been unfairly computed in so far as the costs of normalcy and the status quo, and even of reform and gradualism, have been ignored. If millions have starved under a given regime and are expected to starve if it is preserved, it is morally inadmissible to indict a revolution designed to change the system that permits starvation on the ground that the victims are counted in their hundreds of thousands. Finally, it is pointed out that there is an historic injustice

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in condemning even the excesses involved in implementing the programme of social revolution in the light of the excesses committed in the past in the name of freedom and even of tolerance. It is asserted that there is a legitimate sense in which the red terror is an answer to a white terror. The latter, even if not so intense and dramatic as the former, has endured for a longer time. What are these considerations worth—especially in their bearing on the assessment of the Russian Revolution or of any other revolutionary transformation of an underdeveloped country by violent, dictatorial, and terrorist methods?

THE first striking but pervasive confusion in computing the costs of social transformation in the Soviet Union is to speak of the terror under Lenin and the horrors of the Stalin regime as if they were necessarily involved in the processes of industrialisation and collectivisation. The costs of the industrial revolution in England and other countries are measured in terms of crowding, lack of hygiene, disease, malnutrition, physical discomfort, long hours, child labour, and other privations of a similar order. These costs were the object of bitter criticism at the time. A great deal of the data dramatically used by Marx comes from the reports of the official factory inspectors. The alleviation of these hardships of the industrial revolution became the active object of parliamentary and trade union activity. Before Marx's death many of them had disappeared. There were no mass purges, deportations, executions, and forced labour concentration camps for millions.

The costs of the industrial revolution in the Soviet Union were to some extent already paid for in the pre-revolutionary regime, whose social welfare legislation was in some respects in advance of some western countries. But the dislocation of the population after the Civil War, the government monopoly of employment and housing, and the absence of free and militant trade unions restored some of the old conditions and introduced others. Nothing comparable to the phenomenon of the *Bezprizornye*, the hordes of wild children resulting from the disappearance of their parents which I myself observed in Moscow in 1929, developed in other countries as incidental to their industrial revolution.

But all these costs of the expanded industrialisation of the Soviet Union were as nothing compared to the political excesses of the regime. The millions of casualties of the continued civil war waged by the Kremlin against the Russian population had nothing to do with the processes of industrialisation *except to hamper them*. The claim made by some western apologists (including the Webbs) that the organised terror by the regime was necessary for the expansion and functioning of industry—that the Russian workers had to be driven to a modernised economy against their own will—not only violates the assumptions of every democratic variant of Marxism but sets on its head the simple truths about the prerequisites of industry. During the purge years,

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when hundreds of thousands were sent to death camps on grounds of industrial sabotage, it was clear that the regime was equating industrial errors and mistakes with crimes—and particularly crimes against the state, in short, with treason. As subsequent revelations have confirmed, in such circumstances hardly anyone could be found who was willing to take the initiative, to assume the chance and risk of fresh and original judgment. Almost everyone played it safe, marked time while he protected himself behind a barrier of documents that spread the responsibility and shared it with others similarly engaged in a protective avoidance of industrial leadership. If anything can make the political terror worse than it was, it is the fact that it had no industrial rationale whatsoever. It involved the sheer and immense waste of human and material resources.

All one need do to test this is to select some of the specific outrages committed by the communist high command, especially Stalin, and to enquire what industrial purpose they served. If a victim of the Moscow Trials confesses that he organised a group to sabotage machinery or to put glass or tacks in butter, what possible effects could his punishment have on those producing machines or butter except to limit production by more conscientious effort to avoid furnishing any pretext for the charge of sabotage?

What possible bearing on the costs of industrialisation did myriads of crimes have from the Katyn massacre to the murder of Ehrlich and Alter, leaders of the Jewish Bund, as agents of Hitler? Not a single one of the incidents reported by Khrushchev in his speech before the twentieth congress of the Communist Party as indicative of the type of 'breaches of legality' of which Stalin, in complicity with his opportunistic detractors, was guilty, in any way furthered the industrialisation and modernisation of the Soviet Union. In no other country of the world was political murder on such a vast scale among the methods by which the industrial revolution was brought to pass.

THERE is something odd about the comparison between the costs of industrialisation in the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and the costs of industrialisation in western countries. What is odd about it is that a series of events—the Industrial Revolution in the West—which no one agency or institution willed, is being compared with a series of events which was the result of a deliberate programme or policy. Although the events that constituted the industrial revolution in the West were voluntary, their costs were unintended in the sense that no one agency or institution *initiated* the industrial revolution. The costs of industrialisation in the West were not any less for not being willed. But the moral responsibility was less—it was limited to the range of actions open to the community when the unintended consequences of the unintended industrial revolution unrolled themselves in time.

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The industrialisation undertaken in communist countries was a consequence of deliberate decision. It was willed together with its costs in the face of various alternatives ranging from postponement of the execution of an overall plan to plans of a more modest scope and pace of realisation. An intelligible choice, aside from its wisdom, is a choice made among viable alternatives in the contemporary spectrum of realistic possibilities. Its justification must be grounded on the different consequences of pursuing one course of action rather than another. A policy that requires a reign of terror to implement it, if justified, can be grounded only on the evidence that this is the *only* way to avoid what is sure to be a greater reign of terror. But by no stretch of common sense can it be justified on the ground that a state of affairs which, like the industrial revolution in England, was not the outcome of a policy, had led to an equal or greater amount of suffering and evil in the past.

There is a surprising moral callousness in some of the assessments of the costs of the Russian Revolution which stems from a failure to realise that any social action that is willed carries with it a degree of responsibility that cannot be ascribed to actions that are not willed. The question is not one of miscalculating the effects of a specific policy. The error consists in what is being taken as the basis of the calculation. In discussing the calculus of revolutionary violence, Mr Barrington Moore writes:

> . . . one has to weigh the casualties of a reign of terror against those of allowing the prevailing situation to continue, which may include a high death rate due to disease, ignorance—or at the other end of the scale, failure to control the use of powerful technical devices. (The 40,000 deaths a year in the United States due to automobile accidents come to mind here. What would we think of a political regime that executed 40,000 people a year?) [1]

Presumably the author believes, in answer to his question, that we would think equally poorly of such a regime. Presumably, if the political regime executed only 20,000 people a year it would be only half as bad as if it executed 40,000, and half as bad as a regime which has 40,000 traffic accidents! Accidents and executions are put on the same moral plane!

But this is absurd. Its absurdity can be brought home by considering the parable of the magic carpet. Suppose we were offered a modern version of a magic carpet which required neither oil nor gas to take us where we will at speeds of our desire. It could be rolled up and stored in a closet, was accident proof and unaffected by technological obsolescence. Compared to it our automobile would be a very crude contraption. All that the ingenious inventor wants for it is the lives of 10,000 people. Having read Mr Moore, he argues: 'If you are prepared to pay the price of 40,000 lives for such an inefficient and

[1] *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, by Wolf, Moore, Marcuse (Boston, 1965), p. 76.

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costly machine as the automobile, why do you hesitate to pay me my reasonable price?'

The answer is obvious. Even if the accident rate is not likely to diminish in the future, we would not regard ourselves as benefactors of mankind if we paid the asked-for price for the magic carpet, but as murderers, because it would be our deliberate decision that would make us responsible for their deaths. There are many other reasons on which to ground our refusal to cancel out the distinction between accident and murder but this one is sufficient. The assumption that our action is limited to a choice between accepting the accident figures of the past and deliberately destroying human beings in order to avoid future accidents is, of course, one that is easily challenged. Once we permit assumptions of this grim kind to stand, then the door is open to any fanatical saviour or wilful political adventurer to try to introduce a reign of terror in order to eliminate the errors and accidents and evils that are bound up with ordinary human bungling. In the world of historical reality, of course, there is no guarantee that accidents and errors would be less where freedom, and especially freedom of criticism, was sacrificed on the altars of efficiency. Some of the greatest follies of past dictatorships, often fatal to them, could have germinated only in an atmosphere where the cult of efficiency or personality or party infallibility silenced dissent.

THERE is another point of great importance ignored by those who compare the evils of the industrial revolution in the West with the evils of industrialisation in communist countries. This is the difference which the presence of political democracy makes. It was because of the processes of political democracy that the costs of the industrial revolution in western countries were exposed, diminished, and controlled, and some of its greatest evils abolished. The reports of the English factory inspectors, to whose moral integrity Marx paid a tribute his own theory of morality cannot account for, led to the social welfare legislation that brought the excesses of the industrial revolution to a halt. And that they were excesses can hardly be doubted. The reports naturally centred on illustrations that were extreme rather than typical. A free press, a free literature, and an unmuzzled Parliament proclaimed the evidence of industrial inhumanity to the entire world.

The actual costs of the industrial revolution in communist countries have gone largely unreported, partly because there were no agencies independent of the government to describe them or facilities for distributing eye-witness experiences, and partly because the outrage of the political terror dwarfed the sufferings and privations of ordinary life. There were no reporters on the scene to give an account of the lives of those 'lumber workers' in the northern forests, except escapees and refugees whose revelations were discounted or dismissed as prejudiced judgments reflecting only their personal experiences.

Even if there were some way of making an objective estimate of the

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sufferings of human beings in the past and in the present, there is something absurd in justifying the evils of today by reference to the allegedly equal or greater sufferings of yesterday. Comparisons of this kind are worse than useless to the extent that they distract us from recognising that intelligent choice is always between the evils of alternative courses of action in the *present*. Whatever the evils of yesterday were, they are beyond our control.

To make comparisons with evils of the past and to attempt to guide present action in their light, sometimes lends to an acceptance of the dogma of collective responsibility in its most pernicious form. It is bad enough to hold all members of a group collectively responsible for actions of some individual members of that group unless the members of the group were aware of those actions, and in a position to control them or at least condemn them. But it is monstrous, and a source of great and continuous cruelty in world history, to hold a present generation responsible for the sins of omission and commission of its ancestors.

This cruelty is sometimes concealed in the echoes of rhetorical denunciation of the evils of the past. Thus even Mark Twain, misled by some French historians, in speaking of the excesses and cruelties of the ' red terror ' of the French Revolution, declared that it was nothing but a reply to or a consequence of the ' white terror ' begun with Louis XIV and which continued for a longer period and with a greater loss of life than the terror of 1793–95. But Louis XIV and those of his courtiers who counselled him had long since mouldered in their graves when Marie Antoinette and her entourage, as well as thousands of French workers and peasants, were guillotined.

The very doctrine of collective responsibility and/or guilt is self-defeating in its moral absurdity, since the descendants of the victims of any action justified by the dogma can invoke it to initiate a contemporary massacre. If terror against the Jews is justified by the alleged terror of their ancestors against the ancestors of the present-day terrorists, then terror against the children of today's terrorists would be waged by the descendants of their victims. This can only set up a never ending cycle of hatred and bloodshed. Some Irish terrorists are still revenging themselves upon the English for the crimes of Cromwell. This makes as little sense as would an apologia for Cromwell's excesses on the ground that the Irish are not without guilt since, after all, they wiped out the indigenous population of Ireland.

In an attempt to find a rationale for the appeal to force and violence in the settlement of complex contemporary problems, some American demagogues have argued that the alleged ' genocide ' of the American Indians by the settlers provides a warrant for direct action against the descendants of the settlers. The latter presumably have no moral standing in history to protest against such revolutionary violence today, since they have benefited from its exercise in the past. Actually, even those who invoke this argument have also benefited by it whether they are white or black or red. Where would they be, what state would they

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now be in, if America had not been colonised? There are probably more Indians alive now than when the American continent was discovered. The rights and wrongs of the policies of the settlers canot be discussed here—the wrongs far outweigh the rights—but these wrongs were compounded on *both* sides by the immoral doctrine of collective responsibility which made one Indian village or white settlement guilty for actions committed by other villages or settlements.

It is this concern for *past* rights and wrongs which bedevils so much of contemporary history and prevents an intelligent approach and resolution of problems *in the present*. The legacy of the past and consciousness of the past weigh too heavily on the whole complex of Israeli-Arab problems. And not only in the Near East. One can mention the Far East and Central Europe as well. Wisdom requires the adoption of something like a statute of limitations upon the drive for absolute historic justice, and the substitution of a policy of limited peaceful gains. There is no such thing as absolute justice in this world. The evils Hitler, and not only Hitler, did to the Jews in Europe will never be atoned for or repaid, and the only good reason for remembering what he did is to avoid in the present and future the kind of thought and action that led him to his unspeakable barbarities.

From this point of view, the assessment of the October Revolution, as of all other revolutions, must be primarily in terms of the possibility of other alternatives that could have been considered and taken. The misdeeds of Ivan the Terrible and the cowardly weakness of Nicholas II do not mitigate the actions of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. The only justification of their purges and terror, based on the unlimited rule of force, was that there were no other alternatives that could be taken. Although one can establish this for some phases of some actions, by and large every decisive turning point in the history of the Soviet Union from the forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly to the forcible collectivisation of agriculture, to the Moscow Trials, the German-Soviet Pact, and the resumption of the cold war against the United States and the West, could have been avoided without any threat to its justifying principles of freedom and welfare. The incontestable fact remains that the working masses of the western democratic world have secured for themselves a greater freedom and a higher welfare at a far lower cost than has been paid by their Russian brothers for their present lot.

(*This essay was presented as a paper to the Sixth International Conference on World Politics held in West Berlin in September 1967. The subject of the conference was 'Fifty Years of the Soviet Union'.*)

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

CZECHOSLOVAK WRITERS

Voices of Revolt

Pavel Tigrid

AFTER THE 1956 REVOLT of Hungarian writers, after the Polish October of the same year, we now have what can be safely labelled the Czechoslovak summer of 1967. It was a memorable summer indeed for a country which had been lagging behind some of its neighbours in fresh intellectual initiatives and in moral as well as political renaissance.

The events of the summer have been widely and fairly accurately reported in the western press, and there were many of them: repeated skirmishes between the party leadership and Czech and Slovak intellectuals, frequent changes, dictated by the party, in the editorship of *Literarni noviny*, the mouthpiece of the belligerent writers (estimated readership 500,000), criticism raised but suppressed on the part of a number of prominent communist writers directed against the official Czechoslovak policy towards Israel (it was the first communist country after the Soviet Union to break off diplomatic relations with Israel), the tumultuous June Writers' Congress in Prague, followed immediately by the first political trial the CS Communist Party had staged in many years and in which the novelist Jan Benes was sentenced to a five-year prison term for publishing some of his work in the West. Soon afterwards, a sensation was created by Slovak novelist Ladislav Mnacko (author of the novel, forbidden in Czechoslovakia, *The Taste of Power*), who had left for Israel to demonstrate his opposition to Prague's Middle East policies and who was subsequently expelled from the party and deprived of his citizenship. And that the party leadership meant business—embarrassed as it was, moreover, by such incidents as the Jordan affair, Czech border guards shooting at refugees trying to cross the Czech-Austrian frontier, as well as by the worldwide publicity which the Czechoslovak situation had attracted—was evident from the drastic measures it had taken against a number of the writers in revolt and, more important, against their organisations, publishing houses, and *Literarni noviny*, which practically ceased to exist.

While it is still too early to evaluate these events (the process is still under way and its political impact is yet to be seen), there is little doubt that the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress was probably the biggest protest of writers in eastern Europe since the revolt of the Hungarian intellectual community in 1956. The western reader may well ask what were the crimes the purged writers, all of them long-time communists, had committed to be thus punished and publicly humiliated, without, of course, being given the opportunity of defending themselves.

It was only at the end of October that the texts of their addresses delivered at the Writers' Congress reached the West, in full and in the Czech original. These speeches were given by the party leadership as reasons for the expulsion of Ivan Klima, A. J. Liehm, and Ludvik

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Vaculik from the party ranks; however, the texts were not allowed to be published or otherwise disseminated in Czechoslovakia.

The CPCS leadership accused the dissident writers in general, and the three novelists in particular, of advocating views which were incompatible with party membership. This accusation becomes most enlightening since the texts now available make it clear that the three writers did no more than criticise two generally recognised evils in present-day Czech society—misuse of power and censorship—and advocate the rule of law.

WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to reproduce here the speeches of the three writers in full—their lucidity and memorable moral pathos would make it worth while—some extracts can be given.

Klima opened his address by deploring 'the abnormality' that the Czech and Slovak press 'had been instructed' not to report anything about the congress. This was hardly in keeping with the tradition of a country which 'is the only one of all the socialist states with a hundred-year-old tradition of parliamentary freedoms. This is a fact which can be neither debated away nor destroyed. And if many of us have the feeling that some of the basic human rights guaranteed by the Constitution of 1867 are not valid today, then a feeling of abnormality must indeed oppress us. We are defending ourselves against this abnormality. Of course, we can always be convinced, by persuasion or by force, that we are mistaken. There are certainly many means besides normal discussion of silencing the bitterness felt by any elected body. But nobody can ever erase from history this part of our national past which, whenever it is recalled for comparison, will time and again give birth to this feeling of abnormality in our development, so long as we do not eradicate the reasons for this feeling.'

Klima then criticised the Czechoslovak press law which came into force on 1 January 1967 and which makes it not only impossible for an individual, or group of individuals, to print and publish, but specifies that any publication 'must fulfil its social mission'. Klima noted that such a loose formulation permits the authorities to suppress at will any newspaper or review. In addition, the 1967 press law codified the long-established but unofficial practice of preliminary censorship. And he continued: 'The Imperial Patent under paragraph 151 of the [Austrian] Empire's Code dated 4 March 1849 stated explicitly: "Everyone has the right to proclaim freely his opinion by word, in writing, in print, or through pictures."' A few years later, in 1867, freedom of the press was guaranteed and censorship abolished by the so-called December Constitution. 'It can therefore be said', Klima added, 'that those who selected the year 1967 for the introduction of a press law renewing preliminary censorship just one hundred years after its abolition did not lack a certain ironical sense of humour.'

Klima further argued that preventive censorship, 'legally established in our country after 19 years of socialist reconstruction of our society', did not exist in the pre-war Czechoslovak Republic and was 'unthinkable' in most west European countries. In any case, the press law ran counter to the spirit and wording of the Czechoslovak Constitution. For these reasons he requested the Union to do its utmost to persuade

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the party authorities to 'put an end to the present humiliating and shameful forms of censorship'.

As it happened, the authorities chose to put an end to the political life of their critic.

Another man expelled from the party, A. J. Liehm, is a film and literary critic of renown who had joined the party in 1945. In his speech at the congress he supported those writers who claimed that in Czechoslovakia today it was possible to criticise—up to a point—almost anything without the criticism ever taking root or bringing about a change. Even so, the limits of this criticism were strictly defined. Liehm said: 'While criticism in our country is public, the search for alternatives is taking place to the exclusion of the public and mostly also to the exclusion of the critics. Consequently, a blissful state of utter irresponsibility is created among the critics, a state for which they can never be reproached since they themselves usually do not bear responsibility for anything, and there is not a ray of hope that one day they will bear any.' In these circumstances, he added, it was small wonder that his own speech was in 'the nature of a cry, the sole aim of which was, at most, to be heard'.

Liehm then proposed to analyse what in his country is called 'cultural policy'. He came to the following shattering conclusion: 'It is simply unbelievable, and yet it is so, that in spite of all the experiences of the past, the cultural policy of socialism repeats—with a consistency worthy of a better cause—all those mistakes committed in cultural affairs by previous formations; only empirically and slowly the conclusion is reached that the fault probably is not to be found in the application of a given cultural policy but in the very nature of the cultural policy itself'. Liehm declared that the continual failures of this policy had led many writers and artists to the conclusion that perhaps 'socialism was unable to solve cultural problems', while in the party apparatus comrades 'responsible for the state of culture, for cultural policy', are being constantly relieved of their posts: 'They are dismissed always for the same reasons. They were too liberal or too intolerant, they yielded too much to pressure from below or they relied too often on administrative measures. Yet these people, as we all know, do not differ greatly; their views are very similar and their practices are indistinguishable. They come and go and often return not because they are good or bad, stupid or smart, hard-working or lazy, but simply because they are expected to ensure what cannot be ensured, to fulfil tasks which cannot be fulfilled, to carry out a cultural policy which cannot be carried out.'

Liehm then suggested that the cultural policy of a socialist state should be liberated from two kinds of dictation: 'the dictate of power and the dictate of the market'. The truth was that in Czechoslovakia neither liberation took place. In the concluding part of his speech he suggested that 'it may be the United States of America which, as the richest country in the world, will one day formulate the kind of cultural policy about which we are dreaming. For myself, however, I would like such a formulation to come about first in a socialist country which can claim such a deep cultural experience and tradition as this country of ours. . . .'

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THE SPEECH OF THE THIRD VICTIM of the party purge, Ludvik Vaculik, is already well known in the West,[1] although it was not allowed to appear in print in Czechoslovakia. This writer, of working-class origin and a long-time communist, summarised, forcefully and without pulling any punches, what Klima and Liehm wanted to convey:

> The measure of the real cultural level which a country has attained is the manner in which organised actions of the state are carried out. It is, therefore, more a question of the cultural level of politics than of a good cultural policy. . . . Unsophisticated politics gives rise to centres of struggle for freedom, and yet the regime is offended when we talk about this. The regime does not understand that freedom exists only where there is no need to speak about it, and is annoyed because people talk about what they see. Yet, instead of changing what people see, the regime wants to change their eyes. And in the meantime we are losing sight of what alone deserves the appeal to revolutionary pathos, namely, the ideal of a government with which a citizen can identify himself, the dream of civic self-government.

A number of other writers—with few exceptions all communists—offered criticism of the party's internal and external policies but got away with no more than a mere 'comradely reprimand'. Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera, Alexander Kliment, and scores of others took up the main theme of the congress debate, namely, the rigid, uncontrolled power of the party, which with a heavy hand directs everything in the country from the government down to the factory canteen. If only for this reason, as Kliment pointed out, a writer's conscience 'will always be in conflict with official ideology, since this ideology necessarily, in the interest of broad social prosperity, will always choose simplified and optimistic formulas which appear to be attractive or at least binding for all'. Here were to be found the reasons for the fact that 'our spiritual life is in a crisis'.

In fairness to the writers, it must be said here that all who spoke at the congress and were party members criticised the current *application* of socialism or communism in their country and not socialism or communism as such. Every one of them stressed his continued faith in the original idealistic concepts of his belief. They spoke as comrades honestly alarmed by the deviations, mistakes, stupidity, and even cruelty of those in power. Indeed, the Czech writers quoted here hoped to protect and save what they believe to be a blueprint for a freer and more just society within the framework of socialism. Liehm in his speech even claimed that the Czechoslovak type of socialism could perhaps serve as 'the model of the future' for the entire world.

That these people were now expelled from the party for expressing views 'incompatible' with true communists merely shows the depths to which the present Czech leadership has declined. This decline was well manifested by Milan Lajciak, a poet of hopeless mediocrity and a favourite child of the regime. In a ferocious attack on his comrade writers, who listened in silence, Lajciak shouted: 'You spoke here

[1] *Die Weltwoche*, 21 July 1967, also excerpts in *The Times*, 19 September 1967.

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about Stalinism. I say that this term is borrowed from a foreign arsenal. It is used to denote unheard-of terror. But the soldiers of the Red Army who fought for Prague, for our Prague, fought and died with Stalin's name on their lips.' He continued: 'Comrade Solzhenitsyn is not present to testify whether his letter published in *Le Monde* was genuine . . . unfortunately, the current situation does require the continuation of censorship.'

The expulsions indicate that the present Czech leadership, compromised both by its past and its present, has its back to the wall. Almost totally discredited among the people and in its own party, isolated from the society it wants to direct, this leadership has no future. The future belongs to the writers in revolt, and to those in the nation, and even in the party, who not only sounded the alarm but are trying to find ways and means to lead their country out of decline. The writers are in for a period of difficulties and perhaps even persecution; but what they said has been heard throughout the world and, in spite of restrictions, in their own country as well. What they had to say is not likely to be forgotten.

Closely following on the writers' revolt came student disturbances, and finally Novotny's fight with the opposition in the Party's leading bodies. What next?

THE IMPACT OF 1917 ABROAD

George Lichtheim

THE DISTINGUISHED CONTRIBUTORS to this symposium* have set themselves the difficult task of saying something new and striking about a topic whose lasting import is indeed very great, but whose fascination has latterly begun to dim. On the whole they have succeeded, though largely at the cost of ignoring the more technical aspects of the subject. However, Professor Wiles does delve into the economics of Soviet aid to backward countries, and Mr Richard Lowenthal grapples with the problem of totalitarianism. Wisely, they and the other contributors have left the internal evolution of the Soviet regime alone and concentrated upon the global implications of the 1917 upheaval. Even Professor Seton-Watson, whose essay bears the title *Nationalism and Imperialism,* devotes little space to the operation of nationality policy within the USSR, and for the most part concentrates upon the clash (or synthesis) of communism and nationalism in eastern Europe and in lands further afield. Mr Neil McInnes, an Australian scholar resident in Paris and already known for his studies of Marxian and Sorelian trends in the French labour movement, deviates even further from the customary Sovietological model: his lengthy chapter deals with the

* **The Impact of the Russian Revolution: 1917–1967.** *The Influence of Bolshevism on the World Outside Russia.* With an introductory essay by Arnold J. Toynbee. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press, 1967. 357 pp. 45/–.

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evolution of the west European labour movement since 1917 and does not limit itself to the Comintern. This is the *pièce de résistance* of the volume: one hundred pages of closely reasoned analysis of the process whereby Moscow first split the European labour movement and then failed to win it over. Inevitably, the author goes over some patches of ground already explored by Borkenau and others, but he also brings the reader up to date on topics not often discussed in this particular context. A brief excursion into trade union affairs is particularly valuable.

Faced with such a diversified collection, it is tempting for a reviewer to pick out themes that happen to interest him, to the detriment of a more balanced treatment. One such topic is briefly alluded to in Professor Arnold Toynbee's general introduction to the volume: the quasi-religious character of Russian communism: a movement originating in a relatively backward country whose intellectuals were compelled to solve in a hurry a number of problems—political, cultural, even metaphysical—which in the West had lost some of their urgency. The contrast must not be pushed too far, for the secularisation of Russian Christianity (to which Berdyaev years ago drew attention as being *one* of the aspects of Bolshevism), has had its counterpart in the rise of communist mass movements in France and Italy: not accidentally countries whose culture was shaped by Roman Catholicism. At the risk of exceeding one's mandate, one may venture the suggestion that Russian communism was bound to be a failure on Protestant soil, and not for socio-economic reasons alone. Conversely, the growth of Christian-Democratic mass parties since 1945 has had problematic consequences not only for communists, but also for democratic socialists. Thus it seems fairly evident that what has hitherto blocked the emergence of social-democratic majorities in west Germany and Austria is not the social structure, but the enduring influence of the Catholic Church upon a section of the working-class electorate. That at least one prominent west European Leninist during the inter-war period was alive to this problem is evident from Professor John Cammett's recent biography of Antonio Gramsci.

By implication rather than directly, both Mr McInnes and Professor Lowenthal have something to say on this subject. One could wish they had said more. The 'superstructure' is where political conflict is fought out, and it was one of Lenin's achievements to have hammered this truth into the heads of socialists previously bemused by a species of economic determinism for which no genuine warrant existed in the writings of Marx or even of Engels. Mr McInnes is aware of Gramsci as a political strategist, but does not quite come to grips with the theoretical problems he posed for socialists who did not share his own enthusiasm for Lenin. Professor Lowenthal devotes a few pages to the (by now surely familiar) historical tradition linking the extreme wing of the French Revolution, by way of Buonarroti and Blanqui, with Lenin's 'Jacobin' predecessors in the *Narodnaya Volya*. He reproduces the standard Menshevik arguments against Lenin's concept of the party, while somehow managing to skirt around the dangerous topic of Plekhanov's own 'Jacobinism'. The fact is that Martov and Plekhanov were by no means agreed upon this crucial topic. It was after all

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Plekhanov who at the 1903 party congress exclaimed *salus revolutionis suprema lex*!—much to the delight of the future Bolsheviks present. The 'loyal opposition' to Leninist terrorism after 1917 was incarnated in the person of Martov, plus a handful of his closest supporters. Unfortunately (though not accidentally) they were all Jewish intellectuals: the right-wing Mensheviks from Georgia, being of a more practical turn of mind, had previously joined or supported the Kerensky government, and some of them were later to cooperate with the 'White' armies. Martov's 'Mensheviki-Internationalists'—like Rosa Luxemburg, and for the same reason—abhorred Bolshevism on account of its barbarous reversion to traditional Russian practices of government. It is arguable that they were not out of tune with political reality until Tsarism had committed suicide by plunging into war. But then a recent sympathetic biographer of Martov has drawn attention to the fact that, already on the eve of 1914, the Mensheviks were losing ground to their rivals in Petersburg and Moscow. Was Russia a country where democratic socialism could be expected to work? Could its leaders have dealt either with the agrarian problem or the nationalities tangle? At least one reader of Professor Seton-Watson's recently published Oxford history of Russia has his doubts on the subject.

Professor Wiles has the easiest task. In an entertaining polemic entitled 'Power without Influence', he records the antics of Soviet planners abroad, makes fun of Nkrumah's now defunct 'Afro-Marxism' (should this not have read 'Afro-Maoism'?), and concludes that the Soviet model is inoperative when exported to other lands. Unfortunately he spoils his case by introducing the customary liberal flippancies about Keynes v. Marx. It is one thing to say that real wages have a tendency to rise under (fully developed) capitalism: this piece of news would not have surprised the author of *Capital*, who was aware of it, though he did not think it very important, rising wages being quite compatible with cyclical crises. It is another matter to suggest that capitalism has the edge in trying to solve the problems of societies struggling with the familiar difficulties of 'take-off'. And it is sociological nonsense to assert (p. 268) that 'the capitalist state is above classes and can act, even in peacetime, in the interests of the whole nation'. For one thing, there is no such animal as a 'capitalist state'; there is merely a capitalist mode of production compatible with *any* kind of state—autocratic, democratic, or even Whiggish. Secondly, *no* state is 'above classes', except in the trivial sense that the government of the day may attempt to play off the major social groups against one another. Mr Wiles has been affected by the prevailing mindlessness of the Wilsonian era, or he would not have committed these journalistic excesses. With this proviso, his essay, like the other contributions to this volume, is to be welcomed.

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SINYAVSKY AND DANIEL ON TRIAL

Michael Glenny

THERE CAN SCARCELY BE A READER of *Survey* who does not know of this *cause célèbre*; if there are still any who have not read this book* about it they should remedy the omission. They should be warned, however, that it is not an easy book to read. *On Trial* is a work of record and not a pre-digested version of the story, and a first reading of it may be helped by being selective. The work is divided into five parts, the longest being the transcript of the trial itself: 1. *Background*; 2. *Pre-Trial Investigations*; 3. *The Trial*; 4. *The Aftermath*; 5. *Appendices*. Apart from photographs of the two central figures, the illustrations consist of some attractive but irrelevant photographs taken by Sinyavsky and his wife on holiday in northern Russia. The quality of these divisions of the book is as uneven as their length. Inevitably but sadly, the hardest portions to get through are Parts 2 and 3; inevitably, because they contain so much of the sickening, shifty, equivocating, repetitive and boring diatribes of the prosecuting authorities and their hired hacks; sadly, because the smuggled transcript of the trial makes jerky reading of the crux of the drama and its most tragic moment. It comes across like a distant broadcast that one strains to pick up on short wave—blurred by static and interrupted by ghostly bursts of morse code.

With the exception of the final pleas of the two accused it was, like all show trials, purposely misleading. To call it a trial at all is to a westerner something of a misnomer; it was no more than an arraignment, cruel in its length, feeble in its argument, and hectoring in its rhetoric, followed by verdict and sentence that were foregone conclusions. The harm that this travesty must have done to the Soviet government and to the CPSU within the USSR itself must be incalculable. Its staging bears the hallmarks of all the most retrograde and obscurantist elements of Stalinism which one had hoped were now so discredited as to be incapable of putting the Soviet judicial system to such use. Obviously one was wrong. It is, in fact, extraordinary to discover from *On Trial* that in theory at least two of the prime maxims of English jurisprudence are officially upheld in the Soviet courts—the presumption of innocence and the ban on prejudicial comment while a case is *sub judice*. Yet both these rules were so crassly violated in the Sinyavsky-Daniel case that by implication the authorities who staged the 'trial' are at complete liberty to manipulate the Constitution and the legal code whenever it suits their book—a fact from which countless Soviet citizens will undoubtedly have drawn their own conclusions.

If there is a serious gap in this otherwise very full compilation it is in not providing a penetrating and informed analysis of the process by which this ill-advised, indeed disastrous show trial came to be mounted

* **On Trial: The Case of Sinyavsky (Tertz) and Daniel (Arzhak).** Documents edited by Leopold Labedz and Max Hayward. London, 1967. Collins and Harvill Press. 42/-.

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at all. We might well have had less of the nauseating attacks on Sinyavsky and Daniel published by *Izvestiya* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (their content is not worth reproducing in full and could have been summarised in a few lines with equal effect); and would we really be the poorer for being spared those ten pages of names of worthy university teachers who signed letters of protest? Their space would have perhaps been better filled by a 'kremlinological' examination of the interplay of behind-the-scenes forces that led to the trial and the reasons why the 'right wing' was able to get away with a piece of political miscalculation which will one day bring nemesis on its perpetrators. It is the inconsistency of Soviet ideological policy on art and literature that is so puzzling to the outside observer and so unnerving to Soviet artists and writers. What are we to think of a regime which in the space of a few months permits the staging of whiplash satire like Aksyonov's comedy *Always on Sale*, the publication of such novels as Syomin's *Seven in One House*, and Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita*, which both, in their utterly different ways, totally reject the canons of 'socialist realism' and Marxist ideology, and yet is capable of trying writers on a criminal charge for the content of works published abroad (not in itself an offence) which were never likely to be read by the Soviet public? This seems to argue a state of dystrophy and insecurity amounting to sheer panic which, considering that it is being exhibited not by the incompetent despotism of some Central American banana republic but at the top level of a self-perpetuating oligarchy in absolute control of a massive super-power, gives rise to justified curiosity and fear. It is a study of this vital question which is lacking in *On Trial*.

IN OTHER RESPECTS, HOWEVER, it is an admirable collection of documentary material and comment, in which the compilers have been at pains to illumine the event from every relevant angle. In spite of its inevitable deficiencies, two undeniable features of great significance stand forth from the transcript of the trial: the fact that Sinyavsky and Daniel pleaded Not Guilty and spoke up bravely, patiently, and rationally in their own defence, and the fact that the transcript was made at all—in a courtroom packed with what was ostensibly a docile and 'loyal' claque. Even among that body there was an unsung 'village Hampden' willing to run great risks in the name of truth and justice. The affair is placed in perspective by the two editors—by Mr Hayward in his Introduction, which analyses both the content of Sinyavsky's and Daniel's works and the tortuous means used by the prosecution to make the charge 'stick' under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, and by Mr Labedz in his Epilogue. One of the most depressing points which Mr Labedz stresses is that although the accused were duly convicted, the Soviet authorities were sufficiently dismayed by the clumsiness of the proceedings to pass amendments to the Criminal Code which would 'make the suppression of literary and other forms of nonconformism still easier in future'.

A sympathetic memoir on 'Sinyavsky, The Man and The Writer' is contributed by Hélène Zamoyska, the Frenchwoman who knew Sinyavsky well and was responsible for transmitting his writings to the West. It is a valuable portrait, as are to lesser degrees the comments

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contributed by his other French friends, Michel and Alfreda Aucouturier and J. Bonamour; but by far the most profound and thought-provoking of these pieces is the one by Claude Frioux. Here, with the superb lucidity, care, and insight characteristic of the French, is an analysis of the crippling limitations of the Soviet ideological system combined with a truly sympathetic appreciation of where Sinyavsky and Daniel stand in the tradition of Russian thought. From this Sinyavsky in particular emerges as a moralist of great stature, whose spiritual formation appears to owe as much to the best of the Slavophils, to Dostoevsky, to Solovyov and Berdyaev—in short to the foremost thinkers produced by Russian Orthodox Christianity—as it does to the tradition of critical materialism represented by Belinsky, Pisarev, and Chernyshevsky. There is a moral passion about Sinyavsky which can only be termed religious. *On Trial* is the indispensable record of his and Daniel's martyrdom. One closes the book with a sense of having witnessed their assumption of the title last borne by Tolstoy and until now vacant—*sovest Rossii*, the conscience of Russia.

TWO REWARDING STUDIES

Violet Conolly

HENRI CHAMBRE'S STUDY OF Soviet economic development is a remarkable book on many counts.* Its scope alone is unusual and welcome, and not immediately indicated by its title. In addition to the major essay on the economic development of the Soviet Union, there are valuable chapters on economic growth in such important regions as the Kuzbas and Kazakhstan, and a final section on the Soviet 'doctrine' of aid to the developing countries of the 'third world'. The whole work impresses by its meticulous scholarship, its mastery of Soviet and non-Soviet material, its detached judgments, and the precise elegance of its style—a quality too often lacking in economic treatises.

Soviet economic development is examined here historically and analytically, and its problems and achievements receive equally balanced attention. Soviet economic historians for the most part find it convenient to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union started the process of socialist industrialisation from an inherited infra-structure of railways, factories, heavy and manufacturing industries, banks, agriculture, and a skilled working class of some strength, which undoubtedly contributed to the country's rapid economic growth in the early stages. It is too often forgotten, as stressed by the author, that Tsarist Russia in the thirty-five years preceding the first world war was among the European countries showing the greatest economic growth and that, however ravaged by war and civil war, much of this development survived into the Soviet period.

Soviet economic growth has been propelled by certain 'levers' and

* Henri Chambre. **Union Soviétique et Développement Économique.** Préface de François Perroux. Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1967, pp. 430.

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retarded by certain ' brakes ', both largely implicit in the Soviet political-economic system. The chief levers are identified by Chambre as the peculiar investment policies, creation of coal-steel bases, the organisation of labour and specialist training, and, of lesser import, research and development and trade. The government's centralised control of industry made possible the direction of investment to priority sections and in the first place to producer industries, while light and food industries, transport and agriculture, were starved of capital until at various times of crisis they threatened to become a bottle-neck for the economy as a whole (p. 70). Though there has been a more equable distribution of investment since Stalin's death, heavy industry retains its priority over other sectors of investment. And in spite of many aberrations, it was this policy of forced emphasis on heavy industry which transformed Russia into a great industrial power in the short pre-war planned period. For the post-war period, Chambre's conclusion is that while the growth of production roughly corresponded to that of investment in the years 1950–63, the return on industrial capital diminished.

Soviet economic growth has been retarded by internal brakes of considerable gravity, both structural and institutional. In the first place, there is the ' almost endemic phenomenon of the large volume of industrial constructions unfinished in the stipulated time and carried over from one plan to another (annual or five-year) ' (p. 207), and in some years even exceeding the annual total of investments financed by the state plan. The resulting delays in commissioning new industrial enterprises adversely affect the growth of the whole economy. Père Chambre's statistical survey shows that in the most recent (1962, 1963) years studied, the engineering, metallurgy, and chemical industries seem to have had a worse record in this respect than other industries, e.g. oil, coal, power. Other brakes disrupting the planned order of Soviet development are over-specialisation leading to heavy and costly cross-hauls of raw materials and finished products, lack of coordination between production and construction plans, and a vast dispersion of work-sites often inadequately provided with credits for working purposes. Then there are the institutional brakes, which in their way also slow down growth and, indirectly, efforts to raise the standard of living of the Soviet population. Such are the authoritative and bureaucratic attitude of centralised and administrative planning, the party's control of the entire economic apparatus, ' which is often abusive and creates at the lower levels a climate of favouritism, insecurity, or dissatisfaction among management and workers of economic enterprises '. The wealth of technical detail adduced in support of these contentions reflects the author's unusual combination of engineering and economic expertise, a combination which will surely be more and more necessary for analysts of the increasingly complex Soviet economic system.

THE ENORMOUS AREA OF KAZAKHSTAN, one-eighth of the Soviet Union and five times as large as France, is studied as the prototype of Soviet development of internal underdeveloped territories, being the largest and one of the richest of these territories. The Kazakh pattern of development also has international significance as underlying Soviet plans for the development of underdeveloped areas outside the Soviet Union. The

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conventional Soviet policy of industrialisation, with its emphasis on the extractive industries, has transformed the former nomadic stockbreeding Kazakh lands into an ' industrialised zone ' where the old preponderance of agriculture has yielded place to industrial production in the economy. This change is largely due to the development of the rich resources of non-ferrous metals, coal, and particularly black copper and lead (much of which is still refined outside the republic). Apart from these industries, the build-up in the post-war period of the food and engineering industries in Alma-Ata is of considerable importance. As a result of the evacuation of industrial plant and staff to Alma-Ata during the last war, this erstwhile hamlet has blossomed into the impressive industrial capital of Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan is now the principal Soviet base for the production of copper, zinc, and lead. Industrialisation was long hampered by the failure to provide a corresponding infra-structure of railways and roads (in recent years the position has been greatly improved), while neglect of living conditions in the big new urban industrial complexes, often situated in areas of very harsh climate, created serious labour problems. As far as social amenities are concerned, both urban housing and schools leave much to be desired; even quantitatively, both are below the average for the Union as a whole. It is also interesting to learn that the number of Kazakhs with a higher or middle school education recorded by the 1959 census was much lower than either that of the Soviet average or that of the Slav, Tatar, or Uzbek groups inhabiting the republic.

The economic development of Kazakhstan has been plagued by the excessive dispersal of construction sites, bureaucratism, the faulty distribution of supplies and equipment characteristic of the Soviet economy as a whole, and the number of unfinished projects which had to be carried over from plan to plan. Kazakhstan's development has not followed a very different path under the Soviets from that of other retarded areas under non-socialist direction, priority being given to exploiting its rich mineral resources and exporting these products to other regions of the Soviet Union. This pattern is, however, now changing with the expansion of the processing industries and the creation of many new light and especially textile industries.

The development of industry and agriculture has had far-reaching effects on the population structure of the country. One of the reasons alleged for raising Kazakhstan to federal status in 1936 was the autochthonous Kazakh majority. Owing to the large post-war influx of migrants, mainly of Slav origin, to work the new plants and mines and the ' virgin lands ', this no longer exists. According to the 1959 census, the Kazakh element was only 30 per cent of the total population, being thus reduced to minority status in its own country. The expansion of the non-Kazakh element is especially marked among the technical and executive-managerial classes; this, in Henri Chambre's view, facilitates the integration of Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union, in line with the aims of Soviet nationality policy since 1923 (p. 354).

Throughout this work the reader is constantly warned about the exaggerations of Soviet growth statistics resulting from the distortions involved in the peculiar Soviet methods of compiling production indices. This applies as much to the extremely rapid growth of Kazakhstan

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(which is not denied, though allowance must be made for exaggeration in the case of Soviet statistics of growth) as to that of the Soviet Union.

In the final section of this book, Soviet doctrines regarding economic aid to the developing countries of the 'third world' are expounded, while the application of these principles in the form of aid to particular countries is briefly surveyed. The summary of Soviet writing on this subject calls, I think, for a more critical annotation than it receives here in order to put its aims and practices in realistic prospective.

Like so many French books of quality, this admirable work lacks an index and a bibliography. The sketch maps are scarcely up to the standard of the text. It is regrettable that a book published in 1967 should not (perhaps owing to the exigencies of a publisher's deadline) at least cover the important material on the results of the seven-year plan released in 1966. As a result, some of Père Chambre's conclusions are unnecessarily tentative, notably regarding the preposterous delays in the construction of the 'Third Metallurgical Base' in western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan which still continue to haunt that project.

L'Union Soviétique † presents a well documented chart of the political institutions of the Soviet Union. Unlike Henri Chambre's study of Soviet economic development, it has its counterpart in various English works, but French students may find it very useful. The disparity between the democratic forms of Soviet political institutions and the counter-balancing forces of party dictatorship emerges sharply from this study. The similarity of the titles of these two works is unfortunate and must at times lead to confusion.

DEDIJER'S ROAD TO SARAJEVO

Stevan K. Pavlowitch

VLADIMIR DEDIJER'S massive book on the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand* is interesting on account of its author almost as much as of its subject-matter. Born in 1914, Dedijer started life as a reporter on the staff of the Belgrade daily *Politika* before the war. During the war he joined the communist resistance and quickly rose in the party's agitprop section. After the revolution and liberation, he became Marshal Tito's biographer and propagandist, and was elected to the central committee of the CPY in 1952. Then, in 1954, his association with Milovan Djilas was to prove a turning point in his career. Having defended Djilas's right to free expression, if not his ideas, he was expelled from the CC. ('He left the League of Communists in 1954', says the Yugoslav encyclopaedia.) The following

† **L'Union Soviétique. Introduction à l'Étude de ses Institutions.** Deuxième Edition, revue et augmentée. Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1967, pp. 239.

* Vladimir Dedijer, **The Road to Sarajevo**, Eng. transl. London, McGibbon and Kee, 1967, 550 pp.

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year he was sentenced to a six-month suspended term of prison. He taught modern history at Belgrade University for a while and was eventually allowed to leave Yugoslavia. From 1960 to 1965, research fellowships and visiting professorships took him to British and American universities, where he spent four years investigating the Sarajevo murder.

The origins of Dr Dedijer's interest in this topic are personal. Like Gavrilo Princip, he is a Serb from Bosnia. One of his maternal uncles had been a 'Young Bosnian'; his father, a friend of Colonel Dimitrijevic —'Apis', of 'Black Hand' fame. From his youth he had been interested in one of the leaders of the Young Bosnia revolutionary movement, Vojislav Gacinovic, who had close contacts with the Russian revolutionaries. In the summer of 1964, the manuscript of the English-language edition was ready, and it was announced that the author, who was returning to Yugoslavia, had been appointed a research adviser to the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade.

A decade had passed since his expulsion from the CPY's Central Committee and a large-scale public relations campaign was launched in Yugoslavia announcing the impending simultaneous publication of *Sarajevo 1914* in Serbo-Croat (Cyrillic and Latin-script editions), Slovene, French, German and Italian. The first to come out was the American edition in September 1966. The British appeared in April the following year. In between the two, the Yugoslav editions appeared. Both editions are voluminous and have an impressive scholarly paraphernalia, especially the Yugoslav, double the size of the English, with its 142 pages of notes, 22 of bibliography, and 108 of illustrations.

HITHERTO, ALL THOSE WHO HAVE dealt with the Sarajevo assassination have had an axe to grind; their more or less tendentious interpretations were dictated by the desire to pin the blame on someone. Not that Dr Dedijer had no axe of his own to grind, but his is to place the assassination back where it originated—in Bosnia itself, and he is therefore much more impartial vis-à-vis all those forces hitherto blamed, the more so as he has analysed all the sources available, personally and through an army of research assistants, in Belgrade and Sarajevo, in Vienna, Bonn, and Paris, as well as in the United States, with its rich sources from east European archives. Finally, he has corresponded with and cross-examined many survivors of that period.

Previous research on the murder of 28 June 1914 has been almost exclusively of a political and diplomatic nature. Dr Dedijer's characteristic mixture of nationalism and Marxism has led him to concentrate on economic and social conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has studied both the assassins and their victims and their *milieux*, the relations of the conspirators with Serbia and the outer world, the carrying out of the act and all versions of their motives. He has given us an evaluation of the historical sources on which the various interpretations of the conspiracy are based. Most of the details were known already, but they had been unearthed one after the other to further this or that thesis on responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Dr Dedijer is interested not in this but in showing, once and for all, that the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914 was, from beginning to end, the work, not of foreign governments, services, or

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movements, but of the revolutionary youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of that generation of South Slav romantic nationalists in the Habsburg monarchy who were the first to think in terms of a break-up of the centuries-old dynastic state, who were passionate enough both to dream of a new future for their country and to sacrifice their lives for it. We now have, for the first time in a western language, a study of the Young Bosnians, of their psychology, their politics, and their background, by a man born in their province and into the generation of their sons.

Unfortunately, the thoroughness of his analysis, not only in depth but in breadth, often takes him away from the Yugoslav lands of the early twentieth century, to subjects, lands, peoples, and periods of which he has no grasp, and where the lack of a professional historical training too often shows through. This is particularly true of the first chapters. His views on the Habsburg 'invasion' and the Turkish 'occupation' are as ridiculous as anything the most romantic of nationalist Balkan historians ever wrote in the nineteenth century. Had the author cared to attend a symposium recently held in Yugoslavia 'on the problems of teaching national history', he might have learnt something about the subtler approach to these questions that Yugoslav historians are now trying to instil into the teaching of their country's earlier history.

Dr Dedijer has rightly tried to assess the personality of the victim as well as that of the conspirators. Apart from Rudolf Kiszling, who published a biography of the archduke in Vienna in 1953, he is the first historian to have exhaustively used Francis Ferdinand's papers and he rightly complains that Kiszling's work—that of a Habsburg legitimist—is not objective. Dr Dedijer's analysis of the sources is both more thorough and more objective. Nevertheless, much in the three chapters devoted to Francis Ferdinand is trivial and irrelevant; Dr Dedijer seems incapable of understanding the mentality or the way of life of a Habsburg prince. His use of such terms as 'medieval' and 'feudal' is journalistic rather than historical. All too often he judges retrospectively, hence anachronistically, in terms of later events. For him, to dub Francis Ferdinand an anti-semite is sufficient evidence, after the experience of nazism, of the ugliness of his character. Francis Ferdinand's anti-semitism should be placed in its proper perspective. It was part of a tradition that made nazi anti-semitism possible, yet Francis Ferdinand's dislike of Jews had no tinge of pathological pseudo-scientific racialism. He disliked Jews in the same way as he disliked freemasons, socialists, and Magyars. They were all forces that had developed outside and to the detriment of Habsburg power. In fact, the archduke was very much more anti-Magyar than anti-semite, as clearly appears in the book itself, but Dr Dedijer does not seem to think that hatred of the Hungarians is as damning (if 'racial' at all) as hatred of the Jews.

Francis Ferdinand was a man of more than average intelligence, with the prejudices of his station and age, but capable of overcoming these and of thinking for himself; he had a strong sense of humour, an understanding of the realities of power, and great political acumen. All

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this emerges from Dr Dedijer's *Sarajevo*, as it does indeed from the more subtle, if less exhaustive approach to the question by the Italian historian Leo Valiani in his recent and brilliant *La dissoluzione dell' Austria-Ungheria* (Milan, 1966). This is characteristic of Dedijer's prejudiced but nevertheless basic honesty. He starts by bluntly stating his case and then goes on to give the evidence which, more often than not, does not prove his point, but always allows the reader to come to his own conclusions. But if he cannot understand the workings of Francis Ferdinand the archduke, he gets closer to assessing Francis Ferdinand the politician. He points out the difficulties of pinning down in an unbiased way the intentions of a man who was never able to put them into practice and whose talent for manoeuvring was far-ranging.

WHEN DEALING WITH THE YOUNG BOSNIA movement Dr Dedijer instinctively shows insight. Much is now being written in Yugoslavia about it and several important works have recently contributed to throwing more light on *Mlada Bosna*. Dr Dedijer's research follows that of other Yugoslav scholars. *Mlada Bosna* designated not so much an organisation as a generation. It was part of the spontaneous revolutionary nationalist ferment among the Yugoslav youth of the Habsburg dominions which had been rising ever since the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. In these two provinces the feeling of revolt among the young was especially bitter, at once political, social, and nationalist. The Sarajevo conspiracy was not born in isolation and, for once, it is useful to link it with all the different revolutionary strands spreading throughout the South Slav territories of Austria-Hungary—the students' and workers' strikes, the demonstrations and repressions, the dozen or so previous plots against state dignitaries, the links with the universities and high schools, the political parties and the secret societies of the Kingdom of Serbia.

Dr Dedijer's terms of reference are rigid; he judges the national, political, religious, and social ideas of his characters as 'progressive' or 'reactionary', using the standards of the Yugoslav establishment of 1967, which have little in common with the standards of the particular region at the particular time he is studying. He tells us that the Young Bosnians advocated a federal structure for the future Yugoslav state and that, in the short period of their activity, they passed from the 'chauvinistic' atmosphere of their family background to this progressive view. It is true that, during this short period, the idea of collaboration between Serbs and Croats among the revolutionary youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina came to relative maturity. But the Serbian or Croatian peasant *milieux* from which they sprang were not 'chauvinistic': they were merely closed and inward-looking. Nor were these ideas limited to their province, although the author rightly points out that Bosnia became a link between the different Yugoslav territories. Such ideas were rampant among the young intelligentsia of Croatia, of Dalmatia, of Slovenia, and of Serbia. Conditions were ripening everywhere, political horizons were broadening, society was being loosened up, economic change was progressing fast, the cultural message of the Yugoslav movement was spreading. Nor did these generations invent such ideas. The great precursors are virtually ignored by Dr Dedijer, who only mentions, *en*

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passant, the figure of Bishop Strossmayer, the great apostle of Serbo-Croatian harmony, for whom a deepening of true nationalism (Croatian or Serbian) and true Christianity (Catholic or Orthodox) led to a better understanding, and not to greater antagonism, between Yugoslavs.

Dr Dedijer concludes that it would be wrong to identify *Mlada Bosna* with any foreign ideological influence, and he admits that it would be wrong to link them systematically with any one ideology. They were of peasant stock, instinctive rebels against foreign rule, and the products of their natural environment. To a certain extent, the executants, as opposed to the leaders of the movement, were misfits even in their own environment. They were dissatisfied with their own selves as much as with the state of their homeland. There were unconscious personal psychological reasons behind their acts, as well as national, political, and social ones. The leaders of *Mlada Bosna* did not advocate political terrorism, but their ideas of mass revolution and cultural emancipation were not powerful enough to eradicate the tradition of tyrannicide which the young revolutionaries had inherited through their knowledge of Serbian folk poetry. The idea is an interesting one, although it does not explain why the plotters so often hesitated to kill: as the author is at pains to show, the list of attempts abandoned is as long as that of attempts carried through. The chapters dealing with the actual conspiracy are among the best in the book.

He admits the difficulty of tracing the origins of the conspiracy because of the dearth of primary sources, but the tentative explanation he gives is convincing enough. It seems that it was directed originally against General Potiorek, the governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was switched to Francis Ferdinand only when news that the heir to the throne would attend the summer manoeuvres there was released in March 1914. It is still a matter of controversy whether the decision to kill the archduke was taken by the secret Bosnian youth organisation in Belgrade or by their friends in Sarajevo. In reconstituting the details of the plot and of its execution, Dr Dedijer makes an extremely critical use of the accounts of eye-witnesses, as these were either not at the centre of things, or survived and thus inevitably tended to exaggerate their share in the events at the expense of those who died. The assassination was the result of luck and of a series of favourable circumstances, for never was an attempt more hesitatingly and more amateurishly planned. The conclusion to which the author does not actually come in so many words, but to which his evidence and narrative point, is that it was the rivalry between the civil authorities and the military, in Austro-Hungarian Bosnia as well as in the Kingdom of Serbia, that enabled the conspirators to carry out their coup.

THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS at the trial shed all the light needed on their motives: they had conspired to murder the archduke who symbolised the foreign tyranny that held sway over their country. This was obvious enough, but their motives could have coincided with other motives in other circles, and Dr Dedijer analyses all the factors which, at one time or another, have been made responsible, in Serbia and Russia, in Hungary and Germany, and even in France and Great Britain. The chapter on 'Serbia and Sarajevo' is the most important

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from the traditional point of view, and the one in which the work is probably definitive. New evidence will no doubt fill in details, but not alter the picture. From the start, the Vienna government wanted to show that the conspiracy was the work of the Serbian government, although no evidence could be found to this effect. The key to Serbia's responsibility (or lack of responsibility) lies mainly in the records of the Serbian Royal Household and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were twice removed by the enemy, in the two world wars. When in Austro-German hands, these records were tendentiously manipulated; when in Yugoslav hands betwen the wars they were hidden, not because the Belgrade government wanted to hide possible links with the Sarajevo conspirators, but because some of these documents referred to internal matters which involved the same people said to have been linked with Sarajevo and which the Serbian and later Yugoslav royal government did not wish to reveal.

These people, as every reader will know, were the controversial Apis and the 'Black Hand'. Apis was really Colonel Dimitrijevic and the Black Hand was the secret society called 'Union or Death'. They played an important part in Serbian history, and, in order to understand it, one has to go back to the coup of May 1903 that ended the Obrenovic dynasty. Dr Dedijer goes back to the origin; this is a long story that started in 1903 and ended in 1917, in which 1914 was just an episode—an episode which international repercussions magnified out of recognition. 'Union or Death', alias the 'Black Hand', the secret society of officers involved in the 1903 coup, not only unofficially controlled the army in Serbia thereafter, but increasingly acted as a pressure group furthering an actively nationalist foreign policy. In studying its aims and activity, Dr Dedijer has made use of new sources of evidence, the most important of which is the work of reminiscences about personalities he had known, by the great Yugoslav historian Slobodan Jovanovic, published posthumously in Canada.

What were the links between the Young Bosnians and the Black Handers? After Serbia's victories in the Balkan Wars, the new generation of Young Bosnians, many of whom had fought as volunteers in the Serbian army under the orders of the Bosnian-born and prominent Black Hander Major Tankosic, had had contacts with the secret society. Yet, in spite of their common nationalism and wish to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a marked difference of outlook between the praetorian officers, for whom assassination could be but a political weapon, and the anarchic youths, who would certainly not have exchanged Austro-Hungarian rule for Serbian para-military rule, and for whom political assassination was almost an act of faith. Apis let Tankosic provide the weapons and smuggle Princip across the border. He did not initiate the plot. Nevertheless, he could have prevented it. Why didn't he? Jovanovic has suggested that Apis let the Young Bosnians go ahead because he feared the Germans had given the Austrians a free hand to crush Serbia: by allowing the attempt on Francis Ferdinand he believed that, far from risking war, he would cause confusion in the enemy ranks and force the war party in Vienna to postpone its designs against Serbia. Quite probably, Colonel Dimitrijevic did not believe the attempt would succeed. On the basis of circumstantial

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evidence, Dr Dedijer now suggests a simpler and not unlikely answer: by authorising Tankosic to issue the young men with weapons and to facilitate their return to Sarajevo, Dimitrijevic perhaps believed that they would probably not succeed in killing the archduke, but would certainly cause tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and thus weaken the position of Pasic, the Serbian prime minister.

Did the Serbian government know anything of this ? That the regent and government of Serbia were in any way involved in the assassination not only cannot be proved, but is most unlikely—as the author conclusively shows. Pasic did, however, receive information that armed young men had crossed the border into Bosnia on the night of 1–2 June. This was not an unusual incident, and the authorities did not know that they were on their way to kill the Austro-Hungarian heir. Nevertheless, in view of the archduke's forthcoming visit to Sarajevo, Pasic did discuss the information with members of his cabinet, ordered an enquiry, issued instructions to stop any further crossings and to try to stop the young men. When he realised the government was taking the matter far more seriously than he had envisaged, Apis himself tried to stop the conspirators.

Did the Serbian government pass such information as it had to the Austro-Hungarian? Dr Dedijer comes to the conclusion that it did not do so officially. The only certain thing is that the Serbian minister in Vienna visited the minister responsible for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, in a devious way, told him there might be danger for the archduke in Sarajevo. The minister does not seem to have passed the information on (' I had no right to interfere in military matters ', he later wrote). It would have been difficult, Dr Dedijer explains, for the Serbian government to issue an official warning: it knew nothing concrete, and, with the tense relations existing between the two states, such a warning on so flimsy a basis would have been considered an attempt to meddle in Austria-Hungary's internal affairs and to stop the visit.

Vladimir Dedijer is both a Marxist and a nationalist, but he has been blinded neither by his nationalism nor by his Marxism. The one and the other, as well as his lack of proper historical training, have been the cause of innumerable prejudices and misinterpretations of detail, but they have not influenced the trend of his book. He can be erroneous in his statements and arguments, but he always tells us what they are based on.

PORTRAITS OF REVOLUTIONARIES

Sheila Fitzpatrick

THIS IS A COLLECTION of profiles of Russian revolutionary politicians, mainly Bolshevik, by one of themselves.* Its author was a Bolshevik

* A. V. Lunacharsky, **Revolutionary Silhouettes,** translated and edited by Michael Glenny, introduction by Isaac Deutscher. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press (London, 1967). 35s.

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who lived mainly in emigration before 1917 (for part of that time alienated from the Bolshevik group), and held office as Commissar for Education from 1917 until 1929. He was of the old generation of Bolsheviks, and shared their love of literature but not their political factiousness. He loved art, as a bond between people, and hated faction-fighting, as a breaking of bonds. He disapproved of the narrow party spirit which dominated emigré politics. The pettiness of revolutionaries was at odds with his sense of the grandeur of the revolution.

For Lunacharsky, 1917 turned the successful revolutionaries into heroes. It is characteristic of his real egalitarianism that he begrudged the heroic dimension to no one, and even grieved for such men as Plekhanov and Martov, who rejected it. This is one aspect of his profiles. But Lunacharsky does not idealise his subjects. He has as sharp an eye for personality as Sukhanov, if more charitable: see, for example, his description of Trotsky, who 'treasures his historical role and would probably be ready to make any personal sacrifice . . . in order to go down in human memory surrounded by the aureole of a genuine revolutionary leader'; or of Sverdlov, who 'was transparently free of personal ambition . . . to such a degree that he was somehow faceless'.

Lunacharsky is best of all at noticing the personal style of his subjects: Sverdlov's black leather suit 'which shone like the coat of a well-groomed labrador'; Volodarsky's public speaking, which reminded him of Mayakovsky—'his voice seemed to print the words—it had a graphic poster-like quality with a metallic ring to it'. Since Lunacharsky's political milieu had been one of oratory and argument, these are the talents he appreciates as a professional. He recognises Volodarsky, 'the terrorist', and Sverdlov, 'the clandestine operator' and magnificent organiser, as something new in his experience of revolutionaries, and wonders whether Sverdlov's talents were not more appropriate to the underground period of the party than to the period of proletarian dictatorship. (In 1924, in the journal *Proletarian Revolution*, Stalin wrote an appreciation of Sverdlov as an exemplary proletarian 'leader-organiser', whose abilities, Stalin suggests, could not be appreciated by old Bolshevik literati in charge of inefficient Commissariats.)

Revolutionary Silhouettes is scarcely a political document, just as Lunacharsky was scarcely a politician. He took no position in the factional struggle of 1923, the year in which the book was published. The things he was concerned with touched party factional politics only obliquely. He held, for example, a position in the literary-political debate which offended Trotsky; he had an official position as Commissar for Education in which he was much harassed by Zinoviev. But these considerations are not reflected in the profiles of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

In fact, the chapters on Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Martov were written in 1919, and were published by Grzhebin together with a long article entitled 'My Party History'. The 1919 chapter on Zinoviev, which was cursory and not very flattering, was expanded in 1923 with a favourable commentary on Zinoviev's work in the Comintern. But it seems unlikely that, as Trotsky later claimed in his autobiography, this was an attempt to build up Zinoviev's prestige—at any rate, not at Trotsky's expense. The six chapters added in 1923 are obituaries of

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Plekhanov, Sverdlov, Volodarsky, Uritsky, and the Proletcultists F. I. Kalinin and Bessalko.

There is no chapter on Stalin, nor any comment on him. Deutscher remarks in his introduction to the present volume: 'It is inconceivable that Lunarcharsky should not have been aware how loud his silence on Stalin spoke.' This is true, though Lunacharsky might have retorted that Stalin, not having been in emigration with him, did not qualify for inclusion in 1919; nor did he qualify by death in 1923. It is of interest that Lunacharsky did make a clear if Aesopian attack on Stalin as potential dictator in a speech given a few days after Lenin's death in January 1924 ('Lenin i molodezh', republished in *Prometei*, vol. 1, Moscow, 1966).

The present edition is handsomely produced, with an interesting introduction by Deutscher. The translation is very good, the editing less so. It seems doubtful that the two Proletcultists deserved inclusion, but if they did, more annotation is necessary. The notes are less reliable than those of the parallel Soviet edition (*Siluety*, Moscow, 1965), which Mr Glenny refers to in a surprisingly ungenerous way. The chapters on Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Martov, as well as the two Proletcultists, are omitted from the Soviet edition, and there are considerable omissions from the text that is published. But these omissions are marked. I. A. Sats, formerly Lunacharsky's literary secretary, who edited the book, replied to a query from the present reviewer that '*all* changes—abbreviations—are marked [. . .] unless they were made or marked for future republication by Lunacharsky himself'. To have published any of *Revolutionary Silhouettes* in Moscow was an achievement, and it seems churlish to complain of editing which is of a high standard. Mr Glenny may be thankful that his own editing was done under less arduous circumstances.

INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR

C. G. Bogefeldt

THE GROWING INTEREST in Soviet affairs, among both students and the general public in Sweden, has induced two Swedish research workers to write this *Introduction to Soviet Society*.* There is nothing extraordinary in the book, nor was there meant to be, but its hundred pages serve their purpose. They make use of the increasing amount of information on new tendencies in Soviet politics and economics that is now reaching us. These tendencies, say the authors, are often analysed with insufficient regard to their wider context in Soviet institutions generally. Hence it is important to give an outline of the basic economic and political conditions in Soviet society.

In comparison with what has already appeared on this subject, this is a very clear and up-to-date study. It consists of three parts, the first

* **Introduktion till Sovjetsamhället,** by Gunnar Nordenstam and P. Göran Ennerfelt. Almqvist & Wiksell/Gebers Förlag AB Stockholm 1967.

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two, covering the Communist Party and the Administration, written by Gunnar Nordenstam, and the third, on the economy, by P. Göran Ennerfelt. Nordenstam takes as his starting point the implications of Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution, which says that 'the most active and conscious citizens . . . voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which forms the workers' vanguard in their struggle to build a communist society', and then analyses the role, history, organisation, membership, and recruiting system of the CPSU; this serves as background for the chapter on Administration, dealing with the official institutions and their connection with the Communist Party. It is a well-balanced survey which gives the principles and some good examples of the governmental process in the USSR.

The most interesting part of the book, however, is the chapter on the economy, where Ennerfelt deals with the problems of the Soviet economy, reports on the 'Liberman' debate, and discusses the different schools of economic thinking in the Soviet Union. Some criticisms could be made of the figures used, but as a whole it leaves a very good impression.

OBITUARY FOR A FUTURIST

In Memory of Aleksander Wat

Richard Lourie

Aleksander Wat was a friend and contributor to this journal. He was born in 1900 and died on 29 July 1967 in Paris, after a long illness, the result of the long years spent in Stalin's prisons and labour camps. He was one of the initiators of literary futurism in Poland, a precursor of surrealism, and a friend of many Soviet poets and writers. He was editor of the communist Literary Monthly *in Warsaw between 1929 and 1931, when it was closed by the police and Wat was imprisoned. In 1940 he was imprisoned again in Lvov, this time by the Soviet police. After years of suffering he returned to Warsaw in 1946, and immediately manifested his opposition to Stalinist policy, which made him once again the target of persecution, this time by the Polish communist authorities. He was particularly embarrassing to them, being one of the few survivors of the original pro-communist group among Polish writers in the twenties and early thirties. In 1957, after a long silence, he published a book of poems for which he received the literary prize of the Warsaw journal,* Nowa Kultura *(since closed). He left Poland in the same year for reasons of health, but did not return for political reasons, as the hopes of the Polish October of 1956 did not materialize. Subsequently, he became the object of a defamatory campaign in the Polish press. He contributed an article on Tertz-Sinyavsky to* Survey *(No. 41, April 1962) under the pseudonym Stefan Bergholz. He also presented a paper at a conference on Soviet literature organized jointly by* Survey *and St. Antony's College in Oxford.*

L. L.

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I MET ALEKSANDER WAT, for me always Pan Wat, near the end of his life when death was already snatching at his ankles. In the hours we spent together he showed me much of himself—Wat the poet, Wat the comic, Wat the lover of nature and human culture whose special talent was to move along the outer margin of life (as he called it) and to see the world complete; this was the source of his poems, his strength, and his laughter. There was yet another aspect to him, one that seemed to contain all the others: Wat the survivor; for he had made it through the nightmare of our century, with his skin and his spirit intact. And if those years of war and prison had broken his health, they had also given him things few men ever get to touch, let alone hold—a measure of genuine authority and the good cheer of the wise.

Not that he wasn't vain, hypochondriacal, and fond of attention—he loved to complain, smiled proudly when his wife brought him the requested blanket, spreading it carefully for him on his lap, and he was always marvellously dapper. I had to laugh when he told me 'cut off that moustache and the long hair. Real poets have no need of such nonsense', as he stood there before me, his soft felt hat at a slant both rakish and whimsical, an umbrella dangling elegantly from his arm, and his hair and own moustache so silvery and well cared for. He was always giving me advice, categorical imperatives: 'Don't strive to be original.' 'Don't take drugs.' And I understood that all those indulgences were his rightfully, that they had been paid for by a life.

We were friends because we enjoyed and made good use of each other. For him an audience and a pupil, for me a teacher, that is, an example. We would usually meet in the afternoon and talk through twilight until dinnertime; no one remembered to turn on the lights and I would watch Wat slowly vanish into the fading light against the window. He lived in a modern, typical California motel-like apartment and never felt at home there, or in the state itself. It was the weather, or the lack of it that bothered him—good for his bones, it was bad for his soul. 'Every memory that I have', he once told me, 'is connected with some *paysage*, some season. But here . . .' A wave and a shrug at the world outside, and in the end he preferred Paris—an old city, the old world; those centuries of culture and the wheel of seasons drew him back and he could not have been true to himself if they hadn't.

Wat's English was reading English, as was my Polish, so we conversed on the common ground of Russian. Sometimes his excited speed, his false teeth, and the natural hiss and sizzle of his Polish accent would leave me far behind—I would pant after him, then give up, smile and nod, in a curious way freed to watch the play of his hands (not an old man's hands, but the hands of a large child, pure, unused) and eyes, which told me something that his words never could; that something was the man himself, and if any of him is to live here, it must be subtly as an aroma, for the words themselves do not suffice.

In those hours we spoke of everything—civilisations, the war, the Poles, the Russians, the Jews (it even turned out that we were somehow distant cousins), youth, America, poetry of course, poetry and women ('A poet must have a beautiful wife'—Wat's third law for the poet). More than once I saw Wat engage another Polish poet, Czeslaw Milosz, in the east European ritual family argument, that labyrinthine hide and

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seek of literature and politics whose rules are almost inscrutable; to observe it is a pleasure, but for an outsider to participate is to court a headache. The game requires a tremendous knowledge of detail; it is not enough to know someone's works and career, but also his place and date of birth, class, ancestry, schooling, politics, friends, family life, everything both intimate and public. I was reminded of those odd beings who formerly existed in Europe whose occupation and sole delight was in memorising the lineage and descent of everyone important and knowing all their business besides (there's usually one of them in each of Dostoevsky's novels). In this ritual both participants speak loudly, rapidly, wittily, and simultaneously, until one of them backs down into silence, waiting for the course of thought to curve, so the second round can begin. I saw in Milosz's eyes what I felt in myself—a wonderful, rare combination of enjoyment and respect, and the knowledge that it was all play, that Wat was the old man and to be listened to, and that all of us, Wat, Milosz, and I knew it, which only increased the fun.

In Wat there was a strong streak of fun, of Marx Brothers' (especially Groucho) zaniness; one of his poems begins 'Whenever I meet an elephant I ask him for his doctor's address.' Although he had broken with the forms of his religion (at one time he wore a cross, at others he was an atheist, about the end I know nothing), he preserved its comic spirit, or rather he relived the conditions of historical misfortune that had produced it, and found it his own, like the right to vanity and respect. If he was a man without religion, he was by no means without faith. On the contrary, he was faith in action—a bouncy, chipper spirit, both tough and resilient. He refreshed that spirit at the margin of life which he used to demonstrate to me with a pencil. The pencil (it was right there at hand, but there are no accidents either) was life, the mind of the poet expanded and moved along it, then returned to life full of the energy for poetry and laughter.

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